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ABSTRACT
HOW TWO-LEVEL ENTREPRENEURSHIP WORKS:
A CASE STUDY OF RATCHETING UP A EUROPE-WIDE EMPLOYMENT
STRATEGY
SEPTEMBER 2002
CHRISTINE U. ARNOLD, B.A. UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Eric S. Einhom
European institutions have in recent years increased their competence in the field
of employment policy. This dissertation analyses why and how the European
Commission was finally successful in increasing its competence in this field. This
dissertation details the precise mechanisms by using the context of the development of
employment policy since the early 1990s on the level of the European Union.
The explanation offered links the literature on policy analysis and two-level
entrepreneurship with the formal and informal roles of the European Commission. The
thesis argues that the timing and content of Europe -wide employment measures was
crucially influenced by a multi-step ratcheting process orchestrated by the Commission.
This process aimed at gradually representing and activating latent interests within the
Member States and thereby succeeded in eventually winning all Member States over to
the cluster of countries which supported Europe-wide employment measures.
This argument contrasts with the theoretical predictions made by two of the
dominant approaches in the field of European integration: neofunctionalism and liberal
VI
intergovemmentalism. Neofunctionalists attribute independent causal iniluence over EU
policy development to supranational institutions that are waking closely with
transnational actors and thereby are capable of swaying Member States’ decisions. In
contrast, liberal intergovemmentalists believe that only Member States, fully aware of
their domestic economic and political interests, are central in the negotiation and
agreement on the details of policy developments. The findings of this dissertation
suggest that a simple model of either supranational influence or national influence does
not fully explain the inclusion of employment title into the Treaty of Amsterdam.
Additionally, the argument developed in this dissertation contrasts with two sets
ot explanations offered in the literature: The first set of explanations regards the
employment policy as a collective solution to a common economic problem in Europe.
The second set of explanations maintains that Member States were pressured to add a
social and political dimension due to a generally more critical public opinion. Empirical
analysis of both sets of explanations, however show that the results are counter-indicative
to the generally hypothesized relationship, but instead quantitatively supports the two-
level entrepreneurship model.
The findings of the thesis highlight the forces and factors that determined political
change in employment policyjust as much as the thesis contributes to an analysis of the
logic and structure of European integration under the institutional conditions of the multi-
level European polity.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Question: Explaining the Employment Title
Unemployment represents one of the most severe problems facing the European
Union. With the end of the Golden Age, the unemployment rate rose dramatically during
the three major recessions 1974-75, 80-84 and 91-94 and averaged about 10 % in the
1990s. This is almost five-times more than what it was in the 60s. Typically in the past,
a government would address unemployment by stimulating the economy using monetary
and fiscal instruments. Or alternatively, a government could subsidize the retraining of
labor and thereby taking a hit with the deficit. But with the EMU and the Growth and
Stability Pact, the governments are now locked into European monetary policies which
prevents them from manipulating exchange rates, like they were used to in the past. On
the other hand, deficit financing with a social objective is not an option either, because a
big budget deficit would attract severe penalties from the EU. The result of this is tint
the scope of available strategies governments could pursue separately is severely limited
by Europeanization.
One would think that this should be a clarion call for coordinated action on a
Europe -wide employment policy. Yet, what one actually can observe is that there was
little progress on the social agenda of the European Union for over two decades. At
every summit in the 70s and 80s the social agenda was beset by problems of wide
-spread
difference of opinion among the Member States and a lack of consensus. Therefore the
only agreements that were possible in this period were lowest common denominator
agreements, which ultimately proved to be ineffective.
However, the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 represents a departure from this
pattern. An interesting development during the negotiation was that countries that were
steadfastly divided for over two decades suddenly achieved consensus on the social
agenda. As a result of this, for the first time in the history of European integration, an
employment title, Title VIII in the treaty, which contains six articles (125 to 130), is part
ol the legal framework of European governance. Article (2) in the Amsterdam Treaty
states that employment is “a matter of common concern” and calls for the Member States
and the European Union (EU) to “work towards developing a co-ordinated strategy for
2
employment.” Given the legal basis and the set of procedures that are institutionalized
to accomplish this goal, employment by now is firmly established as a priority on the
agenda of the European Union and is not likely to diminish in its importance in the
3
foreseeable future.
'On the concept of governance see Cram 2001, Kohler-Koch and Eisig 1999, Kohler-
Koch, 1996, Mayntz 1998, Rhodes 1996, Rosenau 1992, and Winn 1998.
2
Commission of the European Communities, 1997, Official Journal C 340.
3
For instance, as pointed out by Martin Rhodes (1997, 22) combating unemployment has
become “the greatest challenge for the European Union.”
2
Thiee aspects ot the treaty stand out: First, the first time in the history of the
European Union, the political commitment among the Member States to promoting
employment on the level of the European Union is formally written into the treaty;
second, a policy procedure is detailed that aims at promoting employment; and third a
Employment Committee is formally created which monitors and policy procedure in the
are of employment.
The goal of achieving the employment priority is supported by a new process of
co-ordination. Starting with the Essen summit in December 1994 and through
subsequent Council summits, a process was launched by which Member States eventually
agreed to accept Europe
-wide employment guidelines from the European Commission
and to implement these on the respective domestic level. This process has most recently
been called an open method of co-ordination.” As part of this process, Member States
currently document the implementation of employment guidelines through annual reports
and thereby expose themselves to an examination of their actions by the European
Commission and the Council. Every year, both European institutions publish a Joint
4 ....
not included in this list is the fact that the Social Protocoll which was annexed to the
Maastricht Treaty has been included into the Amsterdam Treaty and will be binding for
all member states of the EU. For a discussion of the Social Protocoll see chapter 4. Fora
description of this procedure see Rhode 1995.
' For a description of the mechanisms of this process see Commission of the European
Communities, 1999. Platzer 1999, Thomas 1999.
Among many examples, for instance see the most recent speech by the Director
General, Odile Quentin on 27.10.2000.
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Economic Report and Employment Recommendations. In both documents, the national
efforts are assessed and critically evaluated.
At the core of this dissertation is the aim of identifying the factors and forces that
caused the timing, the form and the content of the Europe-wide employment measures.
With this research focus, this dissertation addresses the most fundamental puzzle
confronting those who seek to understand European integration, namely to explain how
stalemate in the decision-making p-ocess of the European Union was overcome during
the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations and why Member States ultimately agreed to include
the employment chapter in the final treaty.
Fundamentally, it poses three basic questions: Who are the actors who influence
flic agenda of the Euiopean Union? I low docs the European Commission manage to
exert any influence over the preference formation of the Member States during the
negotiation, even though it does not have a formal vote? During the final phase of the
negotiation, how does the Commission make the proposed agreement a final outcome?
In response to these questions, this dissertation argues that the inclusion of the
employment title in the Treaty of Amsterdam is the result of a ratcheting strategy by
which the European Commission as a two- level entrepreneur succeeded in facilitating the
gradual representation of previously latent interests within the Member States and
thereby indirectly pressured the Member States to endorse the Europe-wide employment
7
measures. The concerns over unemployment in Europe at that time, gave the
Latent interests in this context are understood to be all interests that do not participate in
the sharing of authority. Authority is legitimated power, and power is understood to be
control over other positions. In this sense, all those interests who are excluded from
authority can be said to represent latent interests. In particular the broad public often fails
4
Commission a position of strength from which it was able to influence agenda-setting as
well as the preference formation and thereby critically influence the inclusion of the
particular employment title in the Amsterdam Treaty.
Three resources of the Commission were particularly crucial for its ability to
influence the outcome ot the multilateral negotiations as a two- level entrepreneur: First,
the Commission successfully utilized its formal role as agenda-setter and thereby
critically influenced the placement of employment on the active agenda of the European
Union. Second, through an informal involvement in the negotiation, the Commission
influenced the preference formation. Specifically, the Commission successfully
exploited the receptiveness of the various Council Presidencies. Especially the
cooperation with the Irish Presidency was vital for the ability of the Commission as an
exogenous force to influence the multilateral negotiations. For, instance, the Irish
Presidency chose to adopt as the main draft proposal of the employment title the proposal
submitted by the Commission, and thereby rejected outright the proposal made by the
Council Secretariat. The reason for this choice was that the Presidency perceived the
Commission’s proposal as being closer to what the respective public in the Member
States would find acceptable. The article relating to employment in the Amsterdam
Treaty should be seen by the public as a strong collective commitment on the part of the
Member States to work towards a reduction of unemployment. The Presidency felt that
this message was better achieved with the proposal of the Commission than with the
proposal of the Council. Third, the Commission maintained the consensus among the
to have its interests aggregated, organized and represented. This understanding draws on
the work of Dahrendorf 1959 and Schattschneider 1960.
5
Member States by persuading the Danish Presidency to withhold further deliberations of
the employment title until the British general elections had completed.
The argument of this dissertation emerges out of a structured and focused
narrative of the decision-making process leading towards the inclusion of the
employment chapter in the Amsterdam Treaty. Guided by the theoretical predictions
made by the literature on two- level entrepreneurship, the account of this single-case study
focuses primarily on the resources and strategies employed by the European Commission
duiing the decision-making process of the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996/1997.
Causal inference to accomplish the within-case analysis is enhanced by the utilization of
two research tools: the process tracing and the congruence method. Multiple sources of
evidence are employed in the analysis, the most important of which are personal
interviews conducted in Brussels during the spring of 2001. Furthermore, extensive use
is made of primary documents, such as treaties, European Council Presidency
Conclusions, Council resolutions, EU directives and regulations, European Commission
and European Parliament documents (resolutions, communications, decisions, reports,
proposals, and IGC positions papers. Additionally, Eurobarometer and Labor Force
Survey data sets are used. Finally, the analysis relies on secondary documents such a
academic and journalistic work.
This dissertation is structured into seven chapters. Chapter 2 provides the
theoretical foundation for this dissertation. This chapter is structured into three
subsections. The first subsection reviews the main theoretical arguments provided in the
literature that aim at explaining why deadlock in joint-decision making processes
happens in the first place and why decisions pertaining to social and employment policy
6
are particularly difficult to agree on at the European level. One conclusion of this chapter
ls that, while the literature is correct in predicting a certain degree of conflict among the
Member States, especially pertaining to decisions in the area of social and employment
policy, what is needed is a theoretical framework which helps to understand both the
conditions under which deadlock can be overcome as well as the role played by the
relevant actors in the decision-making process. In line with this conclusion, the second
section of this chapter outlines the arguments provided by two of the main theoretical
approaches in the Held of European integration (neofunctionalism and liberal
intergovemmentalism) which explain under what conditions and through which
mechanisms deadlock can be overcome. After a review of the strengths and weaknesses
ol both approaches, this dissertation agrees with scholars who have argued that the debate
on the theories ol European integration should move heyond its current limitation of
seeing the decision-making process as being dominated either by supranational
institutions or by national governments. The third and last section of this chapter outlines
an alternative theory of decision-making that combines insights from the work on policy
analysis and two- level entrepreneurship. The central theoretical argument developed in
this section is that outcome ol the process of agenda -setting and process- formation can
substantially be influenced by the Commission when it is able to either organize,
aggregate or represent latent interests among the Member States. Through a ratcheting
mechanism of policy initiation, mediation and mobilization, does the Commission
manage to exert a crucial influence on the final decisions taken by the governments
during the multilateral negotiations.
7
C
'
hapter 3 and 4 provide a historical evolution of the social dimension in general
and the employment measures more specifically, starling will) the Treaty of Rome (1957)
and ending in 1990. Both chapters provide a descriptive and analytical background
against which the single case study can then be compared. This helps to contribute
towards a greater appreciation of the novelty of the employment chapter that was
included in I lie Amsterdam Treaty.
( hapler 5 represents (he core of this dissertation. Designed as a single-case study,
it focuses on the developments that led to the adoption of the employment chapter in the
Amsterdam I reaty. Particular attention is paid to the resources and strategies employed
by the European Commission. The main conclusion of this chapter is that three resources
ol the Commission were particularly crucial for its ability to influence the outcome of
multilatei.il negotiations, hirst, (he institutional location ol the Commission gave it
gieatei flexibility and latitude and thereby allowed it to draw up policy proposals that
were capable of representing crucial domestic interests in the Member States.
Additionally, this position allowed the Commission to draft policy proposals that in effect
represent a compromise position of all the positions among the Member States. In this
way, the ( ommission s proposals represent a postion above the lowest common
denominator.
Second, the receptiveness ol the Council Presidency crucially enabled the
Commission to influence the outcome ol the multilateral negotiations among the Member
Slates. Especially the cooperation with the Irish as well as the Dutch Presidencies were
vital lor the ability of the Commission as an exogenous force to influence the multilateral
negations, for instance, the Irish Presidency chose to adopt as the main draft proposal ol
,x
the employment chapter the proposal submitted by the Commission, and thereby clearly
i ejected the proposal made by the Council Secretariat.
Third, the Commission can exert pressure onto Member States when it can be
seen to represent latent domestic interests. The representation of the concerns over
unemployment in Europe, gave the Commission a position of strength from which it was
able to influence the policy-shaping as well as policy-setting decisions and thereby
critically influence the content of the employment chapter that was ultimately included in
the Amsterdam Treaty. In the last phase of the treaty negotiations, Member States could
not afford to be seen by their respective publics’ as not supporting a Europe
-wide
initiative for more employment. Amidst high levels of unemployment, a commitment of
Member States towards Economic and Monetary Union, and a strong belief of the public
in all the Member States that EMU will not create more jobs, the European Union, just as
much as the Member States had to communicate to the European people that it was
indeed, nevertheless, representing the interests of the European people. The employment
chapter became the crucial item in the Amsterdam Treaty by which such a message could
be conveyed.
This conclusion of this chapter suggests that the process by which the
Commission managed to influence the inclusion of the employment chapter into the
Treaty of Amsterdam is best explained by a theoretical model that simultaneously focuses
on the European as well as the domestic level. As discussed in chapter 2, a two- level
entrepreneurship model is best equipped to capture both the intervening steps of the
decision-making process as well as the final outcome of the negotiation.
9
C haptcr 6 attempts to strengthen the argument presented in this dissertation, by
way of analyzing counter
-arguments presented in the literature. The falsification of the
arguments presented in the literature for the employment chapter indirectly enhances the
plausibility o( the conclusions reached in this dissertation. Chapter 7 presents the
conclusions of the dissertation.
This introduction will provide a brief review of the debates on Europeanization
and the particular reasons why policy change, especially in the social field, is often
hampered. Next it will discuss the competing and rather contradictory predictions
offered by neofunctionalists and intcrgovernmenatalists as to how policy appears likely to
be accomplished. On the basis of these theoretical debates the research questions as well
as hypotheses are formulated.
1.1.1 The Europeanisation of Employment Policy
The general phenomenon that is examined in this dissertation is the inclusion of
the employment chapter in the Treaty of Amsterdam which signifies an increase in the
relevance of employment policy on the agenda of the European Union. Given the fact
that employment has become a priority of the European Union and a new process of
coordination has been developed several scholars have pointed out that employment
policy is now Europeanized. In general, much academic literature is available on the
10
causes and consequences of Europeanisation in various policy fields." More specifically,
some literature is emerging on the Europeanisation of employment policy.
^
Common to most academic work on Europeanisation is the distinction of two
analytical dimensions: First, there are many studies that analyze the factors and forces
that explain the process ol Europeanisation of policy areas on the supranational level.
Second, there are a number of studies that focus on the consequences of Europeanisation
on domestic institutions. Of particular interest to the research focus of this dissertation is
the first dimension.
Scholars in the former approach define Europeanisation “as the emergence and
development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of
political, legal and social institutions associated with problem-solving that formalize
interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of
„
10
authorized rules.” 1 lere, Europeanisation connotes the processes and mechanisms by
which “domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy making.”'
In this research focus, the dependent variables are the processes, the newly created
Among the vast literature on this topic see for instance Boerzel 2000, Kohler-Koch
1998, Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999, Ladrech 1994, Lehmkuhl 2000, Olson 1996, Schmidt
1999, Turner 1996, Cole 2001, Kassim and Menon 1996, Cole and Drake 2000, and
Warleigh 2001,
^Cameron 2000, and Johansson 1999.
Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2000.
“Boerzel (1999, 574).
ll
institutional structures on the supranational level, as well as the degree to which
competences in specific policy areas are conferred to the EU.
On the European Union level, the new process of policy making in the area of
employment policy has shifted both power and influence to the European institutions. As
a result, a novel division of labor between the European level and the national level is
thus being introduced. Each year, on the basis of the Commission’s proposal the Council
spells out Europe-wide employment targets and guidelines. The Member States have
obliged themselves to implement these guidelines in domestic policy programs and
document their efforts in annual National Action Plans. Again on the basis of proposals
Irom the Commission, the Council judges the national efforts in its annual Joint
Economic Report and simultaneously recommends specific policy measures to each
Member States in its Recommendation. Thus, while the Commission and the Council
identify specific employment targets, the Member States are pressured to implement
these into national policies. As pointed out in an interview by Alan Larsson, former
Director General of the DG Employment and Social Affairs of the European
Commission:
I'he method for the co-ordination of employment policy takes the
form of a convergence process [...] similar to the one followed for
the preparation of EMU, with the objective to significantly
increase employment on a lasting basis and to light unemployment.
Unlike for Economic and Monetary Union where the financial
markets would penalize immediately inflationary economies and
therefore strict and objective guarantees had to be introduced, for
employment, the electorate will be the controlling factor, as no
12
single country is willing to be at the bottom of the class.
Larsson, Brussels, February 1 1, 2001.
12
In effect, this means that the European Commission can utilize the “open method
ot coordination” as a tool of assessing and evaluating the Member States' efforts in the
area of employment policy. Through the mechanism of “politics of shame” then, the
European Commission can, if necessary exert pressure onto the Member States and
thereby increase compliance with the specific policy goals of the employment
13
guidelines. This strategy works by exposing to the public the degree to which a
Member State is willing to implement the Europe-wide employment targets. While all
governments are interested in maintaining the image of attempting to actively bring down
unemployment, the nagging voice of the Commission is capable of revealing to the public
how honest the Member States really are in their efforts. As a consequence, Member
States are very keen to avoid the embarassing situation of being seen not complying with
the general effort of reducing unemployment.
Scholars of the latter approach define Europeanisation as a “set of processes
through which the EU political and economic dynamics become part of the logic of
domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.”'
4
Here,
Europeanisation connotes the processes and mechanisms by which European institution-
building cause changes at the domestic level. In this research focus, the dependent
variables are domestic processes, policies and institutions, which are influenced and
changed by the supranational processes and institutions.
13
14
On the efficacy of “politics of shame” see Lake 1993.
Radaelli (2000, 3).
13
On the domestic level, the Europeanisation of employment policy has created a
shared sphere of competence in the area of employment policy. Three changes can be
observed on the domestic level: First, due to the newly created processes, federal
ministries cooperate more closely in orde r to incorporate the employment guidelines into
domestic priorities, and in order to draft and write the National Action Plans, Overall,
this has strengthened the position and prominence of the Ministries of Labor and Social
Affairs vis-a-vis the Ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs.
Second, internal budget priorities have shifted as a result of the Europe
-wide
employment guidelines. The second pillar of the employment strategy spells out the goal
of reducing youth unemployment and long-term unemployment. Member States
increasingly dedicate financial resources towards offering all youth unemployed and all
long-term unemployed an employment measure within a specified time frame.
And finally, the system of measuring and reporting unemployment is being
harmonized. Member States are adopting the same structural indicators as suggested by
the European Commission, to measure and report developments of employment and
unemployment by different sectors. This has contributed towards making the national
efforts more comparable and more transparent.
For youth unemployed the time-frame is six months, for adult long-term unemployed
the time- frame is twelve months.
14
1.1.2. Obstacles in the Way of Europeanisation
Within the tradition of scholars who examine the factors and forces, which
explain the process of Europeanisation of policy areas on the supranational level, Scharpf
(1988, 1991, 1997) provides a set of arguments as to why this process is often
characterized by difficulties of achieving policy change.
‘ 6
In a nutshell he posits that due
to the institutional characteristics of the European Community (EC), joint decision-
making is severely hampered and therefore deadlock is often the only outcome.
Specifically two institutional conditions of the EC are responsible for this outcome: (1)
central government decisions (EC decisions) are directly dependent upon the agreement
of constituent governments (member states), and (2) the agreement of constituent
governments must be unanimous or nearly unanimous. Since the European Community’s
decisions directly depend upon the unanimous agreement of the Member States, actors
are likely to find themselves in a “joint decision trap.” Here, they are unable to either
pioceed to new decisions or to leave the decision-making arena altogether. The
consequence of this arrangement is that the “central government is not free to respond
creatively to external demands, or to anticipate future consensus; its actions are
determined directly by the immediate self-interests of member governments” (Scharpf,
1988, 255).
In his work he applies insights of the debate of interlocking politics in German
federalism (Politikverflechtung) to the European Community. For the debate on German
federalism see Benz 1985, Hesse 1978, Johnson 1973, Riker 1964, Scharpf, Reissert, and
Schnabel (1976, 1977, 1978), Wheare 1964.
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Building on Scharprs arguments, several scholars have suggested that two
important conclusions that can be made about the decision-making process in the
European Union: first, deadlock on the EU level is likely to the degree to which the
outcome ofjoint decisions are seen by the Member States either as a loss in power and
decision competence or as incurring costs of instrumental adjustment. Second, any
policy agreement made in the European Union can be seen as the successful resolution of
the following two cleavages: first, the question of the appropriate level of authority, and
second the question of the appropriate legal instalment to bring about the agreed on
measure.
This dissertation agrees with scholars who have pointed out that while Schaipf is
conect in predicting a certain degree of conflict among the Member States, especially
pertaining to decisions in the area of social and employment policy, what is needed is a
theoretical framework which helps to understand both the conditions under which
deadlock can be overcome as well as the role played by the relevant actors in the
decision-making process. Such a framework would have to specify the resources and
strategies likely to be employed by the various actors.
1.2 The Argument: Two-Level Entrepreneurship
Given the fact that joint-decision making on the European Union level is
hampered by several factors, it appears to be relevant to examine which theories of
For a discussion of this cleavage for instance see Newman 1993.
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European integration might help to explain when, under what conditions, and through
which mechanisms policy change can actually be accomplished.
The central theoretical argument developed in this dissertation is that policy-
shaping and policy-setting decisions can substantially be influenced by the European
Commission when it is able to either organize, aggregate or represent latent interests
among the Member States. Through a ratcheting mechanism of policy initiation,
mediation and mobilization, the Commission manages to exert a crucial degree of
influence on the final decisions taken by the governments during the multilateral
negotiations.
This theoretical frame heavily draws on the insight of work on policy analysis,
especially, the work of Peterson 1995a, 2001, Peterson and Bomberg 1999 as well as the
work of Moravcsik (1999) on two-level entrepreneurship. Such a combination of
approaches not only allows one to analyze both the actors and resources and strategies
involved in the policy-shaping and policy-setting phase, but also to assess the decisive
influence the Commission had on the choices available to the Member States during the
“history-making” decisions.
Policy analysis provides a useful basic analytical framework, due to its distinction
of thiee stages in the process of decision-making: policy-shaping, policy-setting and
history-making decisions. In a nutshell, Peterson’s central claim is that since each stage
of decision-making attracts a different set of actors with varying resources and strategies,
theorists who attempt to explain outcomes across all stages may find that more than one
theoretical model might be needed for an analysis of all the stages of decision-making.
17
According to Peterson, policy-shaping decisions are best explained by a
theoretical framework that is both sensitive to the political realities within the Member
States and provides an explanation how domestic interests get to be represented on the
level of the European Union. In particular, he suggests the most recent work of
Moravcsik (1999) on supranational entrepreneurship provides a useful theoretical
approach which combines both concerns (Peterson, 2001, 305).
S
Policy-setting emerge after bargaining between the European institutions. In this
context, Peterson argues that theoretical frame that combines a theory of ‘domestic
politics' of the European Union with an analysis of the institutional capacity of
supranational actors to influence the course on which policies are set would be a helpful
contribution towards an understanding of the process by which different policy options
aie selected (Peterson, 2001, 300). According to Peterson, since it is at the systemic level
where the many dilferent cleavages to which EU politics give rise to intersect it is at this
level that the EU’s institutions usually provide order and aggregation.
This dissertation argues that such an approach can be developed by focusing
simultaneously on two Icy aspects ol the Commission: first, the Commission’s ability to
aggregate and represent latent domestic interests allows it to influence the Member States
in the policy-setting decisions. Second, the Commission’s influence over policy-setting
decisions, can be expected to be particularly strong during those times in which the
Commission and the Presidency of the Council work closely together. Such a
cooperation allows the Commission to relay the latent domestic interests to the European
1
8
The section below provides a more detailed discussion of Moravcsik’s two- level
entrepreneurship model.
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level, while it allows the Presidency of the Council to widen its scope of possible policy
proposals that it can draw on in its attempt to mediate among governments.
The two-level entrepreneurship model as suggested by Moravcsik (1999) provides
a useful set of theoretical predictions by which the inclusion of the employment chapter
m the Amsterdam Treaty can be analyzed. According to Moravcsik, two level
entrepreneurs are capable of decisively influencing the outcome of multilateral
negotiations through persuasion, due to their ability to organize, aggregate and represent
latent domestic interests. Organizing, aggregating and representing latent domestic
interests, gives the supranational entrepreneur a resource through which it can influence
the policy preferences of the Member States and thereby decisively influence the
outcome of the multilateral negotiations.
This power-resource view implies that two- level entrepreneurship is then
effective when a supranational entrepreneur is capable of utilizing informational and
ideational resources that the principals of a negotiation, namely the national governments,
have previously ignored or would be likely to ignore in the process of decision-making.
Either by credibly claiming to represent these latent domestic interests or by working
towaids manifesting these interests can the two- level entrepreneur indirectly pressure
governments to move in a certain policy direction. The effect of such intervention is that
a two- level entrepreneur can help to overcome deadlock in the decision-making process,
by having widened the scope of political interests represented in the negotiation. In
effect, such an intervention may work towards broadening the set of issues considered to
be part of the win-set of the policy preferences of each Member State. Thus, in a
nutshell, Moravcsik (1999, 272) argues that “the exploitation by international officials of
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asymmetrical control over scarce information or ideas” provides the two level
entrepreneur with a window of opportunity by which it can “influence the outcomes of
multilateral negotiation.”
1.2.1 Alternative Theoretical Models
I he theoretical framework developed in this dissertation suggests the argument
that a simple model of either supranational influence or national influence does not fully
explain the inclusion of employment chapter into the Treaty of Amsterdam. The two
mam approaches that are still dominating the field of European integration are:
neolunctionalism and liberal intergovermentalism. While the first approach
predominately follows a supply-side perspective by focusing on the skills and unique
idiosyncrasies ol political leadership, the second approach is limited in its analysis by
focusing exclusively on the national bargaining preferences of the respective
governments, national needs that supranational policy entrepreneurs would be able to
fill.
In a nutshell, neofunctionalists attribute independent causal influence over EU
policy development to supranational institutions that are working closely with
tiansnational actors and thereby are capable of swaying Member States’ decisions. In
contrast, liberal intergovernmentalists believe that only Member States, fully aware of
thcii domestic economic and political interests, are central in the negotiation and
agreement on the details ol policy developments. This dissertation agrees with scholars
who have argued that the debate on the theories of European integration should move
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beyond its current limitation of seeing the decision-making process as being dominated
either by supranational institutions or by national governments.
1.2. 1.1 Neofunctionalism
The early neofunctionalist literature of the 1950s and 1960s believed that
decisions on the European level and thus the breaking of deadlock was the outcome of
the interaction of sipranational institutions with a range of subnational political actors.
In drawing on the interaction of these two elements, this approach was primarily
concerned with explaining “how and why nation-states cease to be wholly sovereign,
how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbors so as to lose
the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving
conflicts between themselves” (Haas 1970, 610). The central claim of this literature was
that deadlock in regional integration was avoided by the dynamic process of spill-over
from one sectoral domain to another, as societal demands for European policies were
encouraged and translated into concrete proposals by the supranational institutions, the
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Commission in particular.
In this formula, political integration was conceptualized on the grounds of an
institutionalized pattern of interest politics that was played out within existing
institutions. Central among these institutions were supranational institutions and in
particular the European Commission. The most explicit examination of the role of
19
For an overview of the work in the neofunctionalist approach see Battistelli and Isemia
1993, Cram 1996, George 1996, Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996, Pentland 1973.
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supranational institutions in the integration process was conducted by Lindberg and
Scheingold in .970 (92-95). In their study, they discussed the Commission’s roles and
capabilities. Maintaining that the Commission indeed had succeeded in wielding
considerable decision-making power in the Community process, Lindberg and
Scheingold identified five crucial political skills of the Commission: (1) goal
articulatio n, entails the capacity to formulate long-term goals for the Community that can
in turn be legitimated by reference to a common European interest and that are capable of
mobilizing supporter and neutralizing opposition; (2) coalition -building, entails the
capacity to identify problems to be solved through coordinated action and to build
coalitions with client groups and national bureaucracies; (3) political experience and
technical expertise, entails the capacity to maximize national contacts, technical
expertise, and political experience in the organization; (4) task expansion, entails the
capacity to convince client groups and governments of the need for new policies, new
tasks, and new powers for the Community institutions; and finally (5) brokerage and
package deals, entails the capacity to play an active role in intergovernmental bargaining,
building support for its own proposals and constructing deals which satisfy interests of all
national governments.
This dissertation agiees with criticisms of neofunctionalism and also observes that
an understanding of the policy-making process of the European Union requires an
approach that goes beyond being merely descriptive and instead provides a plausible
explanation for the interests ol the Member States to be influenced by the activities of the
European Commission. For instance, Moravcsik (1999, 273) challenges this with the
lollowing question (1999, 273): “Why should governments, with millions of diverse and
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highly trained professional employees, massive information-gathering capacity, and long-
standing experience with international negotiation at their disposal, ever require the
services of a handful of supranational entrepreneurs to generate and disseminate useful
information and ideas?” Thus, while the detailed Ascriptions of the leadership skills of
the Commissions' President as well as the functional roles of the Commission as a whole
is a valuable starting point, what is missing from this analysis, is a clearer insight into the
process by which these characteristics have helped the Commission to actually contribute
towards agenda
-setting and final decision
-selection.
1.2. 1.2 Liberal Intergovermentalism
Liberal Intergovemmentalism explains how and why, in certain limited cases, the
European Union is successful in “pooling national sovereignty through qualified majority
voting rules” and thereby manages to overcome deadlock and to achieve the delegation of
sovereign powers to semi-autonomous central institutions” (Moravcsik, 1993, 509)
According to this approach integration occurs, because the Member States wish it to
occur since it is in their own economic or political self-interest. Thus, decisions and the
successful breaking ot deadlock, on the level of the European Union are the result of
three l elated processes: (1) behavior of rational governments, (2) nationally negotiated
policy preferences, and (3) intergovernmental negotiations of various states. The
occunence of deadlock on the European Union level is determined by the preferences
and the negotiation outcome of national governments. As principal agents national
governments are the only forces that drive or prevent progress in European cooperation.
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The institutions of the EU are merely instruments that can be utilized by Member States
whenever their national preferences can be enhanced by such a move.
The assumption of rational state behavior provides liberal intergovemmentalism
with a general framework of analysis, within which the costs and benefits of economic
interdependence are the primary determinants of national preferences. Resolution of
distributional conflicts among governments is the outcome of the relative intensity of
national preferences, the existence of alternative coalitions, and the opportunity for issue
linkages. The model of rational state behavior on the basis of domestically-constrained
preferences implies that international conflict and co-operation can be modeled as a
process that takes place in two successive stages: governments first define a set of
interests, then bargain among themselves in an effort to realize those interests.
20
Metaphorically, these two stages shape demand and supply functions for international co-
operation. A domestic preference formation process identifies the potential benefits of
policy co-ordination perceived by national governments (demand). The process of
interstate strategic interaction defines the possible political responses of the EC political
system to pressures from those governments (supply). The interaction of demand and
supply, of preference and strategic opportunities, shapes the foreign policy behavior of
states (Moravcsik 1993, 482).
This conceptualization of interest mediation has three implications: First, the
national preferences of the Member States are treated as exogenous to the negotiation
For the concept of the ‘two-level' game see Feld 1980, Paarlberg 1997, Patterson 1997,
Moyer 1993, Putnam 1988, and Zangel 1994; for a “domestic politics” approach see
Bulmer 1983.
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process. By the time Member States meet to discuss any proposals for agreement, their
preferences have already been determined by their respective domestic interests. In this
way, preferences are being treated as given and determined much prior to the process of
negotiation. Second, actor’s preferences are assumed to remain fixed during the process
of interaction and bargaining. Bargains are struck through compromise, side-payments
and package deals, rather than through processes of persuasion and learning in which the
validity of actors claims are at stake. Third, the national governments serve as the crucial
link between the domestic and the international level. In this sense, governments act as
“a gate-keeper between the domestic and international level” (Skjalm 1998, 10).
This dissertation agrees with critics who have pointed that liberal
intergovermentalism provides a rather at best an incomplete picture of decision-making
in the European Union, and, at worst, a flawed picture. Two criticisms in particular are
repeated in the literature most often: First, several scholars have pointed out that liberal
intergovernmentalists' assumption that Member States bring unitary national preferences
21
to an international baigaining table is rather flawed. Second, many scholars have
pointed out that liberal intergovemmentalism exaggerates the role of national
governments in the decision-making processes of the European Union. Especially
scholars who work within the framework of multi-level governance have pointed out
“that European integration is a polity-creating process in which authority and policy
making influence is shared across multiple levels of government sub-national, national
and supranational” (Hooghe and Marks 1997, 22).
For instance see Wallace 1999.
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1.3 Research Design: Questions, Hypothesis, and Methodology
The observation that employment policy is increasingly Europeanized raises the
question which are the forces and factors that explain the timing, the form, and the
content of Europe-wide employment measures. While much literature in economics is
available on the influence of macro- and microeconomic factors on employment and
unemployment in Europe, there is only a limited amount of research available in the field
of political science explaining the political response of the European Union to these
economic realities. Most of the current research in the field of political science fails to
identity the political factors that have led to the recent policy changes in the field of
employment policy on the European level.
As pointed out by Ostrom (1990, 192) “from a framework, one derives the
questions that need to be asked to clarify the structure of the situation.” The theoretical
framework used in this dissertation is an approach which combines insights from policy
analysis and two-level entrepreneurship. The argument of this dissertation emerges out
of a stiuctured and focused narrative of the decision-making process leading towards the
inclusion of the employment chapter in the Amsterdam Treaty. “ This narrative is
sti uctured in so far as it employs a set of questions for the analysis that are derived from
the theoi etical frame. It is focused in so far as it selectively deals only with those aspects
of the historical case that are relevant to the analysis. Guided by the theoretical
22
For a detailed account of the utility of structured and focused analysis see George
1979, and George and McKeown 1985
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predictions made by the literature on two-level entrepreneurship, the account of this
single
-case study focuses primarily on the resources and strategies employed by the
European Commission during the decision-making process of the Intergovernmental
Conference of 1 996/1997.
^
Based on the theoretical frame used in this dissertation, the single case study is
guided by the following bundle of questions:
1. What factors and forces explain the timing, the form and content of the
European Council’s agenda on Europe
-wide employment measures? Who
are the actors whose influence helps the member-state principals to
overcome deadlock and reach an agreement to delegate powers to
supranational agents?
2. Precisely under what conditions and through which mechanisms can
supranational agents encourage the member-state principals to delegate
powers to supranational agents? If the supranational agents enjoy a
comparative informational and ideational advantage is this advantage
prominent during all phases of policymaking? Or can one find particular
phases during which this advantage has more influence?
An abundance of literature is available on the case study method in general as well as
the single case study. For instance see Benett and George 1997b, Cunningham 1997,
Eckstein 1975, Johnson, Joslyn and Reynolds (2001, 144), Lijphart 1971 and 1975 and
Yin 1994.
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3. Overall, what factors explain the specific policy preferences with regard to
the Europe
-wide employment measures of the Commission? By applying
which method do the supranational agents determine which policy
elements to include in their policy proposals and which one to omit? How
do they know which elements that were selected to be included in the
policy proposal they should strategically and tactically emphasize or rather
de-emphasize?
1.3.1 Hypothesis and Methodology
Based on these theoretical framework provided by policy analysis as well as the
two-level entrepreneurship model this dissertation develops and tests the following
hypothesis: The inclusion of the employment title into the Treaty of Amsterdam is the
result of a ratcheting strategy by which the Commission succeeded in activating latent
interests in the Member States which then pressured previously reluctant governments to
endorse the policy preferences of the Commission.
Multiple sources of evidence are employed in the analysis of testing and
developing this hypothesis. The most important source of evidence is provided by the
24
extensive personal interviews conducted in Brussels during the spring of 2001
.
Furthermore, comprehensive use is made of primary documents, such as treaties,
European Council Presidency Conclusions, Council resolutions, EU directives and
24
.
During an internship with the European Commission in the DG Employment and
Social Affairs, most of the interviews were conducted in the Spring of 2001.
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regulations, European Commission and European Parliament documents (resolutions,
communications, decisions, reports, proposals, and IGC positions papers. Additionally,
Eurobarometer and Labor Force Survey data sets are used. Finally, the analysis relies o
secondary documents such a academic and journalistic work.
1 he research design for substantiating the causal inference, utilizes the following
two research tools: the process tracing method and the congruence method. Process
tracing is used to detail the intervening steps by which the Commission managed to
influence the policy- shaping as well as the policy-setting phase and ultimately managed
to decisively shape the interests of the Member States to include the employment chapter
25
in the Amsterdam Ireaty. Particular attention is paid to the resources and strategies
employed by the Commission during the various phases of decision-making. This
includes not only a focus on the interaction of the Commission with the European
C ouncil and governments ol Member States, but also an analysis ol the Commissions’
interaction with interest groups.
The congruence method is used to examine the validity of alternative explanations
provided for the inclusion of the employment chapter in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The
utility of the congruence method is to indirectly strengthen the validity of analysis, by
disconflrming the plausibility of alternative explanations. George and Bennett ( 1997a)
express this idea in the following way: “The congruence method can be employed in a
single case study when the research objective [...] the investigator asks: given the value
ol the independent variable in this particular case, what prediction(s) can be made from
On process tracing and the congruence method see George 1979, George and
McKeown 1989, Hamel 1993, and Peters 1998.
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the theory regarding the outcome of the dependent variable? The investigator uses a
deductive theory or an empirical generalization to generate a prediction/explanation for
the outcome of the dependent variable. If the outcome is consistent with the prediction.
then there is at least a presumption or possibility of a causal relationship.”
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1.3.2 Alternative Explanations
The explanation developed in this dissertation provides a contrast to the
explanations tor the development of Europe
-wide employment measures put forward by
the literature so far. These explanations can be grouped into two categories: The first
views that development as a collective solution to a common problem—the existence of
unusually high and increasing levels of unemployment in the early-to-mid 1990s. The
second views that development as, paradoxically, a response to public disaffection with
the EU—specifically, the increased skepticism among the European publics about
integration and the erosion of the “permissive consensus” that had long supported
integration and increased opposition to the plans, adopted at Maastricht in 1991, to move
to Economic and Monetary Union by the end of the decade.
Both set of explanations are underpinned by different theoretical predictions. The
explanation that considers the employment chapter as a collective solution to a common
problem, can be seen to follow the theoretical predictions of neofunctionalism. In
contrast, the explanation that views the employment chapter as a result of public pressure
26
Since this document is available only in html-format no page numbers were given.
The article can be accessed at http://www.georgetown.edu/bennett/congric.htm.
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can be considered to follow the theoretical predictions of liberal intergovernmentalism.
The falsification of these two sets of explanations strengthens the theoretical model
developed in this dissertation.
1.3. 2.1 Solution for Common Problem
Based on the theoretical assumptions of neofunctionalism, the presumption that
the recent economic development exerts an influence on member states is shared by
several scholars who have put forward various explanations for the development of
employment policies on the European Union level. In general, several scholars maintain
that the most recent prominence of employment policy on the agenda of the European
Council was caused by the fact that all Member States were struggling to lower their
icspective unemployment rates. For instance Roberts and Springer (2001, 44) point out
that “the emergence of employment policy as a major focus for EU policy in the 1990s
has to be seen against the backdrop of chronic unemployment in the EU [...].
Unemployment has been a problem in Europe since the 1970s. Economic growth was
supposed to solve it, but when economic recovery in the 1980s provide only a brief
respite, leaders began searching for other solutions.” Additionally, the Dutch Ministry
ol Social Atiairs and Employment has recently mentioned in a discussion about
Biffl (2000, 63), Lesch (2000, 9).
2 «
Eor a similar explanation of the employment chapter see Aust (2000a, 270) and Kenner
(2000, 378). For a critique of this argument from an economic point of view see Vaubel
(1998, 6).
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employment strategy that “the reason why many EU member states have opted for central
coordination is probably to do with the opportunities that it affords. Central coordination
can act as a platform for recognizing and identifying collective and shared problems and
also collectively looking for solutions.”
29
Furthermore, Cameron (2000, 16) argues that
the scope of the problem of high and rising unemployment in the early 1990s, [and] the
fact that recession and high unemployment afflicted the entire Union, would have
suggested that the sources of the problem, and therefore the key to its alleviation, lay
beyond the realm of national policy at the level of the Union.”
30
Therefore, Member
States had a keen interest in agreeing on Europe-wide employment measures, to
collectively solve their domestic unemployment problem
To assess the validity of this explanation, the following hypothesis will be derived
from the literature and empirically tested:
(1) The greater the increase and the higher the level of domestic unemployment
ovei the past few years, the more supportive the respective government was to Europe-
wide employment measures.
In order to test the validity of this hypothesis, data-sets of Labor Force Survey are
used.. The analysis will proceed in two steps: first, the economic data is used to predict
an expected position of the Member States in regard to Europe-wide employment
measures during the Intergovernmental Conference 1996/1997. Then the expected
position is compared to the actual position taken by the Member States during the
29
Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2000, 206).
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Cameron (2000, 16) (1999), Goetschy 1999, Martin 2000, Walwei (1999, 141).
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negotiations. The proximity or distance between the expected position and the actual
position will be indicative for the falsification of the hypotheses.
1.3. 2.2 Political Response to Public Pressure
Based on the theoretical assumptions of liberal intergovernmental^, one finds
explanations which ascertain that mass public opinion was crucial in determining the
timing and content of the recent Europe
-wide employment measures. The presumption
that public opinion exerts an influence on member states is shared by several scholars
who have put forward various explanations for the development of employment policies
on the European Union level. In general two sets of explanations can be differentiated:
The first maintains that Europe
-wide employment measures were developed due to
indirect domestic pressures. According to this perspective, Member States faced a more
critical public opinion due to the “post
-Maastricht crisis” and the ending of the
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permissive consensus” As the public ‘withdrew’ its quiet acquiescence to European
integration and became outspokenly more skeptical, member states were pressured to add
a social and political dimension to the European integration project.
According to the second explanation, Member States had an interest in developing
European-wide employment measures due to direct public pressure. On the one hand, as
Europe encountered high and persisting unemployment rates, governments could not
afford not to be seen addressing the issue on the European level. On the other hand, the
For a discussion on the “end of permissive consensus” see Reif 1 993.
33
public's skepticism towards a common currency pressured the member states to design a
stronger employment dimension on the European Union level.
To assess the validity of these two sets of explanations, the following hypotheses
will be derived from the literature and empirically tested:
( 1 ) The greater the increase and the larger the proportion of a Member State’s
public felt that its country was not benefiting from European integration, the more
supportive a government was to Europe-wide employment measures.
(2) The greater the increase and the larger the proportion of a Member State’s
public opposed to a common currency, the more supportive the Member State was to
Europe
-wide employment measures.
These hypotheses and questions are examined by drawing on Eurobarometer data
sets tor the years 1991 and 1997. Several questions are selected pertaining to the various
dimensions of the hypotheses. The hypotheses are then tested by extrapolating from the
public opinion an expected position of the Member States and then comparing that
position with the actual position taken by the Member States during the negotiations.
The proximity or distance of both positions will be indicative for the falsification of the
hypotheses.
1.4 Summary
This dissertation joins a lively academic debate about the nature of the European
system ot governance as well as the forces and factors that influence the dynamic of
34
European integration.
3
' By exploring the forces and factors that have pushed
employment policy onto the agenda of the European Union this dissertation contributes to
the academic discussion on the nature of the EU integration in general and the logic of
positive and negative integration in the social policy field in particular within the multi-
level system of governance.
The findings of this dissertation are politically, theoretically, and
methodologically relevant. Politically, the findings of this research are relevant because
it shows how exogenous forces in the form of a supranational policy entrepreneur, whose
formal role is limited and vastly overshadowed by its informal influence, is able to so
effectively orchestrate a surprising amount of influence over the outcome of multi-lateral
negotiations. They successfully help overcome organizational, representational and
accummulational failures in the intrastate bargaining process by stirring up activity which
facilitates the manifestation of previously latent interests and thereby enables Member
States to overcome ponderous deadlocks.
Theoretically and methodologically, existing studies on the influence of the
Commission on the outcome of multi-lateral negotiations most often do not follow a
i igorous theoretical evaluation. The lack of concrete theories and decisive empirical tests
makes the results of many of these studies neither unambiguously true nor available as a
basis from which to predict policy outcomes in similar situations. The findings of this
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Caporaso 1997, Risse-Kappen 1996, Pierson 1996.
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On positive” versus “negative” integration see Scharpf 1997. For a debate on the
nature of European Social Policy see among many others Greyer 2000, Streeck 1995
1997.
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dissertation go beyond these limitations by carefully building up a strong theoretical
foundation, based on a combination of existing heuristic approaches drawn from policy
analysis as well as two level entrepreneurship model. The hypothesis derived from these
approaches are empirically tested both with the help of qualitative as well as quantitative
research methods
Finally, the discussion about European integration and the European Model,
which this thesis thereby joins, is not simply restricted to scholars and experts. It is a
central topic of public debate in all Member States of the European Union, as much as it
is a point of discussion on the level of the Union itself. This dissertation aims at
contributing to an understanding of the European Union’s public policy efforts that
attempt to reduce unemployment. An analytical and empirical research that examines if
any of the policy tools have worked and to what effect will not only be a substantial
contribution but also will be very timely. Such research could possibly address which
additional measures the European Union may need to take, in order to attain its stated
goals in the realm of social policy
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CHAPTER 2
THEORIES OF POLICY MAKING IN THE EUROPE UNION:
EXAMINING PATHWAYS OUT OF DEADLOCK
Policy developments in the area of employment policy at the European level are
characterized by a unique contrast: In the early decades of European integration there
was a slow and limited progression. Following the Treaty of Rome, the policy
competence of the European Union was limited to efforts of facilitating labor mobility,
guaranteeing the equality of wages among men and women and improving the working
environment. In this period, employment policy was subsumed under the general efforts
of providing minimalist social policy measures designed with the aim to facilitate and
enhance the market-making mechanisms of the newly created common market.
Howevei
,
in recent decades not only has the scope of social policy measures of the
European Union become increasingly widened, but also a European employment policy
has gradually been developed. In particular, since the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997
contained a separate employment chapter, many scholars have pointed out that
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employment policy now clearly constitutes a separate policy field on the level of the
r- 34
European Union.
T^s uni
^
ue co»trast raises the question: How can one explain the recent change
in the pace and depth of policy development on the European level in the area of
employment policy leading to a concrete process of coordination of Europe
-wide
employment measures? What factors and forces have pushed employment policy on the
agenda of the European Union? Which mechanisms positively contributed to the
selection of policy decisions with regard to the policy format and content?
In seeking answers to these questions regarding agenda
-setting and decision
selection in the field of employment policy, this dissertation aims at contributing to an
understanding of the dynamics of European policy-making and of the determinants of
political change in policy fields. The main theoretical argument developed is the recent
policy dynamic in the field of employment policy on the European level can best be
understood by an approach that combines insight from the work on policy analysis and
two-level entrepreneurship. Such an approach primarily draws on the work of Peterson
1995a, 2001, Peterson and Bomberg 1999 as well as Moravcsik (1999).
The theoretical approach developed in this dissertation hopes to complement
existing explanatory approaches ot European integration. The two main approaches that
are still seen as dominating the field of European integration and these approaches have
been criticized in the literature for their limited applicability to the policy-making
piocess. While neo-functionalism and liberal intergovemmentalism go some way toward
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See chapter 3, 4 and 5 lor a detailed discussion of the evolution of employment policy
on the European level.
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discerning important characteristics of the European integration process and point
respectively to “spill-over” processes and the importance of Member States’ preferences
in the bargaining processes, it has often been pointed out that they only offer partial
insights into the dynamics of decision-making in specific policy areas. For instance,
Risse-Kappen (1996, 57) maintains that “the traditional notions of intergovemmentalism
or supranationalism fail to capture the essence of EU decision-making.” A common
conclusion that runs through the literature is that these “macro- theories” are well
equipped to explain broad trends in the global environment, yet at the systemic level of
EU decision-making they loose their explanatory power (for instance see Hix 1994,
Mossialos 2000).
Building on this conclusion, several scholars of European integration have
pointed out that these grand theories need to be supplemented with theories of decision-
making that draw on insights from theories of international relations and comparative
politics in order to enhance the understanding of dynamics of policymaking on the EU
level. (Hurell and Menon 1996, Jachtenfuchs 1995, Marks 1997, Mayes 1994, 0hrgaard
1996, Wallace 1993). This endeavor seems to fit well with Wessels’ (1997, 270) demand
lor research on the European Union when he writes: “Looking at these broad currents of
academic discourse, we might formulate some desiderata for further reflection: the focus
of EU studies should [...] look for indicators and factors to explain the evolution of a
political system in a delimited area and over a delimited period of time.”
This chapter is structured into three main sections. The first section outlines the
main theoretical argument provided in the literature that aims at explaining why deadlock
in joint-decision making processes happens in the first place. This section draws on the
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work of Fritz Schaipf. In a nutshell, he argues that deadlock in the decision-making
process of the European Union happens due to the fact that European institutions depend
on the agreement among Member States. Member States are exclusively driven by their
concerns over material benefits and costs of a policy decision. Two fiirther aspects
explaining deadlock, are then discussed: the prospect of losing decision-making power
and competence and the costs of instrumental adjustment. Furthermore, this section
reviews the arguments that apply the logic of the “joint-decision trap" to decisions
pertaining to social and employment policy. Again, the work of Scharpf on positive and
negative integration is presented and then work by other scholars who have extended
Scharpf s point of view is examined. Most commonly, the literature mentions the
following three reasons why social and employment policy on the European Union level
are difficult to agree on: the preeminence of national welfare states, the lack of organized
interests on the EU level, and the lack of financial resources on the EU level. This
section concludes with an assessment of criticisms of Scharpf s argument. The
conclusion of this section agrees with the scholars who have pointed out that the
decision-making process in the European Union is characterized a closely linked pattern
of administrative interaction between supranational and national institutions.
Furthermore, the supranational institutions have been found to be capable of actively
shaping and influencing the policy preferences of the Member States and thereby
minimizing the occurrence of deadlock. Finally, the changes in decision rules from
unanimity to qualified majority vote has provided the supranational institutions with a
greater degree of capability to influence the agenda -setting and final decision-selection.
Thus, in sum, this section concludes that, while Scharpf is correct in predicting a certain
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degree of conflict among the Member States, especially pertaining to decisions in the area
of social and employment policy, what is needed is a theoretical framework which helps
to understand both the conditions under which deadlock can be overcome as well as the
role played by the relevant actors in the decision-making process. Such a framework
would also have to specify the resources and strategies likely to be employed by the
various actors.
The second section of this chapter outlines the arguments provided by two of the
main theoretical approaches in the field of European integration which explain under
what conditions and through which mechanisms deadlock can be overcome. These two
appioaches are neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. This section reviews
the main characteristics of both approaches and then assesses both their strengths and
weaknesses respectively. In a nutshell, neofunctionalists attribute independent causal
influence over EU policy development to supranational institutions that are working
closely with transnational actors and thereby are capable of swaying Member States’
decisions. In contrast, liberal intergovemmentalists believe that only Member States,
fully aware of their domestic economic and political interests, are central in the
negotiation and agreement on the details of policy developments. The conclusion of this
section agrees with scholars who have argued that the debate on the theories of European
integration should move beyond its current limitation of seeing the decision-making
process as being dominated either by supranational institutions or by national
governments. In particular it agrees with scholars who have suggested that the utility of
the theoretical approach depends on the levels of decisions made in the European Union.
41
The third and last section of this chapter outlines an alternative theory of decision-
making that combines insights from the work on policy analysis and two-level
entrepreneurship. The central theoretical argument developed in this section is that
policy-shaping and policy-setting decisions can substantially be influenced by the
Commission when it is able to either organize, aggregate or represent latent interests
among the Member States. Through a ratcheting mechanism of policy initiation,
mediation and mobilization, the Commission manages to exert a crucial degree of
influence on the final decisions taken by the governments during the multilateral
negotiations. This argument is developed in three steps: first, key aspects of the literature
on policy analysis are presented. Special attention is given to the work of Peterson
1995a, 2001, Peterson and Bomberg 1999. Second, the most recent work of Moravcsik
on two-level entrepreneurship is discussed. And then finally a causal model is presented
that predicts the mechanism by which the Commission attempts to influence the decision-
making process in the European Union.
2.1 The Logic of the Joint-Decision Trap
The process of European integration is often characterized by deadlock. A
classical explanation for the occurrence of deadloc k is provided by Fritz Scharpf (1988,
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1991, 1997). This section is divided into four subparts. The first part discusses both
' In his work he applies insights of the debate of interlocking politics in German
federalism (Politikverjlechtung) to the European Community. For the debate on German
federalism see Benz 1985, Hesse 1978, Johnson 1973, Riker 1964, Scharpf, Reissert,and
Schnabel (1976, 1977, 1978), Wheare 1964.
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the conditions and consequences of deadlock. The second part reviews the work of
scholars who have added two additional aspects in their explanation for deadlock: the
prospect of losing decision-making power and competence and the costs of instrumental
adjustment. The third part reviews the arguments that apply the logic of the “joint-
decision trap” to decisions pertaining to social and employment policy. Here, the work of
Scharpf on positive and negative integration provides the basis on for scholars who have
generally mentioned three reasons why social and employment policy on the European
Union level are difficult to agree on: the preeminence of national welfare states, the lack
ol organized interests on the EU level, and the lack of financial resources on the EU
level. The fourth part of this section, discusses various criticisms of Scharpf s argument.
The conclusion of this section agrees with the scholars who have pointed out that the
decision-making process in the European Union is characterized a closely linked pattern
of administrative interaction between supranational and national institutions.
Furthermore, the supranational institutions have been found to be capable of actively
shaping and influencing the policy preferences of the Member States and thereby
minimizing the occurrence of deadlock. Finally, the changes in decision rules from
unanimity to qualified majority vote has provided the supranational institutions with a
gieatei degree of capability to influence the agenda
-setting and final decision-selection.
Thus, in sum, this section concludes that, while Scharpf is correct in predicting a certain
degree of conflict among the Member States, especially pertaining to decisions in the area
of social and employment policy, what is needed is a theoretical framework which helps
to undei stand both the conditions under which deadlock can be overcome as well as the
i°le played by the relevant actors in the decision-making process. Such a framework
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would also have to specify the resources and strategies likely to be employed by the
various actors.
In a nutshell, Scharpf argues that due to the institutional characteristics of the
European Community (EC), joint decision making is severely hampered and therefore
only suboptimal policy outcomes can be achieved. Specifically two institutional
conditions of the EC are responsible for this outcome: (1) central government decisions
(EC decisions) are directly dependent upon the agreement of constituent governments
(member states), and (2) the agreement of constituent governments must be unanimous or
nearly unanimous. Since the European Community’s decisions directly depend upon the
unanimous agreement of the Member States, actors are likely to find themselves in a
joint decision trap. Here, they are unable to either proceed to new decisions or to leave
the decision-making arena altogether. The consequence of this arrangement is that the
central government is not free to respond creatively to external demands, or to anticipate
future consensus; its actions are determined directly by the immediate self-interests of
member governments” (Scharpf, 1988, 255).
Given Schaipf s belief that the behavior of the Member States are exclusively
driven by self-interest, predicts that Member States will only cooperate on the level of the
European Community, if the anticipated utility of doing so is at least as great as the
.
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anticipated utility of non-cooperation. Substantive policy decisions on the European
For the same argument also see Nash (1950,1996). For counter-arguments which point
to the fact that there are many aspects which factor into the Member States’ definition of
interest, see the section below on the “Critique of Schaipf s Arguments.”
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Community level will therefore depend on the calculated assessment of the likely impact
these decisions will have on the distributive positions of the Member States. Since
unanimity is the guiding decision rule, all actors hold a potential veto in the decision
making process. In this situation, proposed changes of policies are only likely to happen
if at least one of the two conditions are met: (1) the distributive position of none of the
actors is reduced; or (2) those actors whose distributive position is reduced will be
compensated lor the loss. Unless at least one of these two conditions is met, this means
that policy change will not occur. Any single actor who either prefers the status quo or
i ejects the proposed modification to the policy can use his or her veto power and
therefore halt the decision-making process.
The gradual deterioration of the quality of public policy is the consequence of the
combination of institutional arrange ment of the European Community and the fact that
the behavior of Member States are exclusively driven by their utility maximizing
pieieiences. In a dynamic environment, in which conditions change all the time, public
policy which is unable to adapt and change simultaneously, will increasingly become
incapable of solving the very problems for which it was designed. This leads to a
systematic deterioration of the ‘goodness of fit’ between public policy and the relevant
policy environment” (Scharpf, 1988, 257). The consequences of this situation are both
inefficiency and ineffectiveness which manifest themselves in an “increase of
expenditures beyond the level that would be politically acceptable within a unitary
government
,
as well as the decline ol the “overall problem-solving capacity” (Scharpf,
1988, 255). Thus, in the words of Scharpf, “joint-decision systems are doubly vulnerable
to the consequences of non-agreement: they may be incapable of reaching effective
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agreement and they may lose the independent capabilities for action of their member
states” (Scharpf, 1988, 258). In this sense, the joint- decision trap is a trap in two ways:
On the one hand it leads to pathological policy choices and on the other hand it blocks its
own further institutional evolution. Thus, joint- decision systems are inherently incapable
of transforming themselves into institutional arrangements of greater policy potential.
2.1.1 Building on Scharpf’s Argument
Drawing on the work of Fritz Scharpf, several scholars have added two more
aspects to the list of items that factor into the Member States’ utility function. In addition
to Scharpf s focus on material benefits and costs of a policy decision, the following two
items have been identified: ( 1 ) the prospect of losing decision-making power and
competences, and (2) the costs of instrumental adjustment. Given the institutional
characteristics of the joint-decision-making arrangements on the European Union, the
effect of both cleavages is to hamper the possibility of policy development and change.
I he consequence again is deadlock and ultimately suboptimal policy outcomes.
Accoiding to seveial authors, the prospect of gaining or losing decision-making
power and competences through a specific policy decision determines if IVfember States
are willing to cooperate with each other on the European Union level (Benz 1992, Friies
1998, Hertier 1997). As pointed out by Wolfgang Wessels ( 1997, 287), “a
comprehensive loss of sovereignty does not lie in the self-interest of governments and
administration.” Also, along similar lines, Keohane (1984, 88) has argued that since
governments put a high value on the maintenance of their own autonomy, it is usually
impossible to establish international institutions that exercise authority overstates.”
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Given this preference of Member States, the higher the risk of loosing decision-making
power and competences, the less Member States are willing to cooperate with each other
on the European Union level. Put in other words, this means that the higher the risk of
losing decision-making power for each Member State, the smaller the possible ‘win-set’.
As pointed out by Sebenius (1992, 333), the risk for deadlock is determined by the “set of
possible agreements that are better for each potential party than the noncooperative
alternatives to an agreement.” This means that the smaller the set of possible agreements,
.
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the larger the risk for deadlock.
Additionally, several scholars have argued persuasively, that concerns about
decision-making power and competences of the Member States in the integration process
are synonymous with concerns about state sovereignty (Hine 1998, 1-13, Hussein and
Menon 1996, 1-10). Sovereignty is defined by Poggi (1990, 21) through the following
aspects:
The controlling organization is a state in so far as it is (among
other things) sovereign: that is, it claims, and if necessary is
willing to prove, that it owes to no other power its control over the
population in question; that it responds to no other organization for
the modalities and the outcomes of that control. It exercises that
control on its own account, activating its own resources,
unconditionally; does not derive it from or share it with any other
entity.
As discussed below, both neofunctionalism as well as liberal intergovernmental ism
otter an alternative view of win -sets. In a nutshell, neofunctionalists believe that the
scope of possible agreements among the Member States is largely influenced by the
actions of supranational institutions. Liberal intergovemmentalists point to “log-rolling”,
package -deals and trade-offs as a way of expanding the win-sets.
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The focus here is on the degree to which European integration has an impact on
the capacities of the state to act autonomously. The more this capacity is likely to be
curtailed by a policy decision on the European Union level, the more the Member States
can be expected to not agree to such a policy change.
Second, a number of scholars have pointed out that also concerns over the costs of
necessary instrumental adjustment deriving from policy changes caused by joint
decisions, factor into Member States utility function.
3
* The degree, to which such costs
are expected to occur as a consequence of decisions taken on the EU level, will reduce
the likelihood with which Member States are willing to agree to such policy changes. As
pointed out by Scharpf (1997, 2), “conflicts are likely to arise from differences [...] in
institutional structures, and hence differences in the cost of adjustment if one of the other
national models were chosen for uniform European solutions.”
Thus, the woik of scholars who have build on Scharpfs arguments brings to the
forefront the following two important conclusions: first, deadlock on the EU level is
likely to the degree to which the outcome of joint decisions are seen by the Member
States either as a loss in power and decision competence or as incurring costs of
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instrumental adjustment. This conclusion is summarized by Heritier (1999, 15) when
she points out that “deadlock emerges in multi-level governance if, under conditions of
consensual decision-making, individual actors are unwilling to acquiesce to the proposed
solution, be it due to a loss of benefits, a loss of decisional power, or the costs of
38
' For this argument see Grande 1995, Hertier, Knill, and Mingers, 1996.
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For a discussion of this cleavage for instance see Newman 1993.
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instrumental adjustment" Second important conclusion is that the policy-making process
in die European Union can be seen as the outcome of the following two general cleavages
that had to be resolved: first, the question of the appropriate level of authority, and
second the question of the appropriate legal instrument to bring about the agreed on
measure.
The following section reviews arguments that apply the logic of the joint-decision
trap to decisions pertaining to social and employment policy. Based on Scharpf s work
on positive and negative integration, tliree further arguments are put forward: the
pi eeminence of national welfare states, the lack of organized interests on the EU level,
and the lack of financial resources on the EU level.
2.1.2 Negative/Positive Integration and Social Policy
In the literature on the development of policies on the European Union level, it is
commonly stated that there is variation in the degree to which deadlock is overcome:
Some policy areas are more subject to the influence of supra-national decision-making
than others (for instance see Jachtenfuchs 2001, Majone 1994, Nugent (1994a, 304),
Pollack (1997, 1 19), Sbragia 1993). Hence, what is needed is an analysis which is
capable of specifying the idiosyncrasies of different policy areas and how these
chai acteristics foster or hamper the development of joint decision-making on the
European Union level, especially with regard to social and employment policies. The
presentation of this analysis in this section is structured into two subparts: First,
Scharpf s argument pertaining to positive and negative integration is presented. Second,
the work of scholars is discussed that have outlined the following three additional reasons
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why social and employment policy would be difficult to agree on at the European Union
level: the preeminence of national welfare states, the lack of organized interests on the
EU level, and the lack of financial resources of the EU.
4°
A prominent explanation for the difference in the degree of Europeanization of
policy areas is provided by Fritz Scharpf in his analysis of negative integration versus
positive integration. In a nutshell, Scharpf argues that social and employment policies
are particularly difficult to agree on under the conditions of joint decision-making on the
European Union level due to two factors: (1) social and employment policies belong to a
group of regulatory policies which require intergovernmental agreeme nts for their
development, (2) different levels of economic interests among Member States lead to
conflicts of interests among the decision-makers. The consequence of these two factors
is that there will be an increase of a “competence gap, in which national policy is
severely restrained in its problem-solving capacity, while European policy is constrained
by the lack of intergovernmental agreement” (Scharpf 1996, 15).
Scharpt arrives at that conclusion by developing his argument in three steps: First,
he differentiates between two categories of regulatory policies: “product-related”
Note that this section is followed by a critique of both Scharpf s arguments.
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Scharpf s concept has been applied to human rights policies, immigration policies,
environmental policies, and social policy. See Alston and Weiler 1999, Geddes 2001,
Gehring 1998, Maduro (2000, 1999), Ziim 1997. Additionally it should be noted that
Knill and Lehmkuhl ( 1999) criticize Scharpf s distinction by pointing out that he misses a
third category of integration, namely “framing integration.” However, Risse’s (1999)
criticism of this third category seems rather appropriate: analytically the authors fail to
provide enough substance to convincingly distinguish this third category.
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regulations and “process-related” regulations.
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While product
-related regulations aim at
eliminating national restraints on trade and distortions of competition, process-related
regulations aim at shaping the conditions under which markets operate. Second, he
argues that agreements on process-related regulation depends upon the intergovernmental
agreements of national Member States in the Council of Europe. In contrast, agreements
on product- related regulations are pushed forward by the European Court of Justice and
the European Commission “behind he back of political processes” (Scharpf 1996, 19).
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Finally, he points out that process-related regulations increase the costs of production and
hence pit Member States with different levels of economic development against each
other: rich and high regulatory Member States tend to demand higher levels of regulation,
while poor and low regulatory Member States prefer non-agreements, that is the status
quo.
The consequence of the different levels of economic development and the
institutional arrangements of decision-making is that Member States will not be able to
agree on social and employment policies on the level of the European Union. Over the
long-run, while negative integration with its market-making mechanisms will
" This distinction is inspired by the work of Rehbinder and Steward (1988, 10-13),
Tinbergen 1965.
43
Wolfang Streeck (1996, 67) provides an explanation for the role of the Commission
and the Courts in the process of negative integration when he points out that “the removal
of barriers to cross-border trade and mobility is less threatening to national sovereignty
and less demanding of democratic legimitation than the creation and enforcement of
rights and obligations of citizenship, especially the modification of property rights and
the institutionalization of social rights to a minimum level of subsistence.”
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continuously be developed, positive integration with the market correcting
will increasingly fall behind.
mechanisms
In line with Scharpf s argument that social policy is subject to intergovernmental
agreements, several scholars have outlined the following three additional reasons why
social and employment policy would be difficult to agree on at the European Union level:
the preeminence of national welfare states, the lack of organized interests on the EU
level, and the lack of financial resources of the EU. These arguments will be First, a
number of scholars have pointed out that the preeminence of national welfare states will
make the development of European social policies rather difficult (Banting 1995,
Hantrais 2000, Kersbergen 2000, Leibfried and Pierson 1995, Majone 1995, Padoan
2001, Scharpf 1997c). Here the argument is that the political reluctance of the Member
States to give up their power in social affairs is driven by Member States’ interest to
preserve one of their defining areas of statehood: social policy is a main source to derive
support from citizens and in the process gain legitimacy. For instance, Leibfried and
Pierson ( 1 995, 2 1 ) argue that a 11 Member States of the European Union have “identified
social policy as a critical instrument for constructing political legitimacy” and thereby
fight tenaciously over jurisdictional boundaries. Any social policy agreed at the
Euiopean level will be viewed by the Member States as a competition for support and
legitimacy with the citizen.
Second, several scholars have pointed out that social policy is difficult to agree on
at the European Union level, because the social forces which would be interested in such
arrangements are rather weak and poorly organized (Rhodes 1995, 1997, Streeck 1996).
While business interests have been quite successful in organizing themselves and thereby
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having their interests represented in the EU polices, trade unions lack the organizational
strength as well as the degree of interest representation. Thus, the argument presented in
this literature is that given this void of forces that could push for social policy, the
European Union is unlikely to develop a social agenda.
And finally, several scholars have pointed out that social policy on the European
Union level is difficult to develop, since the EU lacks the necessary financial resources to
do so. As pointed out by Majone (1993, 160-161), “the Community does not have, and
will not have in the foreseeable future, anything approaching the financial resources
required by modem welfare states. The EC budget, even after approval of the ‘Delors II
package’, amounts to less than 1.3 per cent of the total GDP of the Member States and to
less than 4 per cent of the central government spending of these countries (average
government spending in OECD countries is 40 per cent of the GDP).” Thus the
development of distributive as well as redistributive policies is severely hampered.
Tims in sum, there are three argument presented in the literature why social and
employment policies are difficult to develop on the European Union level. These
arguments are summarized by Leibfried and Pierson (1999, 6), when they point out that
theie are formidable obstacles for such policies: “limited fiscal resources, jealous member
states protection of ‘state-building’ resources, and an unfavourable distribution of power
among interest groups.”
2.1.3 Critique of Scharpf’s Arguments
Most of the criticis ms of Scharpf s argument are directed at the assumptions he is
making. The following section reviews the arguments that question the validity of these
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assumptions. I, proceeds in the following steps: First, a number of scholars have pointed
out that the policy process in the European Union is characterized by an interlocking of
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competences. Administrative structures both on the supranational as well as the
national level have begun to increasingly. Second, a large body of literature has
demonstrated that institutions do matter and that the institutional arrangements in
particular are crucial for the process of decision-making. Institutional arrangements not
only influence the ability of different actors to set the agenda and contribute towards
decision selection, but more broadly speaking, structure the political struggles among all
the relevant actors. Third, many scholars have argued that changes in the rules guiding
decision-making have allowed many decisions on the EU level to be taken by qualified
majority vote. Thus, in a nutshell, this subsection concludes that, while Scharpf is correct
in predicting a certain degree of conflict among the Member States, especially pertaining
to decisions in the area of social and employment policy, what is needed is a theoretical
framework which helps to understand both the conditions under which deadlock can be
overcome as well as the role played by the relevant actors in the decision-making
process. Such a framework would also have to specify the resources and strategies likely
to be employed by the various actors. The remaining part of this chapter then reviews
prominent pathways out of deadlock and then attempts to build an alternative model.
Central to Scharpl s argument about the joint decision trap is the assumption that
the decision-making process in the European Union is characterized by two aspects: (1)
the supranational institutions are dependent on the consensus among the Member States
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For the notion of "interlocking relationship” between the Council and the Commission
see for instance Armingeon (1997, 96).
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and (2) that this consensus has to be reached under the decision rules of unanimity.
However, alter decades of the European integration process, many scholars have pointed
out that these conditions may no longer be prevalent.
As to the first condition, it has been pointed out that one can observe increasingly
deepenedand widened areas of policy cooperation and mechanisms of policy-making
between and among the Member States and the supranational institutions of the European
Union. For instance as mentioned by Benz and Eberlein (1998, 2) “the gloomy picture of
deadlock sits oddly with much recent empirical research which stresses the dynamism,
success or even problem-solving capacity of European policy-making in diverse policy
fields. Thus, these empirical cases point to the possibility that the first condition which
is ciitical for the existence of the joint-decision trap, may no longer be prevalent. The
European Union is not characterized by the dominance of strong Member States which
would piedominately interact with each other and exclude weak supranational institutions
in the decision-making process. Instead, many scholars have argued that the European
Union is characteiized by a significant trend toward a mutual ‘interlocking’, ‘engrenage’,
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and ‘Verflechtung.’ In the words of Wessels (1992, 238),
“the policy cycle of the EC is characterized by a high a widely
spread degree of ‘fusion’, of ‘interlocking’ of national and EC civil
servants (as well as of politicians and lobbies). This EC pattern of
administrative and political interaction reflects a trend by which
Member States ‘pool’ their sovereignties and mix them with
competences of the EC into a system to which the notion of
‘cooperative federalism’ can be applied. [...] The term
‘cooperative’ thus signals two closely linked patterns of
administrative interaction: the way state administrations develop
their national policy-making style in a ‘horizontal view’ and the
45
For instance see Bellier (1997, 1 14).
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way several national and international administrations shape
common policies in a ‘vertical view.’ These trends are mutually
reinforcing.”
This observation leads to the conclusion that the process of policy-making has to
be understood in light of these various interlinkages: policy domains of the Member
States are no longer free from the influence of supranational decisions nor are the
supranational institutions entirely captivated by the preferences of the Member States in
each instance of joint decision making. Instead, policymaking has to be seen as the
outcome of the institutionalized interactions of both national and supranational actors.
Along the same logical line, one can point out that there is a large body of
literature which underscores the fact that these interlinkages between the supranational
and the national systems of governance represent institutional arrangements which are
crucial in the policy process (Peters 1992, Sbragia 1992, Andersen and Eliassen 1993,
Hull 1993). The most important insight of this institutionalist viewpoint is that, although
the Member States cieated the institutions of the EU and delegated authority to them
through the Treaty and its subsequent revisions, the institutions have taken a life of their
own. The basic assumption of this literature is that institutions do matter, and that to
understand the policy-making process of the European Union, one must focus on how
For a discussion of ‘cooperative federalism’ see Kirchner 1992, Wessels 1994. For a
discussion of the arrangement of “pooled sovereignty” see Keohane and Hoffman (1991,
13). It should be noted that throughout the history of integration studies a broad variety
of labels have been used to refer to this phenomenon. Among many others there are for
instance “pluralistic security community” (Deutsch 1957), “regime” (Hoffman 1982,
Wallace 1996), “civitas europae” (Schneider 1995), “regulatory state” (Majone 1994), “a
new style of confederation of old states.” (Elazar 1994), “confederal consociation”
(Chryssochoou 1997), and “condominio” (Schmitter 1996).
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institutional arrangements mediate the political struggles among all the relevant policy
actors (Buhner (1994, 355) and 1997, 1998).
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While the institutionalist perspective does
not deny the continued importance of the Member States, especnlly in decisions that
detennine the “rule of the game” of the European Union, i, does, however, recognize that
the, influence and power have become circumscribed, “embedded in a dense, complex
institutional environment that cannot be easily described in the language of interstate
bargaining” (Pierson and Leibfried 1995, 6). As pointed out by Pierson (1996, 145)
The evolution of EC policy over time may constrain member
states not only because institutional arrangements make a reversal
of course difficult when member states discover unanticipated
consequences ol their policy preferences change [... since] social
adaptation to EC institutions and policies drastically increases the
cost of exit from existing arrangements for member states. Rather
than reflecting the benefits for institutionalized exchange,
continuing integration could easily reflect the rising costs of “non-
Europe.”
This conclusion fits well with Pollack (1997, 107) who pointed out that “the
functions of supranational institutions may reflect not so much the preferences and
intentions of their member state principals, but rather the preferences of the supranational
institutions themselves. Thus, it appears to be particularly fruitful to examine the
efficacy of the ‘stickiness’ of previous decisions and to analyze the degree to which this
aspect influences the outcome of the policy process, especially with regard to agenda-
setting and decision-selection. As argued by Pierson (1996, 143), “ the rules of the game
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For work in the approach of neo- institutionalism among many see Armstrong and
Bulmer 1998, Evans (et al.) 1985, Hall and Taylor 1996, Immergut 1999, Jupille and
Caporaso 1999, March and Olsen (1984, 1989), North 1990, Pierson 1998, Pierson and
Skocpol 2000, Thelen 1999, Thelen and Steinmo 1992, Weaver and Rockman 1993.
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within the Community were designed to inhibit even modest changes of course. The
same requirements that make initial decision making difficult also make previously
enacted refonns hard to undo, even if those reforms turn out to be unexpectedly costly or
to infringe on member-state sovereignty.” In this way, supranational institutions may
well be able to actively shape and influence policy preferences of the Member States.
As to the second condition, many scholars have pointed out that the rules guiding
decision-making have changed quite dramatically (for instance see Falkner 2000).
Starting with the Single European Act and further continued by the Maastricht Treaty in
1991, a range of issue areas can now be decided by qualified majority vote. Thus, to the
degree to which decisions which were previously guided by the rules of unanimity are
now replaced with decisions based on qualified majority rules, the second condition of
48
the joint-decision begins to disappear.
In sum, ScharpPs analysis of the determinants of positive and negative integration
correctly predicts the occurrence of conflicts among Member States and supranational
institutions during the process of policy-making. However, the conditions for a joint-
decision trap may no longer be in place. Important in this context is the insight from
Blom-Hansen s (1996, 36) work in which he demonstrates that “joint-decision traps are
not inherent to joint-decision systems [...]” instead “the effects ofjoint-decision systems
on public policy are contingent upon the central government’s ability to threaten
intergovernmental actois with exit [...] and thus to make a credible threat of using
“alternative policy-making arenas.” Therefore, the degree to which the European
48
For this argument see Falkner 2000. On the implications of changes of decision- rules
for EU policy-making see Mazey and Richardson 1993.
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institutions can circumvent the unanimous decision-making arrangements of the Member
States, determines the availability of possible escape routes out of deadlock. What is
needed is a theoretical framework that helps to understand both the conditions under
which deadlock can be overcome as well as the role played by the relevant actors in the
decision-making process. Such a framework would also have to specify the resources
and strategies likely to be employed by the various actors.
2.2 Prominent Pathways out of Deadlock
Given the fact that joint-decision making on the European Union level is
hampered by several factors, it appears to be relevant to examine which theories of
European integration might help to explain when and under what conditions deadlock can
be overcome. After decades of scholarly work on European integration a plethora of
49
approaches and theories have been developed. Two of the most dominant theories,
neofunctionalism and liberal intergovemmentalism are examined here.
$
° The following
questions guide the discussion of these two approaches: In which way does each
approach offer clues as to why, and under which conditions stalemate during the
49
For a discussion ot different theories of European integration, among many see
Caporaso and Keeler 1995, Cram 1997, Gestohl 2000, Leonardi 1995, McCormick 1999,
Mutimer 1994, Rosamond 1999.
5°
A complete review of both approaches is beyond the scope this investigation. This
dissertation focuses only on those aspects which illuminate the theoretical distinctions
relevant for analyzing the development of Europe-wide employment policy.
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decision-making process may be avoided? What factors and forces are identified by each
approach as being crucial in driving the process of European integration forward?
This section first reviews the main characteristics of each approach and then
assesses both their strengths and weaknesses respectively. In a nutshell, neofunctionalists
attribute independent causal influence over EU policy development to supranational
institutions that are working closely with transnational actors and thereby are capable of
swaying Member States’ decisions. In contrast, liberal intergovemmentalists believe that
only Member States, fully aware of their domestic economic and political interests, are
central in the negotiation and agreement on the details of policy developments. The
conclusion of this section agrees with scholars who have argued that the debate on the
theories of European integration should move beyond its current limitation of seeing the
decision-making process as being dominated either by supranational institutions or by
national governments. In particular it agrees with Peterson and Bomberg (1995a, 1995b,
2001 ) wh° have suggested that the utility of the theoretical approach depends on the
levels of decisions made in the European Union: for policy-shaping and policy-setting
decisions a theoretical model that predicts the influence of a two- level entrepreneur has
the greatest potential. The final “history making” decisions might best be explained by
liberal intergovernmentalism. Therefore, building on the work of Moravcsik (1999) on
two-level entrepreneurship, an alternative model is developed.
2.2.1 Neofunctionalism
The early neofunctionalist literature of the 1950s and 1960s believed that
decisions on the European level and thus the breaking of deadlock was the outcome of
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the interaction of supranational institutions with a range of subnational political actors.
5 '
hi drawing on the interaction of these two elements, this approach is primarily concerned
with explaining "how and why nation-states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why
they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual
attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflicts between
themselves” (Haas 1970, 610). The central claim of this literature is that deadlock in
regional integration is avoided by the dynamic process of spillover from one sectoral
domain to another, as societal demands for European policies were encouraged and
translated into concrete proposals by the supranational institutions, the Commission in
52
particular.
In this formula, political integration is conceptualized on the grounds of an
institutionalized pattern of interest politics that is played out within existing institutions.
Central among these institutions are supranational institutions and in particular the
European Commission. Governments of the Member States are allocated a somewhat
passive role: they are seen to fulfill the ambitions of various parts of society to be
creatively lesponsive in the process. In this context, neofunctionalists point out that
while in governments rest the ultimate power to make policy decisions, given the
The oi igins ot this approach can be seen in efforts of providing a sympathetic critique
of functionalism. For works in functionalism see in particular Mitranyl966. For a
discussion of functionalism see Zellentin 1992.
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For an overview of the work in the neofunctionalist approach see Battistelli and Isemia
1993, Cram 1996, George 1996, Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996, Pentland 1973.
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.
This expression is from Harrison (1974, 80).
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heterogeneity of their interests in certain issue areas, unilateral evasion or recalcitrance
may prove unprofitable if it sets a precedence for other governments. Thus, governments
are seen as being motivated to yield to the pressures of converging supranational and
subnational interests. As recently pointed out by Schmitter (1996, 5) one of the
maxims of neo- functionalist approach is the realization that “states are not the exclusive
and may no longer be the predominant actors in the regional/intemational system.”
The outcome of the interactions of these forces is a gradual widening of the scope
of shared competences between the supranational and the national institutions. This
process of political integration is defined by Haas (1958, 16) as a “process whereby
political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties,
expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or
demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of
political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing
ones.”
Central to the neofunctionalists understanding of the dynamics of integration is
the concept of spillover. The literature on spillover distinguishes three kinds of spillover:
functional spillover, political-spillover, and cultivated spillover/ Overall, the concept of
spillover postulates a gradual accumulation of political power at the supranational level,
as the national states transfer “authority-legitimacy.” According to the logic of this
54
For this line of argument see Mattli (1999, 24-25).
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The text here follows George’s (1991, 23) suggestion of strictly distinguishing those
three types of spillovers. For a similar conception of spillover see Choi (1995, 7-8),
Mutimer (1989), and Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991.
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mechanism, initial steps toward integration would be triggered by endogenous economic
developments. Political dynamics following these developments would lead to further
co-operation. Governments place their decisions on the opinions of technocrats.
Technocrats make economic plans at the regional level that follows inevitable reactions
to the complexity of modem economies. These same complexities are likely, in the
longer term, to trap governments in a web of unintended consequences spun by their
previous commitments.
The logic of functional spillover predicts that since social and economic actors are
motivated by the advantages of collective action, they develop expectations and demands
lor common policies, which the empowered institutions could then transform into a
permanent integrative impulse by meeting these expectations which further encourages a
shift of activities and loyalties to the European level. According to Haas, these actors
begin to press for integration in two situations: ( 1 ) either they find their sector hampered
due to the effects of non- integration of others sectors or (2) they observe a successful
integration outside their own sector and would like to stay on par with the overall
development. As coordinated policies in one area demonstrated the inadequacy of
uncoordinated policies in another, common action would spread to new functional
domains through a process of spill-over.
Political Spillover occurs when the existence of supranational organizations sets
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in motion a self-reinforcing process of institution- building. Nye (1971, 202) describes
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,
Also see Lindberg (1971, 10).
57 ^
For example see Haas (1958, 17) and Lindberg (1971, 9).
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the distinctive feature of this kind of spillover in the following way: “Problems are
deliberately linked together into package deals, not on the basis of technological
necessity but on the basis of political and ideological projections and political
possibilities." Thus, to a large extent, political spillover happens because integration
between nation-states leads to the formation of coalitions by various transnational
groupings. These coalitions consist of interest groups, national representatives and
supranational institutions attempt to influence the policy agenda in order to promote their
own interest.
The logic of cultivated spillover predicts that “international institutions maximize
decision-making” by means of providing the crucial service of mediator and thereby
“yield the greatest amount of process toward the goal of political community” (Haas,
1961, 369). Classical diplomatic negotiations without such a mediator, rarely move
beyond the minimum common denominator. Here the outcome will be determined by the
position of the least cooperative partner. In contrast, if mediatory services are provided,
foi instance by the Commission, negotiations may move further and not only involve the
splitting of the difference, but also the upgrading of the common interest. As
summarized by Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991, 6), “the prime role of the Commission,
theiefoie, is to otter solutions which involve the upgrading of common interest. The
outcome ot the integration process will to some degree be dependent on its ability and
will to perform this function.”
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2.2.1.1 The Role of the Commission in the Policy-Making Process
Much of the old as well as recent neofunctionalist work focuses on the ability of
the Commission to directly shape the preferences of the Member States and thereby not
only help the Member States to overcome deadlock, but also to decisively determine the
outcome of multilateral negotiations. Based on observations of the activities of the
Commission within the EU policy process, the role of the Commission is seen as being
central in the policyshaping phase and thereby critically influences the policy-setting and
has thus important implications for the choices available to Member States during the
history-making decisions of IGC.
However, the literature detailing the influence of the Commission is rather
descriptive and merely lists the various roles by which the Commission supposedly
manages to exert such an influence or the various characteristics particularly influential
members of the Commission had. For instance, one often finds reference to the fact that
as an agenda
-setter” (Pollack 1994) and “broker of interests” (Mazey and Richardson),
the Commission has learned to maximize its room for maneuver in the policy process
while attempting to avoid direct conflict with the member states. As the Commission has
“matured as a bureaucracy” (Christiansen 1996), it has learned to act as a “purposeful
58
It should be noted that while there was a decline in scholarly interest in
neofunctionalist analysis during the 70s and early 80s (especially among
neofunctionalists), neofunctionalism has reemerged in the late 1980s and 1990s. For a
critique of neofunctionalism see Groom 1978, Haas (1971, 1975, 1976). For recent work
of neofunctionalists see for example see Burley and Mattli (1993), Coombes 1970,
Christiansen 1997, Cini 1996, Edwards and Spence 1997, Jensen 2000, Peters 1992,
Niemann 1998, Nugent (1994, 1999), and Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997a, 1998,’
1999). Several case studies have demonstrated the importance of the Commission in the
policy making process. For instance see Fuchs 1994, Sandholz 1992, Schmidt 1997a.
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opportunist:” knowing that its purpose is to expand its competence it "is fairly flexible as
to the means of achieving” its goal. (Cram 1993 and 1997, 187).
5
’ The Commission is
seen as being able to expand its competences in areas where it is difficult for member
states to rain it in. As pointed out by Cram (1999, 49), “the long-term effects of these
activities can be to lock the member states into commitments that they might not initially
,
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nave chosen themselves.”
Institutionally, the Commission is seen as being able to play these roles due to its
function as guardian of the Treaties and defender of the general interest. This formal role
° f the Commission is seen t0 be its most important tool by which it can act as a policy
entrepreneur and influence the policymaking process.
6
'
Most importantly, the
Commission’s right of initiative empowers it to make proposals on the matters contained
in the Treaty, either because the Treaty expressly so provides or because the Commission
considers it necessary. This power of initiative is exclusive in respect of Community
matters, the principle being that the Council takes decisions only on a proposal from the
Commission, so that there is a coherent framework for all initiatives. In the words of
Wise and Gibb (1993, 16), since “the Community’s legislative capacity is dependent on
the readiness of the Commission to formulate policy proposals [...] the Commission is
more than a supranational civil service, playing an overt political role in setting goals for
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Hot further discussion on the organizational strategy of ’purposeful opportunism’ see
Klein and O’Higgins 1985.
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For a similar point see Schmidt (1996, 8) and Usher (1994, 149).
For the description of the Commission as a policy entrepreneur see Sandholtz and
Zysman (1989, 96).
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the Community.” Along similar lines, Lindberg (1963, 71) argues that the Commission
plays a significant integrative role when he points out that:
The Commission bases its proposals on a judgment of what the
fZrr are llkduy t0 aCCept This has not meant in practicethat the Commission has proposed the minimum which was
acceptable, but that its proposals were designed to accommodate
enough from each national position to win support or
acquiescence, albeit grudging.”
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However, it should be noted, that in the cases that such an influence is attributed
to the Commission, the Commission did not have a formal voting rights or coercive
means at its disposal. Instead, the Commission’s influence is attributed to its role as a
leader as well as its capacity of manipulating ideas and information. For instance
emphasizing the importance of leadership, Cox states (1996, 317), “the quality of
executive leadership may prove to be the most critical single determinant of the growth in
scope and authority of international organization.”
Neofunctionalists, in this context, provide a detailed list of political skills of the
Commission which allow it to wield power informally over Member States. The most
explicit list of such characteristics is provided by Lindberg and Scheingold in 1970 (92-
95). In their study, they discussed the Commission’s roles and capabilities. Maintaining
that the Commission indeed had succeeded in wielding considerable decision-making
power in the Community process, Lindberg and Scheingold identified five crucial
political skills ol the Commission: (1) goal articulation
,
entails the capacity to fonnulate
It should be noted that Scheingold ( 1965, 21) arrives at a similar conclusion in his
locus on the European Court of Justice when he points that the “Court is in a strong
position to play a creative role when it is dealing with an unforeseen ambiguity in the
detailed provisions which make up the body of the treaty.”
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long-tern, goals for the Community that can in turn be legitimated by reference to a
common European interest and that are capable of mobilizing supporter and neutralizing
opposition; (2) coalition-building, entails the capacity to identify problems to be solved
through coordinated action and to build coalitions with client groups and national
bureaucracies; (3) political experience end technical expertise, entails the capacity to
maximize national contacts, technical expertise, and political experience in the
organization; (4) task expansio n, entails the capacity to convince client groups and
governments of the need for new policies, new tasks, and new powers for the Community
institutions; and finally (5) brokerage andpackage deals, entails the capacity to play an
active role in intergovernmental bargaining, building support for its own proposals and
constructing deals which satisfy interests of all national governments. Along similar
lines, Puchala (1988, 205) has argued that bureaucrats who “can, and do, deliberately
engineer links among tasks and sectors in efforts to enhance their own authority and to
push toward the complete political unification of countries to which they are committed.”
Furthermore, several studies have maintained that these political skills are
available to the Commission, due to the exceptional skill set of the President of the
European Commission.
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What Cox (1996, 321) has termed “the great-man theory of
international organization” is often applied to the analysis of the influence Jacques
Delois influence over Member States policy preferences and ultimately the negotiation
outcomes. For instance, in an article published in 1989 Sandholtz and Zysman ascribe a
central i ole to the C ommission in developing the single market initiative. In this article
63
For instance see Endo 1999, Nugent 1994, Ross 1994, Schmidt 2001, and Vahl 1992.
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Sandh0ltZ and Zysman ar®ue that ,h<= Commission’s function as policy entrepreneur was
fundamental. Perceiving structural changes in the world economy and recognizing the
inadequacy ol national responses, the Commission successfully exercised political
leadership when proposing the completion of the Internal Market and mobilizing support
from transnational industrial interests. Thus, as pointed out by Sandholtz and Zysman
( 1989, 128), leadership was crucial in creating “a common European interest and then
constructing a set of bargains that embody that understanding.”^
2. 2. 1.2 Strengths of Neofunctionalism
I be most important contribution of neofunctionalism to the study of policy-
making on the level of the European Union can be seen in the fact that neofunctionalism
successfully combines the characteristics and dynamics of policy collaboration as
piedicted by lunctionalists with an analysis of the role of supranational institutions in
their attempt of balancing diverse interests in a mixed-actor setting. Neofunctionalists
main point of departure is the recognition of the essentially political nature of policy-
making to the extent that it contributes to the allocation of resources and the satisfaction
of interest. Accordingly, the understanding ol the process of policy-making is an
important contribution to the study of the dynamics of European integration.
Policy-making, is seen as being shaped and influenced by the interplay of group
interests in the political system, flic staking of claims and demands in return for
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For a similar assessment of the role of the Commission see Ross 1994.
exchanges of political loyalties reinforces the authority of the system as a whole.
According to neofunctionalists, this pattern of political activity can be directly transferred
to the international setting. Thus, in the European Union, governments, interests groups,
bureaucracies and eventually broader political elites will combine and pursue their goals
in a constellation comparable with domestic politics and will increasingly transfer their
loyalties from the national arena to the supranational arena due to the combined forces of
cross-sectoral policy links and the recruiting skills of the new supranational institutions,
in particular the European Commission. This line of argument is summarized by Webb
(1983, 17) when she points out that neofunctionalists most important contribution to the
study of European integration is the "emphasis on the distinctive features of Community
policy-making and, in particular, the investigation of specific bargaining and consensus-
producing mechanisms [which] broke new ground in the systematic study of the policy-
making process.”
2. 2. 1.3 Critique of Neofunctionalism
Most sharply criticized by intergovemmentalists is the neofunctionalists
’
picture
of the supranational institutions as engines and facilitators of European integration,
encoui aging societal demands, structuring the agenda, and brokering deals. Early
intergovemmentalist scholars, grounded in classical realist conceptions of anarchy,
conflict, and power politics, posit that governments had not and were not likely to endow
the EEC s supranational institutions with powers that would grant them an expansive role
in European politics.
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In a classic article, Stanley Hoffmann formulated in 1966 what is generally
regarded as the most influential critique of early neofunctionalist scholarship. Writing at
the height of French president Charles de Gaulle's “empty<hair” policy, which blocked
progress on European integration in the mid-1960s, Hoffmann points out that the belief in
a self-propelling integration process engineered by the supranational institutions was
highly unrealistic. Hoffman (1966, 863) writes,
“my own conclusion is sad and simple. The nation state is still
here. [...] Political unification could have succeeded if, on the one
hand, these nations had not been caught in the whirlpool of
different concerns, as a result of both profoundly different internal
concerns, as a result both ot profoundly different internal
circumstances and of outside legacies, and if, on the other hand,
they had been able or obliged to concentrate on ‘community
building to the exclusion of all problems situated either outside
their area or within each one of them.”
According to Hoffman, national governments are unlikely to confer powers to the
European institutions in areas of key importance to the national interest, and effectively
remained in control of the integration process. Thus, according to Hoffmann (1966, 909),
the authority of the supranational institutions remains “limited, conditional, dependent,
and reversible,” with little hope of change. In the words of Wallace, “the success of the
neo-functional approach dependedupon national governments not noticing - in effect
-
the gradual draining away of their lifeblood to Brussels.”
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For a discussion on the “empty-chair” policy see Dinan(1999, 46-50), Newhouse
(1967), Teasdale (1995, 104-1 10), Wood and Yesilada (1996, 38-46).
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Quoted in Scharpf (1988, 266).
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Ill a recent criticism of neofunctionalism, Moravcsik (1999, 272) classifies the
neofunctionalists predictions of international cooperation as a “supply-side approach”
and challenges the theorists of this approach with the following question (1999, 273):
"Why should governments, with millions of diverse and highly trained professional
employees, massive information-gathering capacity, and long-standing experience with
international negotiation at their disposal, ever require the services of a handful of
supranational entrepreneurs to generate and disseminate useful information and ideas?”
Thus, Moravcsik (1993, 514) takes issue with the neofunctionalist claim that the
supranational institutions enjoy substantial autonomy within their delegated powers,
lixamining the most important functions delegated to the institutions, Moravcsik does not
find any scope for independent initiative/
7
This dissertation agrees with this criticism and also observes that an
understanding of the policy-making process of the European Union requires an approach
that goes beyond being merely descriptive. While the detailed descriptions of the
leadership skills oi the Commissions’ President as well as the functional roles of the
C ommission as a whole is a valuable starting point, what is missing from this analysis, is
a clearer insight into the process by which these characteristics have helped the
Commission to actually contribute towards agenda
-setting and final decision-selection.
The claim of this dissertation is that such an insight can be gained through a
demand-side approach ol international cooperation, which is sensitive to the intrastate
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F-or a similar assessment of the limitations of supranational institutions see Garrett
1992, Garrett and Weingast 1993, Milward 1992, Moravcsik (1991, 1995, 1997, 1998,
1999), Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1999, Taylor 1983.
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dynamics of interest rep-esentation. In a nutshell, the theoretical frame developed below
points to the window of opportunity that the Commission is able to create for itself, by
acting as a twolevel entrepreneur. In its role as a twolevel entrepreneur, i, aggregates
and represents latent interests in the Member States and thereby indirectly exerts
sufficient pressure onto the respective governments to shape the policy preferences of the
Member States. Through a ratcheting mechanism described below, the Commission
gradually and indirectly influences the issues to be placed onto the agenda of the
European Union as well as the choices available to the Member states in the final
decision-selection.
Additionally, many scholars have pointed out that neofunctionalism provided
flawed predictions about the increasing evolution of supranational authority based both
on the logic of spillover and the transfer of loyalties of national elites to the supranational
level. For instance as Wessels (1997, 273) has pointed out, from a neoftinctionalist point
of view we would have expected to find “a linear growth, i.e. a rather smooth process
‘upwards’ to some soil of final state of a ‘federal union.” Wessels underscores his
argument by providing the figure (1) below as a way of demonstrating neofunctionalist
piedictions. However, a number of scholars have pointed out that such automaticity was
empirically flawed and theoretically not well founded.
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Figure (
I ) Neofunctionalist Prediction of the dynamic of European integration
2.2.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism
Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) explains how and why, in certain limited cases,
the European Union is successful in “pooling national sovereignty through qualified
majority voting rules” and thereby manages to overcome deadlock and to achieve the
delegation ol “sovereign powers to semi
-autonomous central institutions” (Moravcsik,
1993, 509). According to this approach integration occurs, because the Member States
wish it to occur since it is in their own economic or political self-interest.
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Thus,
decisions and the successful breaking of deadlock, on the level of the European Union are
the result of three related processes: (1) behavior of rational governments, (2) nationally
68 „ .
tor instance see Hoffman 1963.
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negotiated policy preferences, and (3, inlergoveimuenlal negotiations of vanous states.
The occurrence of deadlock on the European Union level is determined by the
preferences and the negotiation outcome of national governments. As principal agents
national governments are the only forces which dnve or prevent progress in European
cooperation. The institutions of the EU are merely instruments that can be utilized by
Member States whenever their national preferences can be enhanced by such a move.
The assumption of rational state behavior provides liberal intergovemmentalism
W.th a general framework of analysis, within which the costs and benefits of economic
interdependence are the primary detenninants of national preferences. Resolution of
distributional conflicts among governments is the outcome of the relative intensity of
national preferences, the existence of alternative coalitions, and the opportunity for issue
linkages.
The model of rational state behavior on the basis of domestically-constrained
preferences implies that international conflict and cooperation can be modeled as a
process that takes place in two successive stages: governments first define a set of
interests, then bargain among themselves in an effort to realize those interests.®
Metaphorically, these two stages shape demand and supply functions for international co
operation. A domestic preference formation process identifies the potential benefits of
policy coordination perceived by national governments (demand). The process of
interstate strategic interaction defines the possible political responses of the EC political
For the concept of the ‘two level’ game see Feld 1980, Paarlberg 1997, Patterson 1997
Moyer 1993, Putnam 1988, and Zangel 1994; for a “domestic politics” approach see
Bulmer 1983.
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SyStem “ PreSSUreS fr0m
'h0Se g°Vemmen,s (supply). The interaction of demand and
supply, of preference and strategic opportunities, shapes the foreign policy behavior of
states (Moravcsik 1993, 482).
This conceptualization of interest mediation has three implications: First, the
national preferences of the Member States are treated as exogenous to the negotiation
process. By the time Member States meet to discuss any proposals for agreement, their
preferences have already been determined by their respective domestic interests. In this
way, preferences are being treated as given and determined much prior to the process of
gotiation. Second, actor s preferences are assumed to remain fixed during the process
of interaction and bargaining. Bargains are struck through compromise, side-payments
and package deals, rather than through processes of persuasion and learning in which the
validity of actors claims are at stake. Third, the national governments serve as the crucial
link between the domestic and the international level. In this sense, governments act as
a gate-keeper between the domestic and international level” (Skjalm 1998, 10).
2.2.2. 1 Strengths of Liberal Intergovernmental^
L.beral intergovernmentalism represents an improvement on realist accounts of
international politics because it gives a major role to domestic politics. Instead of
assuming that state’s preferences can exclusively be derived from state’s security
concerns in the international system, the image of domestic politics as the driving force
of state’s preferences represents a fresh perspective with which to examine the sources of
preference formation. As Moravcsik (1993, 481) makes clear, “an understanding of
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domestic politics ,s a preconditton for, not a supplement to, the analysis of the strategic
interaction among states.”
In the intergovernmental decision-making processes of the European Union,
national politicians embody state interests and thereby reflect domestic policy
preferences. In this context, Moravcsik argues that (1993, 481),
-foreign policy goals of
national governments are viewed as vanring in response to shifting pressure from
omestic social groups. In this sense, state decision-makers respond to political
pressures nested within each state. Thus, the fifteen state executives bargaining in the
European arena are complemented by fifteen separate state arenas that provide the sole
channel for domestic political interests to the European level.
2.2.2 2 Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism
Liberal intergovernmentalism has been praised by some scholars for its value in
explaining the logic of European integration and simultaneously has been heavily
criticized by others for the limited value it provides when one attempts to explain the
mechanisms of policy-making in the European Union.” Four criticism are often repeated
in the literature: First, several scholars have pointed out that liberal
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It sh°uld be noted that Wincott has criticized Moravcsik for being ambiguous in the
attribution of causality According to Wincott, (1995, 600) “it is not clear whether headsgovernment are embedded in domestic and transnational civil society [. ] or whether2“^ has its impactj more weakiy ’ °niy via the ‘transmissi°n of
For a critique of liberal intergovernmentalism for instance see Foster 1998.
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intergovernmental^- assumption that Member States bring unita^ national preferences
to an international bargaining table is rather flawed.
72
For instance, Jacobson (1996, 93)
has pointed on, that "the heyday of models that depict the state as a unitary rational actor,
billiard ball, or black box apparently is drawing to a close." Along similar lutes, Pollack
(2001, 226) argues that the model of preference formation which liberal
mtergovemmentalism employs “ignores the endogenous effects of EU membership
[•and thereby ignores] one of the fundamental features of the integration process.”
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Along the same logic, Lewis (2000, 266) has argued that this image of preference
formation “remains incomplete and partial. In particular, models of EU decision-making
need to allow for the possibility where sociality and the density of the normative
environments can affect bargaining outcomes by constructing interests and identities in
the first place. Here the argument is that liberal intergovemmentalism ignores that
Member State preferences are shaped by factors other than domestic politics. Thus, when
the Member States are bargaining at the Council table, it is not possible to separate their
domestic policy preferences from their identity as members of the European Union. As
pointed out by Cloutier (1999, 27), the “identity as a member slate precedes any policy
preference formation by the member state, even before domestic polilical influences
attempt to change or shape those preferences.” Along similar lines, Bosson, a former
French minister of European Affairs strengthened this argument when he pointed out that
“I believe the more one is nationalist, the more one is European. In tomorrow’s world.
For instance see Wallace 1999.
For a similar argument also see Sandholtz 1993.
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there is no chance of being a major power (‘grand'), free and respected without working
through Europe. Thus according to the arguments presented by various scholars.
Member States policy preferences are firs, generated from the Member State's identity as
a member of the European Union, prior to any response to domestic pressure or
bargaining at the Couneil table. This identity both constraints and shapes the policy
options available to each Member State.
??
Second, many scholars have pointed out that liberal intergovemmentalism
exaggerates the role of national governments in the decision-making processes of the
European Union. Especially scholars who work within the framework of multi-level
governance have pointed out “that European integration is a polity-creating process in
which authority and policy making influence is shared across multiple levels of
government sub-national, national and supranational” (Hooghe and Marks 1997, 22).
Even though these scholars still believe that Member States play an important role in the
decision-making process, they quite vigorously point out again and again, that Member
74 ^Quoted in Wise and Gibb (1993, 36).
7
'
It should also be noted that Lewis (1998, 484) goes even further in this argument when
he points out that most of the intergovernmental agreements were actually worked out
uimg meetings of the Coreper. He argues that “the Coreper is not just an influential
gioup of diplomats, but an institutional mechanism where Member States internalize EU
membership into their ‘self- 1 interest calculation. The permanent representatives share a
collective rationality based on the dual responsibility to deliver the goods both at home
and collectively at the EU level.” Additionally, Corbey (1995, 261) has pointed out that
the hbeial intergovemmentalists’ view on domestic sources of preference formation is
too restrictive since it fails to explain why in the process of integration requires some
notion of why similar preferences emerge more or less simultaneously in most of the
membei states and therefore it would “seems unlikely that the source of convergence can
be found at the domestic level.”
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States are far from being the most important actors m the policy-making process.
According to these scholars, decision
-making is not monopolized by state executives, but
instead is shared by actors a, different ievels (for instance see Egeberg and Tronda, 1997.
Grande 1996, Hooghe 1998, Kohler-Koch 1996, Marks (1993, 1996), Marks and Hooghe
2000, Scharpf 1994). For instance Hooghe and Marks (1997, 23) point out that
“supranational institutions - above all, the European Commission [...] have independent
influence in policymaking that cannot be derived solely from their role as agents of state
executives. State executives may play an important role, but so too do European- level
actors.” I lence an appropriate understanding of the forces and factors of policymaking
will always have to look beyond the preferences of the Member States and will have to
lake into account the preferences, strategies and resources of supranational and
subnational actors.
Thud, the assumption of liberal intergovemmentalism that Member States are
always free to make any decision is rather flawed according to several scholars. Instead
it has been pointed out that the changes in decision rules may have unintended
consequences, which can create gaps in Member States control and can create
opportunities for supranational and transnational actors to have autonomous influence on
policy making. Member states may unintentionally cede control by locking themselves
in policy preferences in the EU Treaties, and so tie the hands of future actors.
?6
A better
understanding of these dynamics can only be gained by analyzing policy processes over
It should be noted that there is a large body of literature on path dependence which
emphasizes the ways in which initial institutional or policy decisions
-even suboptimal
ones - can become self-reinforcing over time. Among many for instance see David 1994,
Dinutrakopoulos 2001, Krasner 1989, Pierson (1993, 2000), Zysman 1983.
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time. For instance Pierson (1996, 126) argues that “when European integration is
examined over time, the gaps in member-state control appear far more prominent than
they do in intergovernmental accounts.” Addttionally Majone (1989, 98) has argued that
the “results of institutional change cannot be evaluated with reference to discrete, isolated
decisions, but must be assessed in terms of sequences of interdependent decisions taken
by a variety of actors over time.” In this sense, liberal intergovemmentalism distorts the
reality of decision-making on the European Union level, by merely focusing on too short
of a time period. Many important decisions, preceding the intergovernmental bargains,
thereby drop outside of the frame of analysis. Along similar lines, Vickers (1965, 15) has
argued that “those who become engaged in a course of decision-making soon become
aware that each decision is conditioned not only by the concrete situation in wlich it is
taken but also by the sequence of past decisions; and that their new decisions in turn will
influence future decisions.” Building on this argument, Mazey and Richardson (1997.
118) have pointed out that "focusing on the behavior of the set of policy actors taking the
final decision may be misleading. One needs to know why are they deciding at all and
from which options they choose.”
Finally, as pointed out by Wessels (1997) the liberal intergovemmentalist and
realist prediction of the dynamic cf European integration is empirically rather flawed:
these views stress that the geopolitical revolution, and the subsequent radical
tiansformations ot the political context, leaves west European integration a child of the
Cold War.” The predicted trajectory of this theory is displayed in figure (2).
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AFigure (2) LI prediction of the dynamic of European integration.
Thus according to Wessels, these theories emphasize the disintegration of the
European integration project. The outcome of this trajectory will eventually be a political
system which very much looks like the traditional nation-state system. However,
precisely the increased trend of integration in the early 1990s (i.e. Single Market and
Economic and Monetary Union), and the continued efforts of deepening and widening
the integration project (enlargement), make it empirically difficult to observe such a
trajectory.
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2.2.3 Critique of Neofunctionalist
- Intergovernmental^ Dichotomy
As pointed out recently by Aspinwall and Schneider (2000, 2), “sharp divisions
Sti" Characlerize the theoret“' debate on regional collaboration."
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After decades of
scholarly disputes, the disagreements prevail over the relative importance of
supranational institutions vis-a-vis national actors in the policy nuking process and the
factors which are capable of explaining the overcoming of deadlock. Neofttnc.ionalism
and liberal intergovernmental™ are two contending approaches which seem to offer
rivaling interpretations. However, the critique of these two approaches above, point to
the fact that there is a general weakness in the way these traditional approaches address
the question of the supranational and national institutions' role in European integration
and how they manage to illuminate internal mechanism to policy-making on the
European level. As pointed out by Branch and Ohrgaard (1999, 125) “the supranational-
intergovernmental dichotomy traditionally manifests itself by ascribing a key role to
particular actors in EU policy-making at the expense of all other actors, as in the case of
the liberal intergovemmentalist emphasis on domestic interest groups and national
governments at the expense of the EU’s supranational institutions.”
This observation highlights the fact that recent work in the tradition of
neofunctionalism and intergovemmentalism are still rather absolute in their conceptions
of autonomy and influence. These two strands of scholarship represent two fixed and
Several other scholars have stressed the persistence of this cleavage in European
studies. For instance see Caporaso (1999, 163), Church (1996, 27), Cowles 1995,
Dehousse 2000, Hooghe and Marks (2001, 145), Kelstrup 1998, Puchala 1999 Schmidt
(2001, 173) and Wallace (2000, 5).
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competing positions respecttvely on the supranational and national institutions ' capacity
.o push integration ahead or to slow i, down. This makes then, neither sensitive nor open
to the possibility of variation of influence a, different phases in the policy cycle.
Whereas neofunetionalists view the institutions as endowed with substantia, autonomy
and as possessing an independent capacity to acceierate and deepen European integration,
intergovernmental regard them as obedient servants only Mfiliing functions delegated
to them by national governments, with little or no capacity to move the integration
piocess beyond what governments wish.
These two conceptions appear to be mutually exclusive in their theoretical
formulations, as both claim to have general applicability. Yet they may not be mutually
exclusive in practice, if me recognizes that the degree of supranational or national
influence in fact may vaty from one phase of policymaking to the other. With this
distinction in mind, supranational influence or national influence can then be seen as
being a variable which can take on either high values (“engines of integration") or low
values (“obedient servants”), depending on the issue-areas, the policyphases, and the
time. Along similar lines, Richardson (1996b. 28) has pointed out that “it might be
mistaken to look for one model of the EU policy process. Within the EU policy can be
determined at a number of levels and [...] the policy process goes through a number of
stages. Different models of analysis may be useful at different levels within the EU and
at different stages of the policy process.”
This perspective, encourages one to enrich the field of European integration with
theories ot policy making in order to hopefully move beyond the theoretical gridlock of
these competing conceptions and toward a neutral theoretical language that is capable of
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accoum.ng for var.ation in supranational and national influence in different phases of the
decision-makiug process. Particularly useful in this context appears to he the wo* of
Peterson ( 1 995a, 1 995b, 200 1 ) and Peterson and Bomberg ( 1 999). Both scholars suggest
that there is a need differentiate levels of analysis of decisions made in the European
Union. This differentiation should be based on the kind of decisions made as well as the
actors involved. For decisions that invoive the changing of the institutional structure of
the EU, liberal intergovemmentalism appears to be the most appropriate theory available
to assess the influence the Member States have on the final outcome. However, for
decisions that involve agenda-setting and decision-selection, a mesolevel theory of
decision making would be most appropriate. Such a theory would rely heavily on the
insights from policy analysis and supranational entrepreneurship. Thus, in a nutshell,
such an approach allows one to examine the influence of supranational institutions on
policy- setting, policy-shaping and finally decision-selection.
2.3 Alternative Pathways out of Deadlock: Combining Policy Analysis and
Supranational Entrepreneurship
In the attempt of moving beyond the neofunctionalists and intergovermentalist
dichotomy, this dissertation argues that a combined approach might be most useful. The
theoretical framework developed here simultaneously draws on the insight from work on
policy analysis and supranational entrepreneurship. The following section is structured
into three subsections. The first subsection discusses the contribution of policy analysis
lor the examination of decision-making. In particular the work of Peterson (1995a,
1995b, and 2001) and Peterson and Bomberg is utilized.
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The second subsection connects the work on policy analysis with the recent work of
Moravcsik (1999) on tw.leve. entrepreneurship™ The third subsection develops a more
detailed model of policy entrepreneurship. This model ultimately provides the theoretical
frame inside of which the precise mechanism by which a two-level entrepreneur
influenced the policy-shaping and policy-setting decisions can be analyzed and thereby
provides a contribution towards a better understanding of the dynamics that finally led to
the adoption of the employment chapter in the Treaty of Amsterdam.
2.3.1 Policy Analysis
Policy analysis literature pertaining to the European Union is increasingly
becoming available in the past several years. One main understanding in the literature is
that policy analysis is concerned with examining how issues and problems come to be
defined and constructed and how specific policy proposals get placed on the agenda of
79
government, and ultimately get adopted. One prominent approach in policy analysis
conceptualizes the policy process as a process that is segmented in various stages:
agenda
-setting, policy formulation and legitimation, implementation and evaluation.
8
For a critique of Moravcsik see Young 1999.
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Foi instance see Birkland 2001, Dunn 1986, Haas and Springer 1998, Heritier 1993,
Pal 2001, Sabatier 1999, Stone 1997, Weimer and Vining 1999, Windhoff-Heritier 1987.
8°
It should be noted that these stages are viewed as a heuristic device that helps gain a
better understanding of the policy process. Each stage is not necessarily a precondition
for the following stage.
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For each stage, policy analysis examines both the set of actors involved in the decision-
making as well as the resources and strategies they employ.
For policy analysis in the European Union, Peterson (1995a, 1995b, 2001) and
Peterson and Bomberg (1999) have suggested a useful analytical framework. Central to
their analysis is the distinction of three analytical stages of decision-making: policy-
shaping, policy-setting and hi story-making decisions. These three stages are
differentiated, “based on identifiable patters of decision-making” that is the type of
decisions made and the actors which were most dominant in this kind of decision”
81
(Peterson 1995, 70). The following other titles for these stages can also be found in the
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literature: “agenda-setting”, “preference formation” and “interest resolution.”
^
In a nutshell, their central claim is that since each stage of decision-making
attracts a different set of actors with varying resources and strategies, theorists who
attempt to explain outcomes across all stages may find that more than one theoretical
model might be needed for an analysis of all the stages of decision-making.
The first level of analysis is the sub-systemic level. This is the level at which
policy-shaping decisions are made. These are the decisions about what policy will look
like and what policy options will be considered. In the words of Peterson (2001, 295)
It should be noted that Peterson and Bomberg (1999) intend to use the framework of
analysis only as heuristic device. In their own words, they do “not intend to imply that
only one type of decision is ever taken at each level of governance, or that these levels
are demarcated by neat, dividing lines.”
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' This dissertation will use these titles interchangably. For a discussion of “agenda-
setting’ seeBaumgartner and Jones 1993, Baumgartner and Jones 91,Cobb and Elder
1983, Kingdon 1995, Peters 1994, Tsebelis 1994, Tsebelis and Garrett 1998, Tsebelis and
Kreppel 1998, and Schneider.
87
policy-shaping” decisions determine Wthe EU does what it decides to do, or which
pohcy optio„s Win be considered.” Many of these policy-shaptng decisions are taken
>ong before fonna, decisions are taken on the pohcy-sett.ng ievek These poiicyshaping
decstons concent the detaiis of poiicy opttons and preoccupy a diverse range of actors.
The most important actors in these decisions are the respective civil servants
VuncUona^s, in the reievan, DCs of the European Conan,ss,on which dea, with the
specific policy issue as well as affected interest groups and policy experts.
According to Peterson (2001, 305), the most recent work of Moravcsik (1999) on
supranational entrepreneurship provides a useful theoretical approach for explaining
,he
process by which policyshaping decistons are reached. “ this approach, the ability of
.he Commission to decisively influence the policyshaping decisions, is seen to result
from its superior ability to coordinate and manipulate information and ideas held by
domestic groups. Because of its ability to aggregate the interests of domestic groups, the
Commission can no. only set the agenda of the EU, but also influence the Member States
in their policy preferences in the policyshaping and policy-setting decisions. Ultimately,
tins capability allows the Commission to decisively influence the final “historymaking”
decisions of the Member States.
At the second level of analysis, the systemic level, policysetting decisions are
made. These decisions determine what the EU actually does. According to Peterson
(2001, 294), these decisions are “taken when the EU reaches a 'policy decision point' (...)
and actually chooses a policy - a course of action (or inaction) - in the Union's defined
The section below provides a more detailed discussion of Moravcsik
entrepreneurship model.
’s two- level
88
field of convene," Mos, policy setting decisions emerge after bargaining between the
ntst, lotions Tins system of shared powers of decision-making is characterized by
the “community method" (Devust 1999, in which the Commission proposes and the
Council disposes. Thus, the key actors in this process are the European Commission,
counci, of Ministers and the Committee of Pennanen, Representatives. Between these
actors policy-setting decisions occur.
According to Peterson and Bomberg a theoretical frame that combines a theoty of
•domestic politics- of the European Union with an analysis of the institutional capacity of
supranational actors to influence the course on which policies are set would be a helpful
contribution towards an understanding of the process by which different policy options
are selected (Peterson, 2001, 300,. In Peterson's own words, since i, is a, “the systemic
level where the many different cleavages to which EU politics give rite to intersect [it is]
at this level [that] the EU’s institutions usually provide order and aggregation. In his
conclusion, Peterson (200!, 303) calls for the development of an institutionalist theoty of
systemic decision-making.
This dissertation argues that such an approach can be developed by focusing
simultaneously on two key aspects of the Commission: first, the Commission’s ability to
aggregate and represent latent domestic interests allows it to influence the Member States
in the policy-setting decisions. Second, the Commission’s influence over policy-setting
decisions, can be expected to be particularly strong during those times in which the
Commission and the Presidency of the Council work closely together. Such cooperation
allows the Commission to relay the latent domestic interests to the European level, while
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it allows the Presidency of the Council to widen its scope of possible policy proposals
that 1, can draw on in its attempt to mediate among governments.
A. the third level of analysis is the super-systemic
.eve,. Here the most prominent
example of the kind of decsions taken, are decisions tha, tnvolve treaty reviston,
During treaty revises,
“history-making., decsions change the institution,, structure of
the European Union and they transcend the EU, policy process. These super-systemic
decisions addittonally include those that arise from the conclusions of European Council
meetings as i, detennines the pr,or, ties of the EU. The key actors in these decisions are
heads of states that meet a, the bargaining table dunng the European Council meetings,
hi the words of Peterson (2001, 294) the choices made during such meetings are choices
that “preoccupy the highest po.it,cal levels in Europe; that is, national cab,nets and prmre
ministers. As such, they usually are negotiated outcomes of intergovernmental
bargaining.
According to Peterson and Peterson and Bomberg, liberal intergovernmental™ is
>he theoretical approach that is most useful for explaining the process by which the
history-making decisions were reached. For instance Peterson (2001 , 297) points out
"‘'’a' U is our best theory for explaining the process of bargaining at the super-systemic
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level.”
Drawing on the insight of the work of Peterson and Peterson and Bomberg the
theoretical framework of this dissertation aims at combining the insights of policy
argues, that
04
For the same argument see Sbragia 1993. It should be noted that Peterson mi sneofunctionalism is most useful in those kind of analysis that try to explain how the'
vodnuor thT!S
E° declsl0
,
n-makin8 Ganges, such as a shift of qualified majorityti g oi he co-decision procedure involving the European Parliament.
J Y
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analysis with the recent work of Moravcsik (1999) „„ twtxlevel entrepreneurship. Such a
cotnh,nation of approaches not only allows one to analyze both the actors and resources
and strategies involved in the Policy-shaping and policy-set.
,„g phase, bn, also assess
the decisive influence the Commission had
during the “history-making” decisions.
on the choices available to the Member States
2.3.2 Two-level Entrepreneurship
In a recent article, Moravcsik (1999) makes a valuable contribution to the
attempts of going beyond the
neofuncionalist-intergovemmentalist dichotomy.
Analyzing the critical role the Commission is capable of playing during policyshaping
and policy-setting decisions, Moravcsik (1999, 270) points out that “a twolevel
bargaining theoy attentive to the dynamics of state-socie.y relations, rather than a theory
that focuses on interstate bargaining coordination problems, explains the (intermittent and
rare) variation in the effectiveness of supranational entrepreneurship in the EC.” The
following section is structured into three subparts: First Moravcsik’s understanding of
supranational entrepreneurship is presented. Second, a set of circumstances are given,
which Moravcsik argues have to be present for supranational entrepreneurs to exert their
influence. Third a causal model is provided through which the influence of supranational
entrepreneurs can be predicted.
Drawing on the vast literature on entrepreneurship, Moravcsik (1999, 217)
conceptualizes policy entrepreneurship as an effort by supranational institutions to
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“induce authoritative political decisions that would otherwise no, occur.”
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The most
important way by which supranational entrepreneurs achieve such an influence is through
persuasion, that is through the manipulation of ideas and information. According to
Moravcsik, supranational entrepreneurs are capable of decisively influencing the outcome
of multilateral negotiations through persuasion, due to their ability to aggregate and
represent latent domestic interests. Aggregating and representing latent domestic
interests, gives the supranational entrepreneur a resource through which i, can influence
the policy preferences of the Member States and thereby decisively influence the
outcome of the multilateral negotiations. This predicted causal influence a twolevel
entrepreneur can have on policy-shaping, policy-setting and historymaking decisions is
represented in Figure (3).
Figure (3): Causal process of influence of Twolevel Entrepreneurship
For additional references on policy entrepreneurs see Cox and Jacobson 1973, Bums
mco
i0nna and ShepsIe 1989
’
Nu§ent 1995 > Lewis 1984, Roberts and King 1991, Young
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This power-resource view implies that twolevel entrepreneurship is then
effective when a supranational entrepreneur
,s capab.e ofu,.lizing infomiationaI and
ideational resources that the principals of;
have previously ignored or would be likely
a negotiation, namely the national governments
hither by credibly claiming to represent these latent domestic i
towards manifesting these interests can the two-level
to ignore in the process of decision-making.
nterests or by working
entiepreneur indirectly pressure
governments move in a cenain policy direction. The effect of such intervention is that
a two,eve, entrepreneur can help overcome deadlock in the decision-making process,
by having Widened the scope of political interests represented in the negotiation.
effect, such an intervention may work towards broadening the set of issues considered to
be par, of the win-se, of the policy preferences of each Member State. Thus, in a
nutshell, Moravcsik
,1999, 272) argues
.ha, “the exploitation by international officials of
asymmetrical control over scarce information or ideas" provides the twolevel
entrepreneur with a window of opportunity by which it can "influence the outcomes of
multilateral negotiation.”
According to Moravcsik (1999, 283), a two- level entrepreneur can exert such an
influence over policy-shaping, policjcsetting and history making decisions due to the
occurrence of any one of the following three kinds intrastate coor dination problems:
organization, representation, and aggregation failures of domestic interests. The
assumption behind this view is a pluralist understanding of domestic politics in which
domestic interests are presented to government, which, in turn, aggregate and represent
those interests. Domestic and transnational social interests remain latent if these interests
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either fail organize, get aggregated or ge, represented. In ,his case> lhe
and either organize, aggregate or
entrepreneur can overcome these intrastate failures
lepiesent these interests.
The firs, coordinate problenr tha, gives a twolevel entrepreneur the oppotfun.ty
to influence Member States is organizat.on failure. This hind of failure arise when
interested and potentially powerful social groups fail to organize, leaving domestic actors
and their governments untfonned about desirable international agreements. Theories of
collective action suggest tha, i, is often costly for potentially allied individuals and
groups to ideitify one another, define common political goals, coordinate their activifies
resolve disputes among heterogeneous interests, and overcome incentives to free ride
The costs tend to be highest where potential supporters are geographically dispersed,
extremely numerous, substantially heterogeneous, unaware of potential substantive gains,
or inconsistent with existing institutions and cleavages.
The second coordination problem is aggregation failure. This kind of failure
arises when bureaucratic and parliamentary procedures block the emergence of coherent
national position out of demands represented to disparate parts of the state. As a whole,
states may possess the technical information, experience, and interest group contacts
needed to promote cooperation, yet no single set of officials has access to them all,
leaving national leaders unaware of proposals they would othenvise support. This
scenario most likely arises where issues are unprecedented or constitute a package deal
under the administratively fragmented control of many ministries.
The third coordination problem is representation failures. This kind of failure
arises when biases in domestic governmental institutions underrepresent social groups
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favoring cooperation. This si,nation is most hkeiy to occur when concentrated groups
opposed to cooperation traditionally monopolize relations with key domestic
bureaucracies and thereby block consideration of pohces that the g„vemment migh(
accept if informed or pressured by the fill, range of interests. Such classic "iron triangles"
are likely to be disrupted only by strong pressure from above and/or below. A variant on
representation failure arises when national leaders are inhibited from making proposals
by potential retaliation form powerftt, domestic interests but would accept a proposal tha,
permitted them to “scapegoat” a supranational actor.
Concluding on the effects of these three failures, Moravcsik (1999, 284) points
out that the two-level entrepreneurship
"approach suggests that a “window of
opportunity" for supranational officials opens if [...] if there are failures of organization,
representation, and aggregation." In such situations, the Commission can play the role of
a two-level entrepreneur rather effectively due its ability to ac, on two aspects: First, as a
relatively small sized organization, the “Commission may manage disparate issues far
more efficiently than a domestic government” (Moravcsik, 1999, 284). Second, the lack
of direct democratic oversight over supranational officials, which insulates them from
interest group pressure and regulatory capture. Together, these two aspects allow ihe
Commission to organize, aggregate and represent domestic interests and thereby not only
influence policy-shaping, policy-selling decisions but also critically influence die
outcome of the history-making decisions taken during the multilateral negotiations.
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2.3.3 Influence of the Entrepreneur during Decision-Making
According to Moravcsik ( .999, 272), the causa, mechanic of persuasion by the
supranational entrepreneur is structured into three stages: initiation, mediation and
mobilization. general, ihese three stages parallel the stages of decision-making
discussed in policy analysis as well as confirmed by Peterson ( 1 995a, ,995b, 200.) and
Peterson and Bomberg (1999). During the phase in which policyshaping decisions are
.uken, the Commission actively panic,pates in the initiation of the policy debate. Here i,
launches a discussion by highlighting problems, advancing workable proposals, and
underscoring potential material benefits. During the phase in which policysetting
decisions are taken, the Commission intervenes in ongoing interstate negotiations by
proposing new options or compromises with the goal of mediation among governments.
During the phase in which the historymaking decisions are taken, the Commission
attempts to influence the final vote taken by the governments by mobilizing domestic
social support for a particular agreement.
While Moravcsik provides a valuable contribution to the analysis of decision-
making in the European Union, this dissertation argues that his analysis is still
incomplete. The main aspect that is still missing is an analysis of the activities and
influence of the different actors across all stages of decision-making. Also lacking is a
clearer understanding what different resources and strategies the Commission employs at
each stage ol the decision-making process.
This dissertation addresses these concerns by focusing simultaneously both on the
different set of actors across all stages of decision-making as well as the resources and
strategies they employ. On the basis of the analysis of the different stages of decision-
96
31 t,M
employment title in the Ttea,y of Amsterdam
" .he result of a ratcheting strategy by which the European Commission as a policy
ernrepreneur succeeded in facilitating the gradual representation of previously latent
interests within the Member States and thereby indirectly pressured the Member States to
endorse the Europe-wide employment measures. The concents over unemployment in
Europe at .ha, time, gave the Commission a position of strength from which it was able to
inlluence agenda-setting as well as the preference formation and thereby critically
influence the inclusion of the particular employment title in the Amsterdam Treaty.
Two resources of the Commission were particularly crucial for its ability to
inlluence the outcome of the multilateral negotiations as a twolevel entrepreneur: First,
the Commission successfully utilized its formal role as agenda-setter. Second, the
Commission was capable of influencing the preference formation stage by exploiting the
recpetiveness of the Presidency of the European Council.
During agenda-setting, the Commission mainly did two things: first, the
Commission selected the issues to be considered by the European Union. Here it mainly
outlined policy areas ofcommon concern. In the context of the employment title,
precisely this goal was achieved with the White Book on Growth, Competitveness and
Employment. White Paper was a crucial document for setting the agenda for a debate
that politically paved the way for the Europe-wide employment measures to be
acceptable to Member States. As pointed out by Youri Devuyst, the “Commission's
White Paper and Opinions have effectively helped to set the tone for European Council
debates and, consequently, for the EU’s adaptation process at this level. [...] For
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a co-
example, the Delors White Pacer of locn o ^p 1993 the Comm.ssion had called repeatedly for
ordinated Community strategy on employment.”*
6
The second thing
,he Commission did dunng agenda
-setting was to analyze the
pohcy preferences of the Member States and amange them in such a way as fonn
cluslers around the main issues concerned. Countries were grouped by their degree of
predisposed favorability towards the policy initiative ultimately desired by the
Comm, ss, on. This allowed the Commission to identify a cluster of countries that can be
called the favorable cluster. On the basts of this, i, fonnulated an initial draft proposal
tHat rePreSemed
—s belonging this favorable Custer.
In the case of the employment chapter, the analysis ofprimaty documents as well
as the results of elite interviews does in fact indicate tha, the such a favorable cluster did
exist and was represented by the portions taken by Denmark and Belgium as well as
Sweden and Austr.a (after their access, on,. Then in the next step, the Commission
shifted its gaze to the remaining countries namely the countries that do no, belong to the
above favorable cluster. Here i, skfilfirlly refined its draft proposal meet two
requirements: First, emphasize those elements of the proposal that were likely to find
support among latent interests in the countries which did no, belong to the favorable
cluster. Second, tactically ^emphasizes those elements of the proposal tha, were likely
to be antithetical to or adversely received by the governments of the countries not
belonging to the favorable cluster. The result of this exerc.se was a refined version of the
diatt proposal that is then made public.
Devuyst (1998, 616).
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DUri"E ‘he Preferen“ Commission exerted a critical degree
of influence. Here, i, predominant tned ,0 shape tire policy preferences of rhe Member
Stares indirectly by providing the receptive Council Presidency, especially the Irish
Presidency, with a synthesized compromise solution for the employment title. This
compromise represented a poltcy package that was acceptable both to the group of
countries
.ha, demanded stronger measures in the area of employment policy as well as
the group of countries tat demanded only modes, changes. The cooperation with the
Irish Presidency was vital for the ability of the Commission as an exogenous force to
influence the multilateral negotiations. For instance, the Irish Presidency chose to adopt
as the main draft proposal of the employment title the proposal submitted by the
Commission, and thereby rejected outright the proposal made by the Council Secretanat.
The reason for this choice was that the Presidency perceived the Commission's proposal
as being closer to wha, the respective public in the Member States would find aeceptable.
The article relating to employment in the Amsterdam Treaty should be seen by the public
as a strong collective commitment on the part of the Member States to work towards a
reduction of unemployment. The Presidency felt .ha, this message was better achieved
with the proposal of the Commission than with the proposal of the Council.
During the final stage, the interest resolution stage, tile Commission mainly
focused on preserving the consensus among the Member States. Here, the accumulated
result of all these policy movements provided the Presidency of the Council with an
assurance of unanimous support for a finalized treaty proposal. With this assurance, the
Commission concluded this process and recommended to the Presidency of the Council
that the draft of this portion of the treaty should be finalized in preparation for a vote.
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Tac, cooperation between the Commiss ,on and the Presidency
„p „^^^ ^
role in the final success of the Commission's efforts. the ease of the emp.oymen,
chapter, the fact that the Commission was able to conn, on the cooperation of the Dutch
Presidency does indicate that both the Commission as wel, as the Council relied heavily
on each other in the final stage of the decision-making process. For instance, after the
main draft of the employment chapter was completed by the end of 1996, the Dutch
presidency kept the this item off its agenda, until the British election led to a change of
government and thereby fortified the cluster of favorable countries.
Visually, figure (4) below, shows the different stages of decision-making, and
indicates which actors were most influential a, which stage. It is remarkable to note tha,
although the Commission did no. have a formal vote in the final deliberations of the
treaty negotiations, it nevertheless decisively influenced the outcome of the negotiations.
It achieved this exogenous influence largely due to the fact that it had a decisive
influenced agenda-setting and preference formation.
Figure (4) The Actors in the Stages of Decision-Making
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2.4.3.1 Strength of Two-Level Entrepreneurship Model
Wh.le ,t ,s the case that the two-level entrepreneurship model draws on some
qualities mentioned in interstate theories, successful entrepreneurship is no,
conceptualized as resulting from asymmetries in the distribution of infonnation and ideas
among unitary states, but from a superior ability to coordinate and manipulate
information and ideas held by domestic social groups and government officials.
Supranational entrepreneurs intervene to overcome biases in the domestic and
transnational coordination of information and ideas in such a way that tmportan, latent
interests that would otherwise remain underrepresented by national leaders, then become
represented. Precisely from the capacity to organtze, aggregate or represent latent
domestic interests does the Commission derive its ability to influence policy-shaping,
policy-setting decisions as well as the final decisions taken governments during
multilateral negotiations.
This approach goes beyond supply-side logic of neofunctionalism, since it is
capable to explain why Member States might be willing and interested in being
influenced by a two-level entrepreneur. This approach also goes beyond the limitation of
liberal intergovernmental™, since it relaxes the unitary state assumption and treats the
constraints on efficient negotiation as imposed by intrastate collective action failure.
Supranational actors wield influence due to a superior ability to overcome domestic and
transnational coordination problems.
This theoretical frame is used to analyze the factors and forces that have
contributed towards the inclusion of the employment chapter in the Treaty of Amsterdam.
The central claim developed in this dissertation is that a close examination of the multi-
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lateral neg0tiatiOnS tha * CUlminated employment chapter in the Treat, of
Amsterdam reveal the fact that the European Commission significantly influenced lhe
outcome. this instance, the Commission was successfu, as a two,eve, entrepeneur
due to the fact tha, i, managed to success*,,, exp,oi, two strengths. The firs, was the
exploitation of the dynamics of a multi-step ratcheting process tha, aimed a, active,,
building up support among the ,ate„t interests within the Member States. The second
was the support of the Presidency of the Counci,, in particu.ar the ,nsh Presidency in the
second half of 1996 as wel, as the Dutch Presidency in the firs, half of 1997. The
combination of these two allowed the Commission
well as to mobilize transnational domestic
this was found necessary.
to steer the relevant policy debates as
support for its policy preferences whenever
2.4 Summary
Tins chapter has provided an overview of the bodies of research that provide an
explanation for deadlock in join,
-decision making arrangements. This research has then
been applied to the policy area of social and employment policy. Additionally, this
chapter provided an overview of two theories that outline the factors and forces that
explain how deadlock is overcome. This review demonstrates that integration theoty by
and large conceptualizes the decision-making process of policy-making in the European
Union as either driven predominately by supranational actors or by national actors.
Thus, in order to better understand the factors and forces which influenced the
timing, the form and the content of the Europe
-wide employment measures, this
dissertation proposes to use a theoretical frame which combines elements from policy
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analysis and two-leve, entrepreneurship.
,n a nutshell, the theoretical frame developed
below points to the window of opportunity that the Commission is able create for
itself, by acting as a twolevel entrepreneur. In its role as a twolevel entrepreneur i,
aggregates and represents latent interests in the Member States and thereby indirectly
exerts sufficient pressure onto the respective governments shape the policy preferences
of the Member States. Through a ratcheting mechanism described below, the
Commission gradually and indirectly influences the issues to be placed onto the agenda
of the European Union as well as the choices avatlab.e to the Member states the final
decision-selection.
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CHAPTER 3
historical development of community
COMPETENCES IN THE AREA OF SOCIAL AND
EMPLOYMENT POLIYC: 1951-1980
As discussed in the previous chapter, the development of social and employment
policy on the level of the European Union is characterized by two cleavages: the question
of the appropriate level of authority and the question of the appropriate legal measures
used by the European institutions. A detailed analysis of the historical evolution of social
and employment policy on the European Union level demonstrates the changing policy
capacity of the supranational institutions as well as the changing utilization of legal
measures.
The puipose of this chapter as well as the following chapter is to provide a
descriptive and analytical background against which the single case study can then be
compared. This helps to contribute towards a greater appreciation of the novelty of the
employment chapter that was included in the Amsterdam Treaty. This historical
overview is structured into four phases: (1) 1951-1970 an early phase of social policy
limited to fostering the functioning of the market, (2) 1971-1980 a phase of optimism and
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great zeal, (3) 1981-1990 a phase of stagnation, and (4) 1991
,,
87
efforts.
to piesent a phase of mixed
The current chapter examines the firs, two phases, that is the time period from
1 95 1- 1 980. Chapter four focuses on the time period 1 98 1 to 1 990, and chapter live
examines die time period .99, to the present. The flrs, par, of this chapter gives a
historical overview of the main developments after the Second World War in the area of
social policy, on the Member States’ and the European level. The second pan provides a
logical overview of the main agreements and documents on the European level
stalling with the Treaty of Paris. The third pan analyzes developments following the
adoption of the Treaty of Rome, while the last part examines the development of the
Social Action Programme in 1974.
The main conclusion of this chapter is that during the early phase of European
integration, social policy efforts were subsumed under the efforts of creating a common
market in the coal and steel sector. Member Slates were central to making make policy
shaping and policysetting decisions, while
.he Community institutions were given only a
limned legal mandate io participate in the policymaking process. Thus, liberal
mtergovemmentalism appears to be the theoretical model most applicable as an
explanation for the particular policy outcome. As predicted by liberal
87
n
7“r Phases largely follow the distinction as suggested by Gold 1993, Kowalsky
( ,5 9 ) and Vogel-Polsky 1991. Some scholars have suggested three phases:
en mini ( 9, 13ff), Schulte (1995), other scholars differentiate merely two phases'Kleinhenz (1986, 22) and Mosley (1990, 149). A common criticism of this work is that
theSr 18T ?ldC C!nd thCreby d0CS n0t Capture important characteristics ofevolution of social and employment policy on the European Union level.
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intergovernmental jsm the greatest relative influence
large made by the different
over the final decisions were by and
governments involved in the decision-making process.
3.1 European and National Context of Social Policy
The economic experience of the Second World War
during between 1919 and 1939 laid the
as well as the political reality
comer stone for the European House and thereby
constituted a tremendous influence over its vis, on, shape and size. As the fitanie struggle
of Ihe war was over, and amidst the widespread feeling of relief and exhaustion, there
was also a growing sense that a significant watershed in the histoty of the continent had
been reached. The ending of the war was viewed as heralding the beginning of a new era
in which Europe could start afresh with a different political and economic order.
According to these visionaries i, would haw to be an order in which the tired doctrines of
nationalism, political sovereignty and economic autarky upon which the old system of the
continent had been built would have to be exchanged with some kind of European
political union or federation that would effectively achieve some level of harmony among
88
the European nations.
However, the emergence of the Cold War subsequently divided the continent into
two armed camps and decisively separated them by what Churchill called “the iron
curtainf If integration was to occur, it would come as two separate developments: one in
88
Na^m^twf, ™pre?ed ^ actlvists of the Resistance movement againstzis . Foi this argument see for instance Urwin (1991, 7-12). For a general discussion
t thc historical evolution of the European Union among many see for instanceGillingham 1991, McAllister 1997, Pond (1999).
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.he west influenced by Andean presence. Ore other in the easi under Soviei auspices.
Under these circumstances the desire for peace and stabihty was expressed on the
national level of the European countries as well as in the founding treaties for the
European integration.
On the national level, rapid economic growth, widely popular regimes and
relative class peace characterized the two decades following the war. During these years,
a postwar settlement between the political panics in power and representatives of capital
and labor forged a new class compromise that ushered in an era of unprecedented growth
and political stability.
8
’ At the same time, the role of the state expanded considerably in
.he realm of regulating the market by influencing the bargaining process of both capital
and labor. The state persuaded organized labor to moderate its demands for substantial
wage gains, autonomy, and control of the workplace in exchange for substantial benefits
including automatic wage increases, stable prices and full employment. A combination
of Keynesian macroeconomic policies and a consolidation and expansion of the welfare
state was the outcome of the political and economic climate of this time.” As pointed
out by several scholars, this arrangement allowed for the development of nationally
differentiated welfare systems.” Alber (1988, 451) provides a useful definition of the
welfare state in the following description:
89
For a discussion of the post-war settlement see Bomstein 1984, Kesselman (et al
)
1997, Streeck 1998.
90
Ruggie (1982, 1983, 1998) has also called this arrangement of economic order
“embedded liberalism.”
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A differentiation of welfare state into three types (liberal, social democratic and
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cL^ zr:ress or
ohSsZ0 'h:rn0my ““ *he distrZtion omechances that seek to promote the security and equality of citizenso.der to foster Unsocial integration of highly mobilized
industrial societies.
Thus, the national development of the welfare stale can be seen as a deliberate
political erven,ion into the functioning of the market forces. This conceptualization is
well captured by Marshall (1975, 15) when he describes social policy as the use of
-pohttcal power to supersede, supplement or modify operations of the economic system
in order to achieve results which the economic system would no, achieve on its own, and
(...) in doing so is guided by values other than those determined by open market forces.”
In tins sense, the decades following the war secured and extended the realm of social
citizenship.
for the European Union, Lange (1992, 229-230) has proposed the following
definition ofsocial policy as containing “all those policies [...] for the EC and its
member states that provide or would provide rights, opportunities, benefits, or protections
to actual, potential or former participants in the labor market,”
corporatist) is provided by Esping-Andersen 1990.
92„
bora simdar understanding ofsocial policy see Briggs 1961, Leibfried, and Pierson
1992, Spicker 1995, Titmuss 1974, Goma 1996.
93
For a discussion of social citizenship rights on the European level see Feist 2001
lolland ( 1993, 153-156) and Streeck 1996, 1997.
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Around 1950 most western European countries had extended their public
responsibility and a socia! security system was in place which protected people agains,
the four basic risks of life: old age, illness, unemployment a
were Greece, Spain and Portugal).
94
ind disablement (exceptions
3.2 Development of European Social Policy during 1951 - 1970
In contrast to this expansion of social citizenship, the process of European
integration was mainly concerned with eivil citizenship rights such the right to enter in
contracts and free movements of labor. As many scholars have poinled out, from the
beginning the European Community has been far more geared towards making markets
than to correcting them. In line with this effort, the communities' social dimension has
always been subordinated to economic and industrial goals and has thus been both
narrow in scope and incoherent in content.
In this arrangement it was assumed that the economic prosperity resulting from
the establishment of the common market would inevitably lead to enhanced social
benefits. Thus the main contributions of the founding treaties of the European Coal and
Steel C bmmunity (EC SC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) towards the
goal ol enhancing well-being were achieved through indirect measures: it was expected
94
Schmidt" 1 988
rVie
W
°f tHe development of welfare states in Europe see Flora 1986,
95
For this argument see Bouget 1998, Acker 1994, Genschel 1998, Harrop 1996
XtZ^rSChmid 1994, j0USSen 20()0 ’ M°Sley 1990, Scharpf 1997, Spicker
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that an increase in .he wealth of each Member State would result from the proper
economic arrangements created on the European level. In mm, each Member States was
men able to decide independently through domestic policies on the appropriateness of the
redistribution of the economic wealth * Shanks, who was Director-General for Social
Affairs between the years 1 973 to 1 976, explained the rationale for this approach in the
following tenns: “The underlying assumption behind the Treaty was
.ha, if one could
remove all artificial obstacles to the free movement of labour, goods and capital, this
would in time ensure the optimum allocation of resources throughout the Community, the
optimum rate of economic growth, and thus an optimum social system.””
Thus according to this logic the need to write specific social provisions into the
Treaty was not evident. The market would be best left unhampered. Hence as far as
social and employment policy was concerned. Member States did no, see a need to confer
new competences to the emerging European institutions. Thus, while the treaty of Paris
and the treaty of Rome both represent the foundation of the legal frame of European
social and employment policy, they also demonstrate the limited legal mandate given to
the European institutions.
j^For a discussion of this assumption see Collins (1983, 98), Hervey (1998, 6), Mazey
97
x-xQuoted in Kenner (1995, 6).
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3.2.1 Treaty of Paris
The Treaty of Paris (April 18, 1951) which established the European Coal and
stee, Community (ECSC) came into force on July 23, ,952. The firs, Community
institution, the High Authority, took up its duties on August 10, 1952. " The treaty basis
committed the High Authority to the dual goal of promoting economic prosperity as well
as contributing to an increase in the standard of living across Europe. Two broad themes
n,n through the treaty: The firs, theme emphasizes that the achievement of a rational
productive system must be balanced by the need to safeguard the continuity of
employment. This priority is documented right at the beginning of the Treaty. Article 2
states that one of the objectives of establishing a common market is “to contribute, in
harmony with the general economy of the Member States and through the establishment
of a common market (...) to economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising
standard of living in the Member States.”
9
''
The second major theme in the treaty is that
the aim of the Community is to promote improved working conditions and to work
towards an improvement of "the standard of living for workers in each of the industries
tor which It is responsible, so as to make possible their harmonization while the
improvement is being maintained.”'
00
The terms High Authority and European Commission are used interchangeably.
Tieaty Establishing the European Economic Community
Article 3e of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community
The High Authority was given the task of
through the following provisions:
accomplishing these goals specifically
• studies and consultations facilitate the redeployment of workers made
redundant by market development or technical change and to assess the
possibilities for improving workers’ living standards and working
conditions (Articles 46-48).
pi omoting research into occupational safety (Article 55)
guaranteeing adequate wages for workers in the Community industries
(Article 68)
establishing free movement of workers whilst safeguarding their
entitlement to social security (Article 49).
Thus, with the signature of the Treaty of Paris, the Community became
responsible for contributing to economic expansion, to the development of employment
and the improvement of the standard of living in participating countries, for establishing
conditions suitable for the rational distribution of production, high productivity,
safeguarding the continuity of employment and avoiding serious disturbances in the
economies of the Member States. Therefore, the treaty provided the foundation for the
beginning of a system of controlled competition in which the welfare of the general
community was seen to be enhanced by the larger market as well as the subsequent
increase in efficiency of production. In this system, individual producers would be
helped to adjust to the new circumstances and the interests of individual workers in the
coal and steel industries would be safeguarded in various ways.
Nevertheless, as many scholars have pointed out, one of the major weakness of
the meaty was the lack of specific procedures for the implementation of the goals to
which the treaty aspired to. For instance no instructions were given to the High Authority
to enable ,, to contribute d.rectly to a r.sing standard of living or promote better hving
end working conditions. Thus, these goals to some degree were expected rematn
merely asp,rations rather than serve the iunct.on as a concrete basis of specific polices.
The degree to which these goals were transformed into concrete policies depended to a
large measure on the willingness of the institutions of the Community to use their general
powers to pursue such ends with rea, interest as much as on the willingness of national
governments to cooperate with the institutions of the Community. As pointed out by
Collms (1975, 16), “the conclusion must therefore be that, in so far as definite action is
necessary to pursue such aims, the treaty left a great deal to those agents traditionally
responsible, namely national governments and the industries themselves.”
3.2.1
.
1
Community Efforts against Unemployment
One example in which the Community indeed tried to cooperate with the Member
States in the development of social policy can be found in the efforts of developing a
system of protection against unemployment. However, this example also illustrates the
interlocking relationship between the High Authority and the Member States: the scope
of activity for the High Authority as well as the prospect of success of the agreed upon
project to a large degree depended on the willingness of the Member States to cooperate
with the Community institution. Thus, the involvement of the High Authority in this
policy area entirely was guided by the willingness and interest of the Member States to
cooperate.
The effort of addressing unemployment can be seen as a response to concerns that
were raised at that time about the possible consequences of the common market. One of
the concerns raised by the enactment of the Treaty of Paris related to the question of
whether employment prospects would be improved or limited by the establishment of a
common market for steel and coal. In particular i, was anticipated that high-cost coal
mines in Belgium and France would be compelled to reduce their labor force or in the
worst possible outcome might even be forced to cease production altogether. This fear
was based on the realization that Belgian and French average pithead prices were twice
the amount of those charged in West Gennany. Any major readaptation resulting from
the introduction of the common market was thus expected to have to be shouldered by
Belgium and France. Studies of comparative costs suggested that perhaps 30 thousand
workers would have to become redundant in Belgium, and about 50 thousand in
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France.
With regard to problems of unemployment the provisions of the treaty were quite
precise and detailed. These provisions are in fact in contrast to the vagueness of the
means specified which should be used to improve the standard of living or the
harmonization of the conditions of life. The treaty clearly accepted that “the impact of
such adjustments should not be borne by the workers and their cost should be jointly
financed. Specifically Article 23 of the Treaty of Paris provided the High Authority
101
For these estimates see Zawadzki (1953, 165).
With the possibility for certain actions if firms were damaged
of the common market. At the
as a result of the completion
requests of governments concerned, the High Authority
creation of new jobs for
was allowed to grant aid from the social fttnd towards the
redundant workers. Additional forms of grant aid were avatlable to ECSC workers under
the provisos of Ante, e 56. These workers had to have been covered by an opemended
contract for a, leas one year and who had to be concerned by one of the following four
standard situations: (I) early retirement (pre-retirement pensions, severance pay,
allowances equivalent to benefits in kind, pre
-retirement al.owances,
,2) unemployment
(tideover allowances, severance pay allowances to benefits in kind), (3) internal
redeployment (compensating allowances for loss of pay, mobility allowance), and (4)
external redeployment (compensating allowances for loss of pay, mobility allowance.
mobility allowances, severance pay, allowances equivalent to benefits in kind).'"
2
Applications for readaptation aid under the provisions of the treaty, however,
made a slow start. It was not until March 1954 that the High Authority took its first
decision to contribute towards a readaption scheme. The High Authonty accepted as its
first scheme an application from the French government to provide aid for the relocation
of five thousand miners from the Centre-Midi to work in the coal fields of Lorraine or to
find other types of work in this region. The project was conceived as a three year-project
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Ar-M- 'Additionally similar provisions were written into Article 58: This provision allowed
the High Authonty to exceptionally grant special production quotas to fimis might be indanger of having to lay off workers.
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The following account is largely based on Collins (1975, 40).
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between the C„„„nu„i ty and the French government. Even though the project was
carefuNy prepared by conducting numerous stud.es and examinations of the possibie
employment situation Lorraine, the outcome of the project was common,y considered
•o be a failure. While the firs, departures of miners took p,ace in May of 1054, by ,960
only 600 on, of the 5,000 miners scheduled to be transferred had actually relocated.
The reasons for this failure were considered to be complex. Nevertheless, the
project provided the High Authority with the important lesson that schemes to provide
jobs on the spot are inherently more promising than projects which aim at massive
relocations of the work force. The reluctance of the miners to leave, even a, the price of
unemployment suggested the High Authority the need to refocus its priorities to reflect
the importance ofjob creation. Thus, the new approach implied a definite broadening of
die scope of the High Authority's activities. Whilst the Treaty of Paris gave it only
limited opportunity to help in job creation, the realization of the need for massive
redevelopment of the regions of heavy industry created the basis on which the High
Autho.ity could place its political claim for expanding its scope of activities.
Nevertheless, this claim would only be politically relevant as far as Member States were
inteiested in drawing on the resources of the Community.
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This represents 294 million dollars at that time.
3. 2. 1.2 Implications on Decision-Making
It can be concluded that the Treatv nf Pn,-; a a6 lr y of Pans did not supersede the role of the
Member Sra.es in the promotion of Homan we, fare. The wei8hr of resPo„s, bll i,y sri,, ,ay
whhrn the domesrie field. While,
.he High A.„hori,y was given .he legal bas.s to make a
small, bo, definite, eon.ribofion through the help i. gave in readapta.ion programs and ,.s
aid 10 impr0ve hea"h “d
-er.be,ess, both the scope and
.he success
of.be agreed upon projects critically depended on ,he willing of ,|K Member S.a.es
to cooperate.
Along the same lines, i, can be pointed oo,
.ha, the right of ,he High Authority
consult, to study and to publish results was dependent upon the willingness of other
organizations to use the material. The dependence for action on Member States and other
organizations suggests that a function of the High Authority was to act in an indirect
manner, being supporiive of the work of Member States and other social institutions,
rather than adopting a primary role.
Thus, the dynamics of policy-shaping and policy-setting decisions in this early
phase of policy development was clearly dominated by the Member States. Given this
observation, one can conclude that liberal intergovemmentalism appears to be the
theoretical model most applicable as an explanation for the particular social policy
provisions included in the Treaty of Paris.
3.2.2 Treaty of Rome
When the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) was
Republic of Germany, italy, Luxembourg an, the Netherlands
- in effect committed
themselves most importantly to the creation of an economic union. The assumption
behind the Treaty was tha, the removal ofobstac.es to the free movement odabor, goods,
services and capital, would inexorably lead to higher growth and rising living standards
wh,ch in turn, wotdd uplift a„ socio-economic groups and therefore benefit the socially
disadvantaged. Thus, Article 2 EEC proclaimed the Community's task "to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a
commuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, and accelerated raising of the
standard of living and closer relations between its Member States."
In ibis treaty sixteen of the 248 a,tides were explicitly devoted to social policy.
These provisions spread over two groups of articles: one relating to the free movement of
workcis (At Ildus 48 lo 51) and the other concerning general elements of social policy
(Articles 1 17 to 128). The emphasis in the firs, group of articles was on the “abolition of
any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards
employment, remuneration and other working conditions” (Article 48). Notable in this
group ol Articles is that Article 40 specifies that the institutional mechanism for
t ommumty decisions were based on the normal mechanisms which involve a
The treaty of Rome was preceded by the Treaty of Paris creating the Coal and Steal
eXUcIS A|S0 S '8,Kd in 11,57 European Atomic
I 18
c bmmission proposal, consultation of the European Parliaament and the Economic and
Social Committee and, lastly a decision by the Council
directive.
in the form of regulation or
Among the a,tides in the second group. Article 1 17 of the treaty demands “an
accelerated raising of the standard of living" and an “improvement" and
“harmonization
..Hiving and working conditions." Article 1 19 prescribed that “men and women should
receive equal pay for equal work” and Article 1 2 1 was concerned with implementing
common social security measures for migrant workers. Articles 123-128 set out specific
arrangements for operating the European Social Fund. The ESF was intended to make
the employment and re-employment of workers easier and to encourage geographical and
occupational mobility within the EEC by providing assistance with the cost of vocational
retraining and resettlement allowances.'"'' Notable in this group of articles is that Article
118 required the Commission to merely promote “close cooperation between member
states in the field of employment, labour law, and working conditions, vocational
training, social security, prevention of occupational accidents and diseases, occupational
hygiene
,
by delivering opinions and arranging consultations.” Thus the Commission’s
ability to influence the development of social and employment policy was severely
limited. At most it was able to make studies, deliver opinions, and arrange consultations.
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For this argument see Sutter 1997, Hantrais 1995.
3.2.2.1 Factors influencing the Social Policy Measures
The fact that social policy was to be included in the original trealy, can be
P ed by two lactois. (I) the pohey recommendation of the influential Spaak
imiltec and (2) the policy preferences of French government. Together these two
factors influeired the policyshaping and policysetting deetsions and thus the theoretical
predictions made by liberal intergovernmental™ best exp,an, the outcome of the
decision-making process.
3.2.2.1. 1 The Spaak Committee
As to the influence of the Spaak Committee, Barnard (1996) has pointed on, that
"llreoretical inspiration which led the founding fathers to draw a map of social rights
within the borders of economic efficiency was provided by the Spaak Report of 1956.
IW
This Report was made on April 21, 1956 and was the outcome of deliberations in the
Spaak Committee that was established at the Messina conference in June 1955 under the
chairmanship of M. Paul Henri Spaak, then Belgian Foreign Minister and a member of
the Belgian Socahst party. The Committee comprised of the Foreign Minister of the
six Member States of the EEC and an expert group of the ILO and thereby was
107
see Kdsters 987^84 ).
^ For a similar“*«t of the role of the Committee
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C omite Jntergouvememental cree par la Conference de Messine, 1956. A summary ofthe report us provided m Camps 1956. The quotes from the report are taken fro™
io^flMhetrtn''
0
^,','
960
' 297‘458)
' of the historical events leadingl waids the setting up tins committee see Haas 1958, Robertson 1959, Zurcher 1958.
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characterized by its intergovernmental working methods,
leport were based on the conclusions of the
09
While the main tenets of the
report provided by the group of experts from
he ILO, ultimately, the policy-shaping and policysetting decisions were taken by the
Member States.
'
'° The High Authority did not play
process.
a crucial role in the decision-making
The group of experts from the ILO concluded that
policy law was not necessary to achieve integration. This
major interventions in social
conclusion was reached on the
basis of an analysis of labor costs"
1
The arguments put forward in the repotl of the
experts differentiated between the general level of labor costs and the differences
between the inter-industrial pattern of labor cost. With regard to the general level of
labor costs, the report finds that differences in wages and social costs broadly reflect
differences in productivity. Thus, the report saw no need for intervention to create
European standards for such labor costs. Hence, in this area it recommended that no
authority should be given to the Community level to harmonize the general level of labor
costs. This kind of cost was left to the market forces.
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The group of experts from the ILO was composed of Prof. Maurice Bye Prof. R
Ve
a
rdoom.
Pr°f' Meinh°'d
’
Prof' Bertil 0hlin
>
P'°P pasquale Sarceno, Prof. Petrus
1 10
I TbllrO?
pubHshed its fmdin8s 111 the following report: InternationalLabour Office 1956. The main points of this report are also summarized in the following
article: International Labour Review (1956, 99-123).
11
For an analysis of the arguments presented here see Nielsen and Szyszczak ( 1997
7), Barnard (2000, 2). v ’
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w„h regard to the inter-industrial patten, of labor cost, a different argument is
presented. Here the group of experts argue that there is indeed justification for
Community measures to intervene with the market forces. Since panieular industries are
subject to exceptions, ly low wages or social costs, ,1ns wage pattern piaees them a, an
unfair competitive advantage. Thus the report of the group of experts recommends that
the C ommunity should adopt minimalist measures of intervention in particular in the
following areas: wages, methods of financing social security, working time and overtime
premium rates. Yet, i, should be noted that the group of experts make no
recommendation about the legal tool best used to bring about these treasures.
The sections of the Spaak report which dealt with social provisions, heavily drew
on the conclusion of the report of the experts. Along the line of recommending
minimalist measures of intervention, the Spaak report also envisioned a “gradual
coalescence of social policies” as one of the key factors necessary to provide the common
market with a firm foundation.
"
' The gradual assimilation of soeial and labor legislation
was intended to achieve two purposes: the first was to remove distortions from
competition and second was to facilitate the free movement of labor in a common market.
The Report approaches the problem of distortions from competition with great
caution. It points out that legislative and administrative measures other than those of an
openly discriminatory kind and those openly supporting certain industries or enterprises,
may in fact falsify “the conditions of competition between national economies as a whole
Quote from Kahn- Freud (1960, 299).
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or certain of their branches.- In hne with this puipose, the report suggtsted that action
.oust be taken correct or e„m i„a,e the effect of specific distorts which advantage or
disadvantage certain branches of acivtty. Among the factors of dtstortion, the repod
mentioned working conditions of iabor, such as the relation between the wages of men
and women, the systems of working time, overtime and paid holidays. The Repon
conceded that: “even if the existing disparities did not cause distortions, i, would be
necessary for the governments to make a special effon to hannonize progressively the
existing systems with regard to: the principle of equality of men and women's wages, the
length of the nonnal working week beyond which working time is payable and the rates
of overtime pay, and the length of paid vacations.”"
4
With the regard to the free movement of labor, the report specifies that one of the
aims of the Community must be the free circulation no, only of goods and services, bu,
also of the “factors of production themselves, that is of capital and of men.”"
5
The
report goes on to point out that this goal could best be achieved not by developing
complex technical criteria, but instead by seeking general economic conditions which are
conducive to the free movement of workers. Three conditions are identified as
particularly relevant: First, the development of economic activity in underdeveloped
areas, second, the creation of legal framework which allows workers to apply for
employment in any country of the Community, and third, the prohibition of wage
ibid at 299.
1 14 _
Quote from Barnard (1996, 323).
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see Kahn-Freud (1960, 298-299).
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discrimination among nationals and
fulfillment of these three conditions
immigration workers. The synergetic effect of the
were expected to enhance the free moment of
workers.
The repori concludes that the active harmonizing of social policy should only be
conducted where these efforis either achteved the avoidance of dtstorttons to competition
or facilitated the removal of obstacles to the migration of labor. The report points out
,hat
’
“
equalizati0n
-
s° from being a condition precedent of the operation of the
common market, is, on the contraiy, its result. Hence it is useless to fry somehow to
modify by decree the fundamental conditions of an economy which anse from its natural
resources, its level of productivity, the significance of public burdens. Part of what is
commonly called harmonization can therefore only be the result of the frmc.ioning of the
common market itself, of the economic forces which it releases, and of the contacts
between those interested to which it leads.”"'’ On the basis of this understanding, social
policy legislation was seen as an unnecessary component of the goal of European
integration and any proposed legislation in that field should be minimalist in character,
merely facilitating the smooth functioning of the market forces."
7
M6 _
Quote from Kahn- Freud ( 1960, 300).
117 fFor the same analysis of the Spaak Report see Barnard and Deakin 1996.
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3.2.2.12 The French Government
As a result of this theoretical framework, the French government was able
argue successfully that an economic union without the introduction of social policy
would lead a dis,onion of market forces which wotdd he the detriment the economic
„ „ 118n eres, of France. Given the fact that the French constitution guarantees equal rights
and therefore equal pay for men and women, not having a social agenda was feared as
putting France at a competitive dtsadvantage relative to the other Member States. As
pointed ou, by Barnard (1996, 324),
-consequently, France argued that an elimination of
gross distortions of competition was not enough, and that it would be necessary to
assimilate the entire labour and social legislation of the Member States, so as to achieve a
parity of wages and social costs.” However, Germany a. that time was committed a
minimum level of governmental interference in the area of wages and paces.
Correspondingly, the German government countered the French case by arguing that
wage differentials were a result of the operation of market forces and should not therefore
be regulated by EEC law. A “compromise” solution was eventually reached whereby the
Treaty included a short section on social policy but did not stipulate how most of these
provisions should be implemented.
Thus, in the early social policy provisions in the Treaty of Rome can be seen as
the outcome of the efforts of the Member States. The Spaak Committee was the forum in
118
oi a discussion of the French position at that time see Joussen (2000, 192).
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S comPromise see blisters ( 1 982, 375), Masberg and Pintz
(1982, 53), Meehan (1993, 67), Streeck (1994, 153).
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which the Member States both expressed their interests and used their preferences
shape the final outcome of the report which provided the basis for the Treaty of Rome.
Additionally, the French de.egahon was successful to argue in favor of social provisions
on equal pay among men and women. The role of the High Authority a, that time was
tamer limited. As a ve* young institution hardly participated in the decisions pertaining
to agenda-setting and policy-setting.
3.2.2. 1 .3 Reaction of the Commission
The European Commission interpreted the outcome the Treaty of Rome in two
ways: first, by broadening the interpretation of Article 117, and second by systematically
applying Article 118. In the wake of the Treaty of Rome, the first strategy of the
Commission was to interpret the legal provisions of Article 1 17 in a broader frame. In a
report issued in 1959, the Commission clarified that one had to read Article 1 17 to
provide for “the equalization in an upward direction of the living and working conditions
of labor” not to “imply a leveling on a theoretical average standard of living, as this
would, lor example force those countries with the most advanced economic and social
development to hold up their social evolution till less fortunate countries have managed
120
to catch up. Instead, Article 1 17 had to be read as program which asked the
supranational institutions to promote social progress for the peoples of the Community.
Hence, the automatism of the Common Market was permitted to have a free play as long
120
nofn°Tn?i
SSi°n °f the Eur°Pean Economic Community, 1959b, quoted in Kahn- Freud
(1960,302).
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as i. produces an eq ua,i Zatl„„ of working conditions in an upward direction. Corrective
leads to a deterioration in the conditions of the more advanced members. This need for
community action is summarized by Petrilli (1959, <>7), the Chairman of the Social
Affairs group, when he mentions that “the signatories the Treaty thus considered that
although the function,
„g of the Common Market was a necessary condition of social
progress, it could not be a sufficient condition for such progress. In fact, the
approximation for social as much as for economic ends (...) are two complementary
factors which are essential to the proper functioning of the Common Market." Thus, as
pomted ou, by Kahn- Freud (1960, 303), given this deliberate attempt by the Commission
.0 interpret Article I 17 as broadly as possible this “penrrits and indeed demands
conscious action not only to promote migration and to remove distortions of competition,
but also to promote social progress,
[ and thus this] constitutes a program which goes
beyond that envisaged in the Spaak Report.”
The second strategy of the Commission was to extensively use all the possibilities
provided by Article 118. Most importantly, the Commission has used the article to focus
its activity on several objectives: streamlining and harmonizing labor market statistics
and systems of reporting, and disseminating as widely as possible studies on
employment-related topics, such as the free movement of labor, vocational training, equal
pay, and occupational hazards. For instance, as early as 1959, the Commission facilitated
meetings between the DG for Social Affairs, the Statistical Service and national labor
market experts in order to study employment patterns in the Member States. After a
meeting which was held on January 7th and g h 1959, the Commission summarized the
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conclusion by pointing out that the
out in two stages. The first would
experts approved [...a] project that would be
consist of a thorough analysis of the trend in
carried
employment during recent years, which would make it possible to analyze the present
s.Uumon with nil the precision of which the available statistics allow and to place i,
against the background of recent developnrents. The purpose of the second par, would be
to hi ing out the main trends of employment, and cas far as possible, to forecast the future
situation.’
3.2.3 Implications on Decision-Making
h should be noted that the legal basis for the development of soeial provisions
dependent on unanimity as well as on a generous interpretation of Articles 100 and 235
Article 100 lit provides for the approximation of laws if the Council of Ministers
agrees on the matter by an unanimous vote. On the basis of this legal provision only
directives may be issued and they must be “directly effect the establishment or
121
rCommissiou of the European Community (1959a, 32). Additionally in this contextone should point out that the most important initiative to be mentioned is the setting-up ofie Eui opean Employment Observatory much later in the development of the EuropeanUnion. This institution brings together and links with the Commission several networks
indePendently collect and disseminate information pertaining to employment
statistics, hoi a documentation on the Observatory see OJ C328, 30 12 1989 The
following networks are brought together by the Observatory: Mutual Information System
on Employment Policy (M1SEP) which comprises representatives of the national
administration and of the Commission, Network of Employment Coordinators (NEC)
w nch comprises national officials, and the Employment Monitoring System (SYSDEM)
which consists ol national experts in the area of labor market and employment. With the
information from the Observatory, the Commission frequently publishes reports on
employment forecasts for each sector.
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functioning of the Common Market." Article 235 EEC specifies that the following three
conditions must be me, in order to nigger this area of legislative competence: There must
be (I) a need for Community action,
,2) in order to obtain one of the objectives of the
Treaty in the course of the Common Market
,3) to which the Treaty has no, provided the
necessary powers. Again, Article 235 is subject to unanimous voting.
Quite obviously, the treaty basis confines the development of social policy to
these areas in which all Member States agree unanimously that the Community should
take action. In the early decades of the Community, the areas included were mainly the
free movement of labor, social security measures for migrant workers, equal pay for men
and women and a few programs of the Social Fund.
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Although, the Commission would
try to use the limited treaty basis as much as possible, its influence was limited to
coordinating efforts among Member States, conducting studies and disseminating
information.
The process of decision-making that lead to Treaty of Rome was clearly
dominated by the actions of the Member States. Both the influence of the Spaak
Committee as well as the French government on the policy-shaping, polic^setting and
the final outcome of the Treaty of Rome are best predicted by the theoretical frame
suggested by liberal intergovemmentalism.
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Comici! Resolutions OJ C2/1980, OJ C62/1982 as amended OJ C18/1983 and OJC 1 28/ 1 982 as amended OJ C 1 33/1984.
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3.3 Development of European Social Policy during 1971-1980
Many scholars have poimed ou, that (he penod Qf „ 7| |9(j0^ a per]od Qf
limited progress: development of Europe-wide policies in the area of social and
employment policy was achieved.^ Efforts l0 deepen ,he European Community a„d
widen its scope of integration were politically margined in this period as national
governments were reluctant to develop such measures
. Analyzing the development of
the European Community as a whole, Middlemas (1995, considers the years 1973
1983 as “the stagnant decade.”
3.3.1 Social Action Programme of 1974
The first major attempt to expand the scope of Community’s competences in the
area of social policy was the Social Action Programme of 1974. On the basis of an
initiative from the European Commission, the heads of governments issued a
communique at the ,972 Parts summit which asserted that as much importance was to be
attached to “vigorous action in the social field as to the achievement of the economic and
monetary union [...] it is essential to ensure the increased involvement of labour and
management in the economic and social decisions of the Community.”'
24
The Council
asked the Commission to draw up an action programme by I January, 1974 "providing
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For instance see Berie (1993, 56) Kreile 1989, and Schneider (1992, 18).
Quoted in Nielsen and Szyszczak (1997, 25). For a discussion of the relevance of the
taa'leul) (199
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TOnt S°C ' ai aCtion Pr08rarame see Bottcher(l990, 149),
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lor concrete measures and the necpscan, rcoe s ry resources, particularly in the framework of the
Social Fund.”
In line with this mandate the Co,omission adopted a draft proposal for a Social
Action Programme on April 18, ,973.“ The document contained a senes of suggestions
for the Promotion of full and better employment, the amelioration of working conditions
and of living conditions and the assurance of the pan, c, pa, ion of the social panners
social and economtc decision taken within the Community. Quite boldly the document
announces that the “Social Action Programme is regarded by the Commission as the
basis for a Community social policy [...]. wha, is involved, in fact, is the
implementation of the firs, phase of European Social Union."
'
“ The need for such a
Union, was seen to arise primarily on, of the fact that those problems which were
“common to all Member States" were “best solved on a Community basis rather than in
... 127
Thus the Commission's strategy was to argue that the limited transfer of
responsibilities and functions previously held by Member States would allow for a more
efficient way of solving of the current economic and social problems in Europe, In this
sense, the main argument employed by the Commission was to present Community
activity as an “added- value” to Member States' efforts to address the problem of
unemployment.
Commission of the European Communities, 1973.
Ibid, paragraph 4.
Ibid, paragraph 9 (a), p. 6.
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The Commissions’ proposal was formally submitted to the Council on October
1 28
25. 1973. The Council of Ministers adopted this proposal on 21 January 1974.
overall, this programme identified some 40 priority measures and provtded for action
primarily three areas: the attainment of full and better employment; the improvement
and upward harmonization of living and working conditions; the increased involvement
of management and labor in economic and social decisions of the Community and of
workers in the organization of their firms. The Council’s view of Community
competence in the area of social policy a, that time was presented in cautious terms,
foreshadowing the concept of subsidarity:
[The Council] Considers that the Community social policy has an
individual role to play and should make an essential contribution toachieving of the aforementioned objectives by means of
Community measures or the definition by the Community of
objectives for national social policies, without however seeking a
standard solution to all social problems or attempting to transfer to
Community level any responsibilities which are assumed
effectively at other levels.
more
The resolution from the Council of Ministers ‘concerning a social action
programme’ noted that economic expansion was not to be seen as an end in itself, but
should result in an improvement of the quality of life.
' This sentiment represents a new
This was clearly a reaction to the “oil crises” of 1973-1979.
Official Journal of the European Communities, (1974, C 13/1, 2).
Official Journal of the European Communities, 1974, Cl 3/1.
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consensus on the need for working towards the
EC social policy.
development of a more comprehensive
3.3.1.1 Factors influencing the Social Action Programme
Three developments most crucially contributed to this new consensus and
subsequently tc the development of the Social Action Programme.
' 3
'
Firs,, in the wake
Of the first oil price shock, as profits soared and full employment as a goal appeared more
dtfficult to attain, the economic model became increasingly questioned. This created
pressure on the European Community and the governments of the Member States which
opened the window of opportunity to address the old debate on the balance between
economic laissez-faire and social regulation.'
32
There was a wide-spread consensus that
the economic model in Europe was in a crisis.
Second, key political individuals in the Member States arguedthat the European
Community needed a ‘human face’ to solicit more political support of the trade unions
for the European integration. Especially Willy Brandt, then Chancellor of West Germany
and Stcco Mansholt, who was President of the European Commission, both argued that
European integration will only be socially and politically acceptable if economic
development will be accompanied by an active programme of social reform.
131
01 a discussion ot the factors leading to the development of the Social ActionProgramme see Mazey, 1989.
132 nFor this argument see Lodge (1978, 120) and Shanks 1977.
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Third, the Social
leaction of the European
Action Programme can be seen as a politically well-crafted
Commission to early efforts of creating an economic and
monetary union. After the summit in The Hague had authorized Luxembourg's Prune
Minister Pierre Wenter to write a report on monetary union, the Commission used the
new momentum in the economic realm of European integration to re-introduce into the
debate the call for the development of social policy on the European level.'
33
On March
17, 1971 the Commission issued a document which already in the very firs, sentence
emphasized the connection between developments in the economic realm and social
policy by pointing out: “Now that the Community has embarked resolutely on the road
to economic and monetary union, social policy appears in a new light."'
34
The
documents more specifically points out that this new light brings forward the realization
that the success of the integration “process will be jeopardised if economic and monetary
integration and social integration do not take place simultaneously .”'
35
In this sense, the
Commission’s action can be interpreted that by then “the Commission [had) learned to
capitalize upon the rhetoric of the member states. It quickly learned to couch its
proposals in the language of economic and monetaiy union favoured a, the Summits held
at The Hague 1969 and Paris in 1972.”
36
Foi a discussion of this point see Hrbek and Wessels (1984, 52).
Commission of the European Communities, (1971, 7).
ibid
This argument is put forward by Cram (1997, 37).
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The documents identifies three goals as paramount: First, the enhancement of
opportunities for employment which aim a, guaranteeing full and bene, employment;
.second, an increase in social justice which aim a, fairer distribution of incomes and
wealth as well as an improvement in the standard of living, and third, an improvement in
.he quality of living which aim a, an improvement of working conditions. As pointed on,
by several scholars, this proposal of the Commission was crucial for the later
development of the first social action programme. In effect the Commission both
enhanced the momentum for social policy on the European level created by political
pressure as well as provided important policy ideas at the right time .'
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3.3.2 Implications on Decision-Making
The Social Action Programme represents an example in which the Commission
has used rather skillfully a window of opportunity: maximizing on current debates which
demanded further integration in economic and monetary union, the Commission was able
to attach to those debates a renewed concern over social and employment policy. In this
sense, the Commission was instrumental in setting the agenda for the social debates and
thereby achieved an important agreement on the supranational level.
137 cFor this argument for instance see Maurer (1993, 139).
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However, one has be realistic that in ,he end the Soc , a| Action
Which resulted from this, was rather limited in its the overall impact.
' 38
The
Community's objective on the training policy remained unfulfilled jus, as much as the
coordination of national labor market polteies never materia, ized. Equally, the goals of
improving the living and working conditions and increasing worker participation were
never achieved due to resistance by employers and national governments." Among the
proposals most heavily criticized were: the Vrendling directive on information and
consultation of workers and the Fifth Directive on Company Law which aimed a,
increasing worker participation. These proposals were perceived by business as aiming
a ‘ UPWard hann°nization of Enropean labor standards at the highest level, and were
therefore fought with growing tenacity. In the end no progress was achieved and the
Social Action Programme remained limited in its impact.
This political impasse was especially detrimental to any progress in the social
policy field on the European level due to the institutional weakness of the Commission.
The EC Treaties in the area of social policy at that time were rather general in content
and thereby provided no concrete measures. This gave the Commission only a limited
legal basis on which it could propose Community action.
As a consequence of this weakness, the Commission could work towards the
goals of the Social Action Programme only through the tools of directives or regulations
For a discussion on the economic and political circumstances which hampered the
adoption of the recommendations of the Action Programme see Taylor (1996, 23ff).
1 39
On the
605).
limited impact ol the Social Action Programme see Addison and Siebert (1991,
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and positive ac.ion proves. Both tools have their inherent weakness.
,he case of
•he directives and regulations, unanimous support of all Member States was required for
any social policy ,0 be adopted by the Council. Given the preferences of a handful of key
Member States a, that time, most notably the United Kingdom, bu, also Germany, the
requirement of unanimity became tantamount with a state of veto and stalemate.
Additionally, positive action programmes were no, legally bindhg upon the governments
of the Member States and employers organ,zations. Thus, also during this historical
Phase of the evolution of social and employment policy, libera, intergovenunentalism
appears lo be the theoretical approach that is best equipped to explain the decision-
making process.
3.4 Summary
This chapter has provided a historical overview of the main developments in the
area of social and employment policy on the European level following the end of the
Second World War. In particular focusing on the Treaty of Pans, Rome and the Social
Action Programme, the goal of this chapter was to analyze both the factors which
influenced the social policy measures contained in these agreements as well as to
highlight the implications of these agreements on the two cleavages identified at the
beginning of the chapter, namely the question over the appropriate level of authority for
developing and implementing social policy and the debate on the need to interfere with
the market forces.
As this chapter has demonstrated, during the early phase of European integration,
the competences of the European institutions in the area of social and employment policy
137
was very linked. The lega, Rework created in the treattes by
,he Member States „„ly
conferred limited capacities to the European Commission. Also, the prevailing
understanding a, the time was
.hat the best “social policy" the Community could pursue
was one in which i, would allow the market forces to generate sufficient wealth and
prosperity which would then automatically lead to an overall increase in the general
welfare.
As pointed ou, by Cram (1997, 31), an “accurate characterisation of this period is
.ha, the newly established Commisston of the European Union was attempting to define
Its relationship vis-a-vis the Council of the Ministers. In the social field,” - Cram (1997,
35, continues to point out that “Being a ‘purposeful opportunist’, the Commission’s
approach to social policy may most usefully be characterized as more pragmatic than
ideologica I. The Commission’s early high-profile support for the social dimension may
have been less a sign of its commitment to social progress than a means by which it
sought to expand the scope of its competence in this field. When it became clear that the
member states were unwilling to support a broad interpretation of the Commission's
activities in the social field, but would continue to issue ambiguous statements of support
tor the social dimension, the Commission sought to justify the extension of its activities
by emphasizing the social aspects of economic integration.” “As member states have
been less equivocal about the role of the Commission in economic integration and the
completion of the internal market, the symbolic references made by the Commission to
economic rationalizations for its actions in the social field have allowed it to engage in a
lange ot activities in the social field which would otherwise have been impossible.”(p.35)
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CHAPTER 4
RELAUNCHED MOMENTUM: SOCIAL AND
EMPLOYMENT POLICY BETWEEN 1981-1990
In the early 80s, economic and social policy development received a new impetus
in the European Union. Subsequently the question regarding the appropriate level of
authority of policy-shaping and policy-setting decisions were readdressed. In the process
of finding answers, the European Union extended its scope of influence, especially in the
realm of economic policy but also in the realm of social and employment policy.
Additionally, the debates surrounding the single market added new momertum to
initiatives on creating a Social Europe for mitigating the potential consequences of the
fi-ee play of the market forces. The European Commission, supported by several key
Member States, seized the opportunity provided by the agreement on the market
initiative. It warned that the internal market without a social dimension would exacerbate
social, economic and regional divisions within the EU, particularly by encouraging social
dumping, that is the movement of capital and jobs away from high taxation and welfare
expenditure states. Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission,
presented his vision of the social dimension as a vital element of the single market and
skillfully crafted a political strategy to bring about this vision.
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The pupose of ,hi» chapter is provide a descriptive and analytical background
ofihe development of social and employment policy during the time period of ,981 to
1990. This description of policy development provides a background for the single case
study that will be conducted in the following chapter, tha, is chapter 5. By way of
providing this backhand, greater appreciation of the novelty of the employment chapter
that was included in the Amsterdam Treaty can be achieved.
Of particular interest is to analyze in this chapter here are the factors that
influenced the policy-setting as well as policy-shaping decisions reached a, the level of
the European Union. Special attention is paid to the crucial role played by the European
Commission, in particular Jacques Odors’ vision of a rejuvenated economic and social
Europe and his skillful strategy, as well as the importance of the Presidencies of the
Council.
The first par, of this chapter describes Delors vision and strategy for a rejuvenated
economic and social Europe. The second par, then provides both a description of the
Single European Act as well as an analysis of the factors that influenced its development.
The third and last part look more closely at the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights,
again also with an interest of understanding the factors that shaped its development. The
mam conclusion of this chapter is that the European Commission, in particular Jacques
Delors, was veiy important in setting the agenda for the European Union and thereby
crucially influenced the policy-shaping decisions taken during the IGC and the
Strasbourg meeting in 1989. Given this observation, this dissertation agrees with
scholars who have suggested that the policy outcome of the IGC can best be explained
with the theoietical tools of neofunctionalism.
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acques Delors Vision of a Rejuvenated Economic and Social Europe
Mirny scholars have pointed cm, that the leadership Jacques Delors provided as
Piesidenl of the lunopcan C ommission was crucial lor the timing and the direction of
economic and social policy change
.ha, took place in the late 80s in the European Union
PartiCU,ar
-
b°'h HiS P°litiCal
- «, skillful crafting of political strategies
helped to present the need for strengthening the soc ial dimension as a necessary
contponen, for the success of,he single market. Given this fact, neofunctionalis,
explanations that emphasize the relevance of technical and cultivated spillover, seem to
be best equipped to explain the social measures included in the Single European Act.
h> 1984, at the Fontainebleau Council of Ministers under the French Presidency.
Jacques Delors was appointed as Commission President. Delors started his tenure as
President of the Commission in January of 1985. He had a political background as a
f rench technocrat and former minister with close links to the Mitterrand government and
had worked both for the Banque de France and the Catholic trade union confederation
(Confederation Francaise des Travailleurs Chretiens). From the beginning of his
tenure, he articulated his vision to foster the development of strong supranational
institutions both in the economic and political and social dimension. For instance in his
opening speech on January 14"' to the European Parliament, he stressed that his aim was
140
hoi l,1 's argument see Drake 1995, 2000, Dyson and Featerstone 1999, Endo 1999Rometsch 1999, Ross, 1995, Ginsburg 1997,
For a discussion on Delors see Grant 1994.
141
.o establish no, simply an economic and financial union, bu, also a 'social Europe.'
•his sense his twin goals for his tenure with the Commission was to promote a single
market as well as a stronger social dimension on the European Union level.
In order to develop a feasible strategy to accomplish this vision, Delors
immediately upon starting his tenure, toured the capitals of the Member States,
accompanied by his fttture chief of staff, Pascal Lamy. Most prominently he suggested
four possible ideas as agenda priorities for the Community: (1) monetary union, (2)
defense cooperation, (3, institutional reform, and ,4, the completion of the internal
market. While the firs, three options were received with some skepticism among the
Member States, the last option received 143unanimous support. The feedback from the
governments made Delors aware of the positive climate for the completion of the internal
market and thereby influenced him to select this goal as his first priority.
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T7for the whole speech see Commission of the European Communities, (1985b, 1
1
).
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ti6S and thC SeleCti°n °f the sin§le market Delors (1994220), olchester and Buchanan (1990, pp. 28-29).
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Parallel to Delors efforts, it should be noted that Jerome Vignon, Delors’ advisorrgamzed a wide range of consultations with businessmen and officials on behalf of
Delors. For instance in December 1984, Vignon arranged a seminar with Europeandushialis s on the completion of the internal market. For a discussion of these details
see Endo (1999 134) and Grant (1994, 66). Additionally, between 1984 and 1985 severalkey business leaders urged the heads of state to develop a single market. For instanceWisse Dekker, the head of Philips in one of his publications (1984) strongly promoted the
EUrT °thCr publications t0 be mentioned in this context is oneom Fiat (1985) and one from Ford (1985). References from Dinan (1994, 155). For a
discussion of the significance of these business leaders on the single market see Pelkmans
and Beuter 1986, and Sandholz and Zysman 1989.
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Thus, after an initial phase of orientation in his new position, Delors placed his
priorities on the goal of foster,
„
g econo,nic growth while achieving the inrprovenrent of
he employment situation in Europe. Concretely, when Delors presented the
Commissions’ Programme of 1985 on March 12, ,985 to the European Parliament, he
argued that economic growth and employment could be achieved only as long as Europe
manages to exploit the potential of a large common market as well as fosters the
development of social measures.'
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4.2. The Single European Act
The Single European Act represents the successful efforts of Delors to bring about
a rejuvenated economic and social Europe. The treaty revisions link the economic reform
efforts with subsequent reform initiatives in the social dimension of the European
146
The treaty revisions were based on Delors vision of bringing about a single
market and improving the relevant decision-making procedures by increasing the use of
qualified majority voting and strengthening the democratic control of the European
Parliament (introduction of the legislative cooperation procedure between the European
Parliament and the Council). As a side-effect to the political reform efforts reform
145
Commission of the European Communities, 1985c. Also see Agence Europe (March
6, 1985, 5) (March 11/12, 1985, 1).
146
For the treaty provisions of the Single European Act see Commission of the European
Communities 1986b
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initiatives in the area of soda, poiicy clearly benefited from ,„c changes in decision-
making rules.
F°r
"le reViSed Anide ll8a
'
*• member states committed themselves
«0 pursuing upward harmonization in the areas of “the working environment, as regards
the health, and safety of the workers.’' Community legislation in this area now could be
adopted by means of qualified majority in the Council. Additionally, Article 1 18b
created a mandate for the Commission to “develop the dialogue between management
and labour at European level.” And finally. A,tide 1 30a committed the community
‘the strengthening of economic and social cohesion - in particular through the measure of
Structural funds. Nevertheless, Article 100a (2), which introduced the possibility of
Qualified Majority Voting, explicitly precluded the use of this procedure for measures
relating to the “rights and interests of employed persons." As Hyman (1997, 316)
pointed on, correetly, this in effect “left social policy subject the veto of any individual
member state.”
Thus, the impact of the Single European Act is summarized by Endo (1999, 129),
when he points out that “the SEA introduced a much wider use of qualified majority
voting in the Council [... and it thereby] enhanced the Community’s capacity to act in
general and to complete the internal market by 1992 in particular, and [it] effectively put
an end to the defacto unanimity voting rule in place since the Luxembourg Compromise
was concluded in 1966.” According to Noel (1989, 96), a former Secretary General of
the Commission, just half a year after the Luxembourg Council which passed the Single
European Act, around 100 decisions were already taken on the basis of the newly adopted
qualified majority voting rules. Additionally Howe, a minister in the government of
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Margaret Thatcher, admitted that he had miscalculated the impact of the SEA when he
pointed on, that “there was one consequence of the Single European Ac, tha, I had
certainly no, fully anticipated, namely the impact on the socalled ,966 Luxembourg
Compromise." Pu, in other words, with an increase in decisions reached through
qualified majority vote. Member States effectively reduce their individual veto power.
Thus ,0 summarize the impact of the SEA one can point ou, that the SEA did
provide new opportunities for a broaden,ng of the scope of socia, policy, particularly in
the health and safety field and i, thereby facilitated a process by which “several new
policy sectors which belong to the core of state sovereignty [were] Europeanized.”'
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However, a, the same time it represents a retreat from the ambitious goals of the Action
Programme which stated that “vigorous action [... was needed] in order to attain the
improvement of living and working conditions so as to make possible their harmonization
whtle the improvement is being maintained.” Thus, the SEA represented a subtle but
important change in the priorities of Community social policy: No longer was
harmonization the goal of European social policy, but instead the attainment of minimal
standards was the new aim. This shift in priorities is noted in the White Paper on Social
Policy (1994, 29). Since the adoption of the Single European Act, the emphasis has
shitted from harmonisation to the adoption of minimum standards.”
This raises the question what factors and forces have influenced the Single
European Act both in its timing as well as its content. In particular which strategy did the
Commission pursue and politically which steps did it take to influence the final outcome?
147
see Horeth (1999, 252).
(1996, 96).
For a similar argument see Betten (1989, 108) and Davies
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4.2.1 Factors influenced the adoption of the Single European Act
Dinan (1997, 189) stated that “most observers agree that the Commission, and
especially its President, piayed a pivotal role in the events and negotiations
.ha, ied the
1986 treaty rev,s, on. Tire C ommission had tot polled its ‘1992’ proposal out of thin air
bu, had cleverly played the role of 'policy entrepreneur,' identifying a demand
(completion of the singie market) and delivering a product (the White Paper)." Aiso
Lodge (1985b, 210, comes to a similar conclusion when she states, that after having
analyzed the factors which contributed to the adoption of the Singie European Ac, “the
Commission’s influence can clearly be seen.”
Moreover, Grant (1994, 70) argues that in the single market initiative, Deiors
“had spotted the strategic significance of a project which would gather support from
nearly all shades of the political spectrum [...]. Once the Community had such an
ambitious goal on its agenda, the pressure for constitutional refonn would grow.” These
pressures would then inevitably lead to new debates on the possible re-arrangements of
the European institutions. Intermingled with this concern would then be the question of
the political and social Union. Along similar lines Cram (1997, 40) stated that the
negotiations over the Single European Act and the future direction the EU was to
provide the window of opportunity which the Commission required to launch a renewed
offensive on the social dimension.” The fact that the Commission was ready to seize the
opportunities provided are clearly expressed in the words of Deiors when he points out
that “the creation of a vast economic area, based on the market and business co-operation,
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*S inconceivable
- I would say unattainable
- without some harmonisation of social
legislation. Our ultimate aim must be the creation of a European social area”'
48
Overall, the Commission's interest in developing a stronger social dimension on
'he EUr°Pean 'eVel WaS pUrSued ^ a three-stage strategy: in the first stage, the
Commission aimed a, reaching an agreement on the need for a single market. Then in the
second stage, it aimed at committing the Member States to an Intergovernmental
Conference. In the third and finally stage, i, aimed a, achieving changes in decision-rules
which would both increase its own capacity to influence polic^shaping decisions as well
as the European Parliament's capacity to participate in the decision-making process.
With regards to the strategy of the firs, stage, the Commission aimed at presenting
the single market initiative as a mere technicality of the overall economic efforts instead
of a politically contentious issue. Along similar lines Wise and Gibb (1993, 62) have
argued that the "tactic adopted by the Commission to gain support from the Member
States for the White Paper was shrewd. By presenting the 300 proposals as purely
technical matters to be executed in order to fulfill the ideas proposed by successive
Council meetings, the Commission created a political situation whereby it gained the
support of all twelve member states.” The authors continue to argue that the significance
of the consequences of the Single Market were clearly underestimated by the Member
States: "It would be fair to assume that many Member States signed the 1987 SEA
without fully realizing the full economic and political consequences of doing so.”'
49
Commission of the European Communities, (1986a, point 1.2.7).
See Wise and Gibbs (1993, 95). For a similar argument see Bieber, Dehousse, Pinder
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The responsibility for developing the proposals for an internal market was
assigned to Commissioner Lord Cockfield, Thatcher's trade secretary nnti, appointed to
Ihe Commission in ,985. On June 14-, 1985, he presented the Commission's White
^ °" 'he C°mpletim °f,he" with its 297 measures remove all
remaining physical, technical and fiscal ba,Tiers the free movement of goods, services
end people within the Community rather quickly. 1„ ,„e words of Lord Cockfield
< 1 994, 48) the Commission pursued the following strategy:
My aim throughout had been to put the White Paper to the Heads of
fills While Paper with the emphasis for establishing the four freedoms (goods,
persons, services, capital) became the basis for economic measures contained in the
Single European Act and ensured that the priority for the subsequent role of the European
Union would continue to be the elimination of nation-specific restraints on market
mechanisms. Again, in the words of Cockfield (1994, 55) “when the White Paper
appeared, there were no rivals to attract attention, the White Paper took centre stage
indeed it was the only player on stage. [...] We succeeded in selling it well."
and Weiler 1988.
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Commission of the European Communities, 1985a.
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on
"* SeCOnd^ thC C°“" “» aimed at secutmg an agreement
Immcd and immediate measures sueh as the holding of an IGC. This agreement would
by and large he viewed by the Member States as rather inconsequential and was thereby
expected be politically relatively uncontroversial. This mean, that once sufficient
political momentum had emerged for an IGC, i, was rather difficult for Member States
not to agree to one proposal or another.
While the momentum to complete the internal market had built up in the early
1980s ensured that heads of states by and large could easily agree on the implementation
ol the White Paper, there was a considerable diversity of opinion as to what legislation
was needed to translate these principles into practice. The European Commission
presented the logic of an integrated market as a step inextricably linked to full European
economic and political Union. While most Member States agreed with the Commission,
the United Kingdom and Denmark regarded it merely as a step towards enhancing tin
free-trading conditions of the European economy. Thus by linking the success of the
internal market initiative to necessary political and institutional reform, the Commission
was able lo create enough political momentum behind reform efforts.
Soon after the White Paper was issued, the Commission issued another document
m which it alerted the Member States that the internal market could only be achieved if
appropriate institutional reforms would be taken in advance. Endo (1999, 137) mentions
that Delors successfully argued that roughly “three out of four proposals anticipated in
the forthcoming White Paper, would necessitate unanimity decisions by the Council.” To
dlustrate the potential lor negative repercussions due to this arrangement, Delors
maintained that it had taken the Council of Ministers 15 years to agree on legislation that
finally allowed architects in the Member States to work anywhere in the Community.
The urgency for institutional refonn is captured in the words of Delors, when he pointed
out just before the Milan summit that “in January I was cautious in my remarks to
Parliament because I did not want the institutional question to be used as an alibi for
doing nothing - now, after six months in the thick of things, I am now of the opinion that
the institutional question cannot be avoided [...] I was less convinced of this six month
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ago; now I am absolutely sure.”
In line with this realization, the Commission pushed to see two institutional
problems solved: First, there should be a settlement on the decision-making process, i.e.
concerning qualified majority decisions. In the words of Delors, such a settlement would
be very important for the Community as a whole in order to minimize “the gray area
between the Commission and the Council, in which projects he forgotten for years on
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end.” According to the Commission’s proposals, majority voting should be the rule
within the Council of Ministers, except in cases explicitly provided for. Thus, the
number of cases requiring unanimity rule should be reduced to those few cases where
Member States expressively wish to preserve their vital interests. Second, the Parliament
should be granted a larger role in the decision-making processes of the Community.
According to the Commission a new co-decision procedure should be developed which
would allow the Parliament to participate the legislative matters with the Council of
' 1
Transcript of Press Conference by Jacques Delors, Brussels 26.6.1985. Quoted in
Endo (1999, 137).
I5
“ Quoted in Agence Europe (June 10/11, 1985, 3).
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Ministers for ,, the feWs of competence which have been give„ over to the Community
and excluded from national sovereignty.
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.n the third and last stage then, the Cotnnrission ainred a more concrete agreenten,
on global institutional revisions during the IGC. In this context, the potentially
conflictual social provisions were presented as a matter of procedure rather than of
substance. As pointed ou, by Cram (1997, 40) 'one impottam reason for the relative lack
Of connic. over the issue of social policy during the SEA negotiations was the rather low-
profile approach adopted by the Commission and the focus it encouraged on procedural,
rather than substantive issues.”'
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The White Paper was seen as a means for furthering integration in the social and
political area. As pointed out in the White Paper (1985, 55), “jus, as much as the
Customs Union had to precede Economic Integration, so Economic Integration has to
precede European Unity.- Thus, the new dynamic in economic integration was clearly
observed as a formidable opportunity by the Commission to also bring about more
integration in the social and political realm. This objective is well expressed in the words
of Delors when he admitted on a French radio in 1 993 that “if this job was about making
a single market I wouldn’t have come here in 1985. We are not here to just to make a
single market - that does not interest me - but to make a political union.
For a discussion of these priorities see Agence Europe (June 27, 1985, 3).
For this argument see Cram (1997, 40).
Quoted in Grant (1994, 70).
The follow,
„g section analyzes
.note concrete,y the exact steps the Contntission
PUrSUed m °rdCr l° aCWeVe i,S P°lit,Cal S 'ra^y. Particular attention is pair, to the second
and Ihtrd stage of the Commissions- strategy. After an unsuccessful summit in Dublin
and a semi-successful summit in Mi,an, Delors three-stage s ,ra ,egy^
successful during the Luxembourg summit win the adoption of the institutional
reforms. Delors strategy was supported by the work of a highly respected Committee
which also strongly recommended institutional changes (Dooge Committee or also
referred to as Spaak II Committee) and the European Parliament a
the supported most importantly
Committee, the efforts of the E
ind most importantly
the Italian and Luxembourg Presidency. The Dooge
mropean Parliament and the Council Presidents helped to
create a political momentum which in the end swayed the reluctant Member Stales to
agiee to the institutional reform proposals.
4.2. 1.1 Summit in Dublin
An important committee which contributed towards the preparation of the Dublin
summit was the Dooge Committee. The Committee was created at the Fontainebleau
Council meeting on June 25-6 1984. The task of the Committee was ,0 translate a wide
range of existing views on the nature of European integration into politically acceptable
terms which would lead to significant political reform. It was composed of personal
representatives of the Member Stales and was chaired by the Irish James Dooge who was
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leader of .he Irish Senate and fanner foreign minister.'* „ was generally^
the new committee was to operate, as the Spaak
, Committee had done, outs.de the
routine administrative frameworks of either the Community or national leve.s. During its
existence, the Committee published two major reports both of which were drafted by
Maurice Faure, the French Representative: one interim report just pnor to the Dublin
summit in December
.985 and one final rePo,1 before the Milan summit in 1985.
the ma in text of both reports, the Committee spelled on, the goal of fo.muIa.ing »a true
political entity which would enable the Community to represent political and social
interest just as much as economic interests.
' For this purpose the Committee strongly
recommended that an IGC should be called which would have to aim a, creating
institutional reforms which should strengthen the role both of the European Commission
and the European Parliament.'
59
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The the Doodge Committee cons.sted of the following members: Frans Andriessenemission), Jean Dondehnger (Luxembourg), James Doodge (Ireland), Maurice Faure(France), Mauro Fern (Italy), Fernand Herman (Belgium), Otto Moller (Denmark) IonnisPapanton.ou (Greece), Malcom Rifkin (United Kingdom), Carlo Ripa di Meana
’
(Commission) Jurgen Ruhfus (Germany), and Wilhelm van Ekelen (Netherlands) Thecompos, t,on of the Committee is listed Council of the European Communities 1985 Forthe organization of the Committee see Meenan 1985.
For the
noted that
France.
text of the first report see Agence Europe (December 2, 1984). It should be
Maurice Faure was nominated by Francois Mitterand as a representative for
Ibid, p. 2.
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vFor instance see Agence Europe (November 16, 1984, 1) (November 23 1985 31(November 24, 1984, 3). ’ ’
J)
’
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Apan from
.his conclusion in .he main ,ex. of ,he reports, ,he foo.no.es con,ained
he Politically m„s, important message: „ was
.here ,ha, the d.ssen.ing Member S,a,es
voiced
.heir reservations. In the words of Keatinge and Murphy (1987, 224) "the critical
parts of the report proved to be
.he foo.no.es, which generally made visible the obstacles
lo the success of the Genscher
-Colombo [reform] initiative"'
60
Mos, strongly opposed to any institutional reforms at that time were three
countries: the United Kingdom, Denmark and Greece. On many occasions the British
government pointed on, that there was no need for any institutional modifications, since
this would only lead to an erosion of the sovereignty of the Member States. For instance,
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, attacked the idea of
institutional reforms which should lead to political union in a speech she delivered in
Avignon in November 1984. In her speech she considered unity (for instance in a
Common Market) to be the substance of European integration, while union would only be
its shadow and therefore concluded: “work for substance rather than talk of the
161
shadow.” Along the same lines, Geoffrey Howe, Britain's foreign secre.aty suggested
that no institutional reform was necessary. Instead he proposed that any government that
would be opposed to an internal-market law should make a 'gentlemen's agreement' to
abstain from supporting it, rather than change the institutional decisions structures in
place since the Luxembourg compromise. In effect Howe urged Member States to
160
For a discussion of the Genscher
-Colombo initiative see Bonvicini 1987.
161
AAgence Europe (December 3/4, 1984, 1).
For this proposal see Agence Europe, (June 10/11, 1985, 1).
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make greater USe °f A '1iCle
,48(3) 0f EC which already allows for abstentions
in decisions which require unanimity.
Addilionally Denmark war also not convinced that political reform was
necessary. According to Keatinge and Murphy (,987. 233-234). ‘.he Danish view could
he described as that of a •strict constitutionalist.' Opposition to change was put in the
context of the treaties, which were regarded as adequate as a legal basis but which had
no, been implemented. By and large the Danish position was rather similar to the British
position, for mstance, the Danish Foreign Minister, Ellemann-jensen pointed out while
his “Government supports a better Europe functioning better” he does “not believe it
necessary to move towards institutional reform.” Additionally, the position of Greece
was that the political reform of the Community proposed would be inappropriate. For
instance the Greece was concerned that while economic integration is moving ahead,
little effort is put into eliminating the economic and social imbalances which characterize
the Community. Especially, the Greece pointed out tha, a redistribution of resources to
poorer regions would be necessary. As long this was not achieved, any further changes
in the institutional structure of the Community would only lead to aggravating these
„
164
uillerences further.
Thus, despite the unified message of the Dooge report, the representatives of three
Member State reserved their right to voice criticism over the reform proposals and
cautioned the heads of state not to enter into any binding resolution during the Dublin
Quoted in Agence Europe (May 25, 1985, 3).
Agence Europe (January 19, 1985, 3).
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summit. This division split the Dooge committee into two camps: the majority of
countries which desired institutional reforms and a minority of countries which were
cautious about any changes at the present. This led to a paradoxical situation: even
'hough the majority of countries desired institutional reform and a large number of
roups and institutions supported the conclusions of the Dooge report, the hands of the
Irish presidency were tied. Given the split among the Member States and the unanimity
requirement, the Irish government decided to make institutional reform a low priority.
Overall, however, the effect of the Dooge reports was to strengthen the position of
‘he tommission
- The Commission strongly favored institutional and decision-making
reform. In several documents released prior to the summit, the Commission proposed the
immediate amendment of three articles in the Treaty of Rome, so that the Council would
be able to decide all single-market laws by majority-vote. Overall, the Commission's
viewpoint was very similar to the majority view point of the Dooge Committee.
Despite the majority opinion of the Member States and the Commission's strong
recommendation, the Dublin summit, however, was not able to come to a binding
conclusion on the issue of political union. In the final conclusion released, merely eight
165
Additionally, several groups and institutions supported the Dooge report For
ns, nee, he Pres,den, of the European Parliament, Pierre Pllimlin'senta personal letter
to all heads of state urging them to take the conclusions of the Dooge Committee in
Stnr/” A
ag,ee
r°
n a IGC WhlCh W0Uld be welcomed by public opinion as “a historic
gestu e. Agence Europe, (December 3/4, 1984, 6). Furthermore, the Trade Union
Confederation (ETUC ) expressed in a meeting on December 4th with the President of theEuiopean Council, Garret Fitzgerald who is also the Irish Prime Minister, that Europe is
in need of political reform. (Agence Europe, December 5, 1984, 9). Also, the Council ofEuropean Municipalities adopted a political statement in which it says that it is placing
great hopes in the intergovernmental conference proposed by the interim report and
which should be held “very soon.”
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lines make a salutary reference to the resolve of the Member States consider the issue
Overa,,. the Irish government was careful jus, use its Presidency solicit opinions on
the matter, without trying to bring about a decision.
m contras, to the Irish government, the Italian government which was to take the
Presidency next, announced right after the Dublin summit that Italy was committed to
teaching “binding political conclusions” a, the next summit, scheduled for June the
following year in Milan
,1985, From early on, the Italian government signaled tha, i,
was interested in working closely with the European Commission in order to make its
Presidency a success.
4.2. 1.2 Summit in Milan
4. 2. 1.2.1 Building Up Support
In the run-up to the Milan summit key figures of European institutions tried to
give further impetus to bring about institutional reforms. For instance, Pierre Pflimlin,
President of the European Parliament, pointed out that “Europe is at the crossroads and
condemned to choose. The institutions function badly. The Council is paralyzed by the
principle of unanimity which is already used in the preparatory work at officials’ level.
There will be no spontaneous progress. Progress has to be initiated.”
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Also, Jacques
Delors, made the following statement: “The major debate on what is to become of the
1 66
Agence Europe (December 5, 1984, 1).
167
Quoted in Agence Europe (January 25, 1985, 3).
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institutions of Europe must, whatever the circumstances, be ,he centra, point oftbe Mi,an
council. For its pan, the Commission is ready for ibis major debate. „ has made Us
careful preparations.”
The Prime Minister of Italy, Bettino Craxi, agreed with Dolors when he
emphasized in a speech in late February 1985 lhat Italy would like to see “the
Community transformed into a true political entity with an institutional structure,
financial autonomy and a wider range of powers.” For this purpose, the Italian
government would intend to “work as hard as it can so that during the European Council
in Milan, an agreement on calling an intergovernmental conference with a mandate to
negotiate a draft Treaty on European Union can be reached.” Thus, in the end, in
addition to pressure of various political organizations, the most important factor which
influenced the decision to hold an IOC was the cooperation between the Italian
I lesidency and the European Commission.
One ol the additional organizations which strongly favored institutional reform
was the “Committee lor Action on Europe” which was formed, by two prominent
political figures jus, briefly after the failed Dublin summit. Both Leo Tindcmans and Max
Kohnstammer were instrumental for the formation of this Committee. ‘™ The explicit
goal lor the Committee was to further action of the Community in three related areas: (1)
the creation of a genuinely unified internal market, (2) the development of a policy of
168
rxQuoted in Agence Europe (June 6, 1985, 3).
1 69
Quoted in Agence Europe, (February 23, 1985, 3).
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Leo Tindemans was the Foreign Minister of Belgium at the time.
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economic expansion and effons io combai employment, and
,3) the lmprovemcnt
,
pragmatic manner of decision-making procedures in the institutions of the
n . 171
ommunity. The implicit goal was to find
and political reform and then “translate this
a consensus on the question of economic
consensus into pressure on governments” in
order to “avoid the usual log-jams the Counci, of Ministers."'
72
Both of the initiators
for tins lobby group took the idea from Jean Monne, who had announced the creat.on of
the “Committee for the United States of Eure
173
Committee until 1975.
rope” on October 13, 1955 and chaired this
lioth Ttndemans and Kohnstammer had served on the previous committee,
Kohnstammer even as vice-chairman. The formation of this committee was remarkable
for the scope of actors involved: both leaders of national parties (government and
opposition) as well as representatives of the social partners were members of this
committee. The first series of meetings took place at Rambouillet on December 20 and
21 were attended by a total of 70 members. Also present at the first meeting were
Jacques Delors and Francois Mitterand, the President of France. On the potential
influence of this Committee Gazzo has pointed out (1985, 1) “it goes without saying, that
although there is no kind of organic link, the Committee’s work will broadly assume the
role of sometimes anticipating, sometimes accompanying and supporting initiatives taken
m
for a description of these goals see Agence Europe (December 19, 1984, 1).
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for this argument see Agence Europe (January 9, 1985, 1).
173
cfor a detailed discussion on the history and the activities of the
1994, Winand (1995, 2001). and Yondorf 1965
group see Duchene
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^ 'he EUr°Pean C°mmiSSi0n ”
'
^
I,l™8 a meting in Bonn on June 6/7
,
, „85
, the
Connnit.ee adopted a statement in which i, urged the Commission and the heads of state
to agree on holding an Intergovernmental Conference.
'
'
Moreover, the European Trade Union Confederation urged the heads of state to
adopt the institutional reforms as proposed by the Commission in order to puli out of the
Obvious paralysis which characterizes the way the Community institutions work. its
statement “The EEC a, the Crossroad.- ETUC points out that
-.he European Community
has no choice bu, to make progress and strengthen its ability to lake action in order to
Ugh. unemployment effectively and lake up the economic, social, technological and
,
.
, ,
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in usna cialluigc. F°r these goals to be achieved, institutional reforms are
necessary condition.
Finally, business associations expressed their interest in institutional reform of the
Huropean Communities. For instance the European League for Economic Cooperation
174 ^
C omment in Agence Europe (January 9, 1985).
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Among others, the meeting was attended by Etienne Davignon (Belgium), Georges
ebunne (Belgium- former Chairman of the European Trade Union Conference)Fernand Herman (MEP), Guy Spitacls (Belgian Minister of State and Chairman ofSounhsi Patly), Mart,,, Bangemann (German Minister of Industry), Rainer Barzel, ErnstBtet((President ol ETUC), Dreher, Hans-Joachim Vogel, Halligan, Umberto Agnelli
' h° Agnelli, Jean Dondeltnger (Luxembourg Minister of Foreign Affairs, Conner
’
p?2Tw mTfm li,'7 )v'°0p den Uyl <PreSidcm of Confederation of SocialistI antes), Win, Kok (Dutch Finance Minister), Piet Bukman (Chairman of the European
opuku ally), Edward Heath (former British Prime Minister), David Steel (Member ofPar uu^ent and former leader of British Social and Liberal Democratic Party) and GastonThom (C han man of European Movement at the time and former President of the
European C ommission). For a list of these members see Agence Europe (June 3/4
,
1985
-
). oi a mote comprehensive list of members see Agence Europ (March 6, 1987, 4).
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See Agence Europe (June 24/25, 1985a, 12).
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adopted a reso.udot, for the Milan summit,
, n which it expressed i(s „deep^ for^
future of Europe, if Mi,an „ne faded ,o reach agree™, on the Con, nity, decision.
making powers.” It urged the heads of state that the achievement of a genuine internal
market would only be feasible, if the Community would give itself the necessaty tneans
of improving its decision-making capabilities.
4.2.1.2 2 Uncertainty and the Strategy of the Italian Government
On the eve of the Milan summit, despite these strong statements of support,
political commentators pointed ou, that “utter uncertainty continues to reign as to the
possible results- of the summit.'™ a lead article ofAgence Europe, Gazzo (1985, 1)
asked: “Wha, will happen in Milan?"^ Delors a. that time was unable to provide any
answers and merely pointed ou. in an interview with the French magazine U Poinr. “No
1 80
predictions can be made.”
This sense of uncertainty was increased further when, the United Kingdom, just
days before the summit, expressed strong resistance to any proposals that would change
the unanimity rule and thereby deprive Member States of their veto.
' 8
'
Given the
Quoted in Agence Europe (June 20, 1985, 4).
See Agence Europe (June 21, 1985, 1).
See Agence Europe (June 12, 1985, 1).
Quoted in Agence Europe (June 26, 1985, 1).
See Agence Europe (June 13, 1985, 1).
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understanding in the tninds of the participants of the sunttni, that any Ca„ foran
Intergovernmental Conference would have to be
Milan summit opened on the
and uncertainty.
Despite the presumed uncertainty of the outcome of the Milan summit, howev
there was one element which was beyond doubt: the Italian Prime Minister, Bettino
supported by all Member States, the
morning of June 28 at 10:45 in the mood of unpredictability
Craxt, was fully supporting the Commission’s proposal for institutional refonn and was
determined to get the heads of stale to agree on holding an Intergovernmental
Conference. Given the constellation of interests of the Member States, this would surely
require some unusual measures. A hint of what strategy the Italian government had in
mind can be found in a statement Guilio Andreotti, the Italian Foreign Affairs Minister,
made to the members of the Chamber of Deputies of the Foreign Affairs Committee jus,
a few days before the summit: “The decision to produce a new treaty does no,
necessarily have to be unanimously adopted, whereas a decision to amend the existing
treaty does require a unanimous verdict.”
* 8 ~
After the first day of the summit on June 28th
,
1985 it was obvious to the Italian
government that no unanimous decision would be possible on holding an IGC. Although,
the Danish government hid softened its stance and now agreed with the proposals put
forward by the Commission and taken up by the Italian presidency, the United Kingdom
and Greece continued to insist on minimal institutional changes. According to these two
Quoted in Agence Europe (June 24/25, 1985, 3).
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governments, these changes cou.d he achieved hy si,np ly amending the treaties. Thus
these governments still did not see a need to call for an IGC.
183
Given the entrenched position of the UK and Greece
vote would have clearly defeated any a hope for
situation ultimately left the Italian
an attempt to hold a regular
winning a mandate for an IGC. This
government with only two options: it could either give
up its ambition or it could find recourse in unusual
the Commission, the Italian
measures. After consultations with
govemmeit took Delors proposal proceed in two stages:
firs, reach agreement on limited immediate measures (such as the holdtng of an ,GC> and
.hen agree on global institutional revtsions afterwards (such as the concrete measures to
be worked out during the IGC). Delors suggested
.ha, Article 236 and 148, could be used
which would allow the Presidency of the Council precisely to these limited immediate
measures: on the basis of majority vote, the Presidency could call for a vote on holding
184
an IGC. While unanimity votes are necessary for treaty amendments, this article
allows majority voting on decision pertaining to calling for an IGC. With the cunning
use of this treaty basis, unprecedented in the his.oty of European integration, Delors and
Ctaxt knew that they would be able to muster enough support from a majority of Member
States. With this move they were able to ensure that the reform proposal, as expressed in
own words of Craxi, would “escape the guillotine of unanimity.”
185
Foi a discussion of these positions see Agence Europe (June 29, 1985, 3ff).
184
Agence Europe (June 30, 1985, 2). Also see Dinan (1997, 189).
185
ru-Ibid, 7. For a discussion of the procedure of this vote also see Lodge (1985a, 206),
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In line with this knowledge, Craxi opened
.he second day of the Milan summit by
calhng for a vote on holding an ,GC. Subsequently, through the positive outcome of this
vote, Craxi was able to conun., the Member States to an IGC during which the question
Of institutional reform was central. A article in Agence Europe fully attributed this
outcome to Delors when i, wntes that “the proposal presented by Delors htmself played a
decisive pan, by making the debate inevitable and ai,owing clarification which moreover
provoked between the Heads of government arguments which for some were
186
unexpected.”
Bntain, Denmark and Greece were outraged about the mm of events: Margaret
Thatcher claimed that she was a victim of a trap, Poul Schluter, the Danish prime
minister complained of rape and Andreas Papandreou, the Greek Prime Minister, spoke
1 87
of a “mini coup d'etat” But seven Member States, including France and Gennany
voted for the IGC and thereby decisively paved the way for it.
During the final press conference Craxi expressed a great sense of achievement
and satisfaction with the results of the sununit when he pointed out that “we have taken
an important and necessary decision [...] Today's decision was a difficult one, after a
battle which was finally won because of political will and the possibilities offered in the
Treaty. We would have preferred a general consensus and unanimity though these were
not possible. [. .
.] The way is now open for European unity in the economic, social.
Agence Europe (July 4, 1985, 5).
Ibid, 9. Foi a reference of Thatcher’s quote see Agence Europe (November 27, 1985.
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Europe of reel,oologies, cultural, institutional, political
this represents a significant step forward;
cooperation and security fields, all
188
4.2. 1.2. 3 Summit in Luxembourg
Immediately after the Milan conclusions Britain was quick to point out that the
fact
.ha, an IGC wii, he held does still no, mean tha, Me tuber States can he compelled to
any decision. At the end of the day, treaty revisions will still have to be supported by
each and eveiy Member State. Delors, responded to these comments by emphasizing the
nupo,lance of institutional reform for the success of the single market, in a speech in the
European Parliament he vigorously expounded that the proposal he had pu, forward in
Milan was done in a “pure and intransien, manner: the single market must be an overall
development, a package, and not a drugstore from which each party obtains just wha, he
189
During a conference of the European Parliament’s Socialist Group, Delors
went even further and alleged that some Member States “wanted to make Europe into a
1 90
supermarket without paying any price." While they were saying “yes" to the openings
of markets, they refused to consider any political and social reforms necessary.
Despite the entrenched opposition to any treaty revisions by some Member States,
it is nevertheless remarkable that in the end, the Luxembourg summit which took place
189
,
Agence Europe (July 10, 1985, 4).
19°
Quoted in Agence Europe (October 5, 1985, 5).
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December 2 and 3
,
1985 agreed on the a draft treaty for the Single European Act.
The treaty amend™,s were subsequent ratified by a„ Member States and came
r 191
force
,, 1987
. This outcome can clearly be seen as a success of the strategy
used and the resources mobi.ized by the Commission. this comext
, Mors claimed
'hat 85 PerCen ‘ °f ‘he P,0Visi0nS °f the Sil’8'e European Ac, were written by him and his
staff. Even though Gran, ,1994, 75), believes tha, the 60 70 percent is a fairer figure,
this still represents and enonnous influence for an institution which does no, have a
formal vote in the final decision-making.
In trying to assess the factors and forces which enabled the Commission to
achieve its goal of the Single European Ac, three elements stand ou, in pari.cular: First,
the strategy and resources available to the Commission, second the willingness of the
Luxembourg Presidency to support the European Commission, and third, the strong
support of the European Parliament for economic and political reform.
As to the first aspect, the Commission was able to develop a strategy by which it
convinced the Member States of the need for political reform that would have to be
pursued in conjunction with economic reform. According to Grant (1994, 72) Delors
portrayed the European Union as faced with two options: initiate economic and political
reforms or decline economically and politically. Delors was successful in arguing that
without the single market initiative and the implementation of the necessary institutional
It should be noted that the following three Member States did miss the earlier deadlineof ratifying the treaty by February 17, 1986 as stipulated by the IGC: Ireland Denmarkand Gieece. Ireland and Denmark were delayed by the procedure of a referendum and
2,006^4 ‘ or
2
‘I
16 laS ‘ C0U" ,ry ‘° ra,ify and therebT waited un,il bolh countries had
concluded the ratification process.
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reforms, Europe would no, only fal, behind its competitors economically, but would also
be po,ideally paralyzed and crippled. The
.mage of Europe's demise was very much on
the mind of the decision-makers in the las. phase of the Luxembourg summit.
Additionally, the Commission made ample use of its opportunity to participate in
the Intergovernmental Conference: together with the European Parliament i, was the firs,
delegation to table any proposals and in total tabled far more proposals than any other
delegation touching on nearly all chapters of the Treaty refonn discussed. According to
Corbett (1987, 244), the Commission submitted a total of 30 proposals to the
Luxembourg Prestdency, while most Member States submitted between three and four
proposals. Formally, 1, participated in the ministerial-level meetings called by the
Luxembourg Presidency. Thus, according to Rometsch (1999, 1 14) due to the activities
of the Commission, “its position papers were at the center of the negotiations.”"’
2
Immediately after Luxembourg had taken over the Presidency of the European
Council, it formed a Working group headed by Jean Dondelinger, Luxembourg's Foreign
Minister as well as a member of the Dcoge Committee. The Committee was given the
task of discussing draft proposals of participants and ultimately preparing a final treaty
proposal. Already on July 22"J
, 1985, both the Commission and the Parliament submitted
their position papers to the Dode linger Committee. Additionally, in mid-September the
Commission submitted three more texts: one on the creation of the internal market, one
on increased flexibility on decision-making linked to the internal market which
192
Original quote in German.
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93
recommended rhe adoptron maj„rity voting rules in the Conncii, and one technology
'n addition to these proposals, i, announced that further proposals win be submitted
baling to internal cohesion and solidarity, one on coordination of financial instruments
and one on the powers of the European Parliament and the Commission. These proposals
were formally submitted to the Dondelinger Committee just prior its meeting on
i 194
Octoher * ,985. According to information available Agence Europe,
-several
delegations welcomed these proposals and did no, present their own proposals saying
they are ready to use those of the Commission as a basis for their work”'
93
With the
exception of the proposals from the Parliament and one proposal sub,pitted by the
German delegation a, the end of September, by October (f. ,985 the proposals submitted
by the Commission were the only position papers received by the Dondelinger Group.
196
Thus, Commission no, only acted much faster than any other delegation, bu, i, also
sub,pitted a much larger number of proposals than any other delegation. This allowed the
Commission to substantially influence the policy debate which took place inside the
Dondelinger Group.
As to the second factor that influenced the adoption of the Single European Act, it
was crucial that the Luxembourg government completely agreed with the Commissions
Agence Europe (September 18, 1985, 3).
194
Agence Europe (October 2, 1985, 3).
195
AAgence Europe (September 19, 1985, 3).
196
Agence Europe (October 7/8, 1985, 1 ).
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-I- the freaty revisions should be conduced within one si„8,e framework. combining
omic reform and political reform. When the Luxembourg Presidency announced
.he Council, program for the ,GC, of the four aspects of its proposal one was to strongly
emphasize that the Presidency very much supported the Commission, point of view that
only one conference should he convened. This conference should simultaneously
revtse the EEC treaty to enable the single market measures be implemented as well as
included institutional reforms in order to father political cooperation. this sense, the
Presidency aimed at incorporating the proposed new provisions in one single
199
h omework. Several Member States, in particular again the United Kingdom and
Greece, favored minimal changes to pave the way for the single market and no changes
pertaining to the decision rules in the Council.
2
” The Commission reacted to the
decision of the Presidency in a very positive way. The Commission, spokesman Mr.
en pointed out that the L ommission welcomes the unicity of the Conference, an
197
there should h!
n0te
,
d
'!“ illS0 l
!
K proposal of tl,e European Parliament emphasized thatI ct be single framework for economic and political reform.
198 XI .1ie other three aspects included: to improve the Council decision-making procedures
•
y l
!
1 Izing quallfled majonty voting rules; to strengthen the Commission’simplementing power; and to enhance the powers of the European Parliament. Foraie eience of this list see Agence Europe (July 25, 1985, 3) as well as Commission of theEuropean Communities (1985d, point 1.1,10),
199
For a discussion ol this point see Agence Europe (July 26, 1985, I).
200 oSee Agence Europe (July 22/23, 1985, 3).
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orientation in line with wha, PresideM De,ors advocated when ^^^^
Community separation between the eeonomie element and the political element"
20 '
Also the Parliament supported the same point of view as the Commission
.
202
For
instanee, Aherio Spinelli, the Chainnan of the Committee on Institutional Affairs,
emphasized that the Parliament essentially has three weapons by which i, could threaten
lire Member States to paralyze the Community: firs,, i, could re^se to adopt a budget,
second „ could table a censure motion which would force the Commission to resign and
third it could refuse to give its opinion on legislative proposals deliberated by the
Council. Each of these three measures separately, and certainly any combination of them
would bring about a serious crisis of the Community. If necessaty, Spinelli maintains,
the Parliament "will resort to this tribunal power which it has and which Governments
know can be formidable ”
203
The Parliaments’ position was considerably strengthened when Italian
government announced that i, would ratify a new Treaty only if it were accepted by the
c 204
-uropean Parliament. In the words of Corbett (1987, 242-243) "the Italian threat to
veto any package not acceptable to the EP turned this into one of the trickiest points in
the final stages of the negotiations. (...) This too can be seen as an attempt to push a
Quoted in Agence Europe (July 24, 1985, 5).
202
For a more detailed discussion of the position of the EP see Schmuck 1987.
203
Foi Spinelli s comments see Agence Europe (September 9/10, 1985, 1).
204
For this detail see Corbett (1987, 241).
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particular government further along ,he pa«h of reform.” While agreement was reached
on .he single market initiative rather quickly, the agreement on political refonn was
considerably helped through the actions of the European Parliament.
Partly by taking these threats seriously, but also partly by agreeing with the
Commission that the European Parliament should play a larger role in the Communities
decision making, the President of the European Council, Mr. Poos, the Prime Minister of
Luxembourg, pointed „u, that
-a, all costs, the wishes of the Parliament should no, be
205
ignored.” Concretely, the President made possible tha, a delegation from the
Parliament was able to attend each Ministerial session of the Conference. This
participation, allowed the Parliament to make its position known directly to the Ministers
at each Conference session. Additionally, and more importantly so, the work of the
sessions should be delivered to the Parliament
vote on it, before heads of governments would
in time so that it would be able to take a
even have had the opportunity to discuss
the proposal.
In the run-up to the summit, both the proposals of the Commission as well as the
dra^^ treaty Pr°P°sal of the European Parliament were essential building-block on the
basis of which decisions were finally reached. On December 17, 1985, the
Intergovernmental Conference completed its work to reform the treaties by adopting a
“Single European Act” which contained a European Community aspect and a Political
Cooperation aspect. Several compromises were crafted: First, the objective of a broadly
defined internal market by 1992 was accepted, given that the 1992 deadline would not
Quoted in Agence Europe (September 1 1, 1985, 3).
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create any automatic legal effects. Second, with regard
Article 100 was revised to allow
harmonization which were
to unanimity rule or majority rule:
majority voting, but only pertaining to measures of
seen as necessary for the successful completion of the single
market. Addit.onally, a compromise sola,ton was found on the question of participahon
of the European Par,lament. the end. the Member States agreed to extend compulsory
consultation between the Council and the Parliament to new policy issues> and mQre
importantly, to establish a system of “cooperation" to involve Parliament fully the
legislative process, notably for most of the single market program. While all Member
States, including the United Kingdom and Greece were agreeable to the final outcome,
Denmark remained the only country which voiced strong reservations. Nevertheless, the
Danish delegation still signaled drat Denmark would be willing ,o ratify the treaty.
4.2.2 Implications for the Decision-Making Process
Despite the fact that the European Commission had no formal role in the final
decision-making process of the Intergovernmental Conference, many scholars agree that
the influence it was still able to exert on the final outcome was quite considerable. Given
this observation, the predictions made by neoftinctionalist scholars about the dynamics of
the decision-making process seem to best suited to explain the outcome of the Single
European Act.
The factors that helped the Commission to participate in the policyshaping and
policy-setting decisions are two-fold: on the one hand Delors very actively produced a
laige number documents and position papers in which he not only repeated his vision of a
economically and socially rejuvenated Europe, but also managed to give a reality to this
172
vision through a carefully crated three-stage strategy: in the first stage, the Commission
aimed at reaching an agreement on the need for a single market. Then in the second
stage, it aimed at committing the Member States to an Intergovernmental Conference. In
the third and finally stage, it aimed at achieving changes in decision-rules which would
both increase its own capacity to influence policy-shaping decisions as well as the
European Parliament’s capacity to participate in the decision-making process. The most
important factor that helped the Commission to achieve its vision and realize its strategy
was the willingness of the Council Presidencies to cooperate. The support from the
Italian and Luxembourg governments was vital for the success of the efforts that Delors
pursued.
4.3 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights
The debates surrounding the single market created increased momentum behind
the debates on a Social Europe. The importance of the increased integration of the single
market was pointed out by Delors on May 12, 1988 when he said during a Congress of
the European Trade Union Confederation in Stockholm, “the social dimension of
building Europe” which was “both a condition and a goal for further progress in Europe
[...] now requires us to make the most of the opportunities opened up in the field by the
206
Single European Act.” Along similar lines Andriessen (1986, 15) then Vice-President
of the Commission, stated that the “Commission is determined to take advantage of what
206
Quote in Commission of the European Communities, (1988d, point 1.1.1).
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Ihe Single Ac, has to offer.” This momentum was carried further by the Delors'
Commtssion in its continued efforts to tmpiemen, the single market as wel, as further the
social dimension. The Commission's efforts were most importantly supported by the
Beigian government which held the Presidency of the European Council during the firs,
half of the year 1987.
The Commission finished a draft of the Social Charter and submitted i, to the
European Council on May 30\ ,989.” June the same year, the Social Affairs
Council debated this proposal and was most heavily criticized by the British delegation.
At the European Council in Madrid only eleven of the twelve Member States declare that
a Social Charter should be agreed on at the European Union level. When the
Commission finally presented the formal proposal, the head of state of the British
government, Margaret Thatcher, considers the charter as a "backlash into Marxtsm.”
During the meeting in Strasbourg on 8-9 December 1989, the heads of all Member States,
with the exception of the United Kingdom, adopted the Community Charter of the
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers.
09
The preamble to the Charter stated resolutely that “the same importance must be
attached to the social aspects as to the economic aspects and [...] therefore, they must be
207
208
209
Quoted in Cram (1997, 40-41).
Commission of the European Communities 1989b.
1 989)
>r ^ie C°nC ^US*°n Strasbourg Summit see Agence Europe (December 10,
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210
P m a balanced manner. Despite these encouraging words of the preamble.
Robens and Springer pom, ou, that “the flaw in the chatter is tha, i, does no, actually
provide rights for employee.” On the basis of the chafer, no emp.oyee may Cam, rights
against national or EU authorities. A,so abundant literature agrees, tha, the documen
was merely symbolic in character and had no consequences for social policy and
industrial relations of the European Union or the member states.
2 '
' In the word of
Delors, the charter embodied an “aspiration.”
2 ' 2
A number of scholars have identified several weaknesses of the Charter: First,
several scholars have emphasized that since the Charter is non-binding on its signatories
and thereby in the words of Combes and Rees (1991, 271) can be characterized as
-no
more than a statement of principle”, no, much effect can ever be expected from it.
213
This means that the Charter is considered to be no, much more than a solemn declaration,
leaving decisions on implementation procedures entirely to individual member states.
Second, also in the literature one finds the observation that the Charter does no, give the
Commission any new or expanded legislative mandate.
2 ' 4
The Community is explicitly
210
Commission of the European Communities 1990.
Silvia *1 991
a
? Te3gUe 1989a ’ TeagUe and Grahl 1991 ’ Rhodes 1991 >1 . Foi a detailed discussion of the system of supervision of the European
Social Charter see Hams 1991. F
212
213
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Commission of the European Communities (1990, 3).
For this argument see Mohn (1992, 6).
See Berie (1993, 69) and Vogel-Polsky (1991, 43).
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reminded to act within the limits of its powers,” and the Preamble states that “the
implementation of the Charter must no, entail an extension to the Communitys powers
as defined by the Treaties.- Third, several seholars have pointed on, that no, much of an
effect can be expected from the Charter due to the vagueness and generality of a large
215
number of its clauses. For instance, clause 10 on social protection simply says that
every worker should have a right to adequate social
‘must be able to receive sufficient
protection, while the unprotected
resources and social assistance in keeping with their
particular situation." Additionally, clause 24 states that retired workers must be able to
enjoy "a decent standard of living." Ohvtously, the combination of the non-binding
character of the Charter with the absence of a legal basis in addition to the extremely
elastic notions of adequacy, sufficiency and decency, open the possibility for diverging
interpretations and varying degrees of implementation in the Member States.
Perhaps the only tangible effect the Charter has had is .ha, it again continued the
authority of the Commission to issue proposals to implement the charter as well as annual
reports assessing its implementation. In compliance with this responsibility, after the
adoption of the Social Charter, the Commission proposed 47 initiatives in a new Social
Action Programme. " Seventeen of these items were directives and these primarily dealt
with health and safety matters. Others were no, legally binding recommendations in the
area of social policy (examples). Bu, due to the unanimity rule required and the negative
For this argument see Daubler (1990, 67) and Seidel (1990, 167).
216
See Commission of the European Communities, 1989a.
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posincn of the United Kingdom, vet^ few soc ,a|_s were adopted^^
completion of the internal market. As pointed out by Dowling (1996, 599).
n!tX
h
r«?
a
uL”
d
,
,lKr9 S°Cial AC ‘i0n Pro~ hadgI* roice I...J these two documents quicklv took t iifP .1 •
own. By the 1990s the Charter and the ^989 SocTa, Aei.onPtogramme had catapulted the previously obscure EU worker
important priorities.
rUm°r '° °"e °f B~ssels ’ ™*«
Along similar lines, Kowalsky (1999, 136) pointed out that effects of the debate of the
Social Charter were primarily reintroduce into the political debate again two important
arguments which pointed to the fact that there can he “(1, no social progress without
economic progress, (2) no sustainable economic growth without social cohesion.” This
interdependence of social and economic policy was a central principle in the Treaty of
Paris and as will be discussed in the next chapter, was also an important argument
developed by the Commission in the mid 1990s. Additionally, Keller (1995, 4 | |) has
pointed out .ha, politically, the Social Charter represents “an important milestone along
the path of developing a social Europe.”
This observation raises the question what factors and forces have influenced the
adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights. In particular, which strategy did
the Commission pursue and politically which steps did it take to influence the final
outcome?
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4.3.1 Factors influencing the adoption of the Charter on Fundamental
Social Rights
The strategy of the Commission to achieve the Social Charter mainly had three
the idea as possible. Second, again the Commission aimed a, a twos,age strategy: in the
nrst Phase i, aimed a, achieving a solemn declaration from the Heads of State committing
themselves to the implementation of the goals of the Charter. In the second phase, the
Commission could then spell on, more concrete,y wha, exactly these goals should entail.
Agam, the cooperation with the Presidency of the European Council was very critical for
the achievement of the strategy of the European Commission.
As to the firs, component of the Commission's strategy, Delors sen, a letter to the
chairman 01 the Ec0nomic and Social Committee (ESC) on November 10, 1988 and
thereby formally requested the opinion of the Committee on the possibilities of creating a
cohesive social European agenda.
2 ' 7
The letter points out that “the elaboration of such a
Community Charter is not an easy task. It requires a thorough knowledge of national
practices and frank confrontation between partners in economic and social life.”
2
'*
The
Commission believed that the ESC’s composition would make it best able to discuss and
reflect on the possible content of such a document. The Committee was asked to present
its opinion at the beginning of January. As pointed out by Falkner (1994, 225) this move
The letter was reprinted in Commission of the European Communities (1990 80) andin Agence Europe (November 1 1, 1988, 6).
218
Ibid, 6.
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on
.he pan of the Common represented a so far
“unprecedented opportunity for the
ESC to actively participate in the shaping of EU
.egislatio. Even though the Committee
responded with some delay on February 22"-, 1988, by issuing its opinion on basic
community social rights, the proposals made in this opinion were largely no, take„ up
.
wever, instead ot the taking the elements of the proposal of the ECS, the final
document approved by the heads of state was vety Cose to the document prepared by the
219
European Commission.
In order to succeed in getting a declaration from the heads of state, the
Commission critically had to rely on the support from the Presidency of the European
Council. Again, the Belgian government which started the Presidency started January 1«
1987 was willing to give this kind of support. The intention of the Belgian government
to work very closely with the European Commission was expressed vety early during its
tenure. In an interview on January d", Leo Tindemans, Belgians Foreign Affairs
Minister pointed out that “Belgium will await the Commission's proposals; its
responsibility will be to ensure that the meetings it chairs progresses correctly, so that the
Council of Ministers decides. Only if the Commission is not up to the task will the
Belgian government be led to formulate suggestions.”
220
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For this point see Dowling (1996, 598). Also Kowalsky (1999, 136) pointed out that
ofAe ECS again
61 16nCe ^ Commission has 50 far not caIled 011 the active participation
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Quoted in Agence Europe (January 6, 1987, 3).
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m his speech to .he Parliament on January 22"“,
,987, in which he presented the
Presidency's Programme, Tindemans is even more explicit when he points out that
“holding the presidency [...] plays a sometimes essential rde in
to forget or shove aside.”
In mid-February, Delors presented the Commission's programme for 1987 to the
222
European Parliament. In his presentation he stressed one overarching priority:
creating the essential conditions to implement the Single European Ac, Among the
essentia, conditions he identified: first, the adaption of the common agricultural policy to
the new Cities of the European market, second, stronger emphasis on Community
economic policies which aim at structural reforms, and third, reform of the budget
process. Additionally, Delors outlined that the following two measures should be taken
10 strengthen the Single Market: developing a single currency and involving the actors' of
social and economic life in a cooperative growth strategy.
Parallel to presenting the Commission’s programme to the European Parliament,
Delors also submitted a communication to European Council with the title “Making a
Success of the Single Act - A new Frontier” (also referred to as the Delors plan) which
Quoted in Agence Europe (January 23, 1987, 3).
Foi details ot the programme see Agpnce Europe (February 19, 1987, 5-8).
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spelied ou, the same goa.s and pnonties for the Conttnttnity.“ After the Be|glan
Presidency received this docuntent, he,„g convinced ahon, the arguntents presented,
,,
immediately responded posidvely to i, and potnted
,ha, this was a comp,ex and
ambitious plan which cannot be broken up by isolating one aspect or another.
224
Additionally, the President of the European Council, Wlfned Martens, also the Prime
Minister of Belgium, pointed ou, tha, Europe must “develop towards a true political
225
union.”
clearly, the Belgian presidency was very much committed to work closely with
the Commission to achieve this goal. Two examples, confirm this determination: First,
tire Belgian Presidency prepared a report for the General Affairs Council on the Delors
plan. In its 3t>page long report, the Belgian presidency emphasized the following points:
( 1 ) the Delors plan should be maintained as a whole; (2) the implementation of the Single
Act should be a priority without opening any new debates on cohesion or the role of the
structural funds in this context; and (3) a minimum body of social provisions should be
226
created. This move not only gua ranteed that the Delors plan would remain on the
223
For the complete text of the document see Agence Europe (February 20 1987 15-18)
(February 26!
' 987
'
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5).
For the reaction of the Belgian Presidency see Agence Europe (February 25, 1987b,
Quoted in Agence Europe (February 26, 1987b, 3).
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For a discussion of this report see Agence Europe (April 25, 1987, 5) andC ommission of the European Communities (1988e, 61-62).
agenda of the European Council, but also that the debate
for the Commission.
was framed in a favorable way
Second, during the General Affairs Council the Belgian Presidency managed to
find a consensus among the delegates whtch by and large left the Delors plan unchanged.
By majority vote all Member States, with the exception of one - namely the United
Kingdom
- gave their approval to the guidelines of the Delors plan. This outcome was
achieved by rather choosing to main,a, n the tex, with its substantta, content instead of
searching for a unanimous agreement, which would have resulted in a substantially
changed and weakened text.
4.3.1.1 Criticism of Lack of Social Dimension
Parallel to the Commissions’ efforts of implementing the measures to bring about
the single market, numerous institutions and political groups voiced them concern over
possible consequences of the single market. These criticisms helped to strengthen the
Commission’s agenda. Most commonly voiced was the fear that the common market will
lead to an increase in social and political polarization in Europe. For instance the
European Parliament raised the following two questions during a committee hearing on
the Single European Act: “are the measures proposed in the Delors plan sufficient to
ensure that the large internal market is completed in tandem with increasing economic
and social cohesion? If not, must we face the possibility that the unified economic area
227
1987°5)
a d 'SCUSSIOn °f thlS strategy of Belgian Presidency see Agence Europe (July 2,
182
^ C°mPle,ed WlK
" Member States are s.il, such ,ha, the
elimination of all frontiers could aggravate rather than attenuate them?"
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Additionally, Guy Spitaels, Belgian Minister of State and Socialist Party
Chainttan, made a wide-ranging speech on April 27, 1987 with the theme "unjamming
Httrope." his speech he criticized the recent European initiatives as being too much
focused on creatmg a singie market and improving the effectiveness of Community
mechanisms. Instead wha, would be needed is a programme of action which would focus
on the following three themes: employment and social justice, the cuitura, model, and
defense. Spitaels stressed that “all political leaders must give concrete replies to the
government who question them on fundamental issues: employment, soc,a, protection,
and armament, all of which have a European dimension. Without a programme
perceptible to public opinion, how can voters be led or be asked to show support or even
,
229
enthusiasm?”
Along similar lines, ETUC emphasized in numerous press releases that while it
supports the basic approach of the Delors plan, further action would be necessaty to bring
about a European social area.
23
"
I, warns that as long as the single market would be
implemented without further action in the social area, inevitably there will be negative
consequences lor regions which are economically weak. Through the use of the concept
228
229
Agence Europe (April 4, 1987, 11).
Quoted in Agenge Europe (April 29, 1987a, 5).
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For instance see Agence Europe (April 29, 1987b, 14), June 29/30, 1987a, 9), (March
1, 1988).
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"socia, dumping”, ETUC aniculated the fear economic liberalization in the sing ,e
marke, could be used to weaken social protection of workers competing for jobs in a
more ‘laissez-faire' European environment created by the single market, fn this context
ETUC argued that an unregulated single market could encourage companies, freed ft
national shackles on capital investment movements to relocate from countries which
provided high wages, wide social secunty provisions and good working condttions to
countries where income expectations are lower, social provisions are far less protective
Oil!
and environmental legislation less restrictive.
23 '
In terms of immediate concrete policy proposals ETUC called for the adoption „f
macro-economic policies aiming to promote growth and employment as well as industrial
policies aiming to overcome structural inequalities. Additionally, i, demanded the
creation of European citizenship rights which would guarantee to all citizens of Europe
economic, social and political rights wherever they reside within the Community.
232
In
terms of developing a medium-term strategy, it demands asked the Commission to draw
up a report on the social consequences of the single trained market. In the words of the
Secretary General of ETUC, Mr. Hinterscheid, the current principles of the single market
231
There is a large body of literature available on the concept of “social dumping ” For~ M
T 7
( 7 : l60) Se“ S°Cial dUmP 'ng aS 3 “ co,npet,rnSbasedemployment practices. He understands that, within the EU and as theinternal market program advances, “standards of social protection might be depressed or
at least kept from nstng, by increased competition after 1992 from States with
substantially lower standards". For similar definitions and empirical work on social
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For this demand see Agence Europe (May 12, 1988, 14).
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-if pU . into practice give rise to a race to abandon regulations, in which the winners
would be those employers who were best a, a,ranging the hours, who laid most workers
off, had the work contracts which were the most flexible, and the cheapest in terms of
social protection and salarial costs. This downwards spiral, this way of tmnagtng the
economy and employment on a week-to-week basis could only damage healthy
competition based on technological innovation, a dynamic trade policy and a far-seeing
employment policy in quantitative and qualitative terms.”
233
Several scholars have potnted out that ETUC understood that the reasons for the
lack of a stronger social dimension were no, due to the Commission’s reluctance
develop one, but rather due to the opposition of the British government for such
234
measures. Accordingly, ETUC’s main criticism of the social market were targeted
specifically at the British government as well as the European Council more generally.
235
As such i, saw in the Commission a helpful alliance to push for further developments in
the social arena as well as it strengthened the position of the Commission vis-a-vis the
Member States.
A Memorandum issued by the Belgian Presidency of the European Council on
May 27, 1987, proposed that the Community should be authorized to develop “minimal
soctal standards which would provide the social partners with a stable and common base
233
Quoted in Agence Europe (June 29/30, 1987b, 9). For a detailed
policy position of ETUC see Seidel (1989, 158). Brusis (1989, 16).
discussion of the
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For this argument see Rometsch (1999, 105), and Kopke (1988, 48).
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from which they could negotiate in order to guarantee a real social dimension for the
internal market. AcCord,„g to the proposal, the following social guarantees are no
longer negotiable: (1) concerning industrial relations: trade union freedom and the right
.0 organize and to engage in collective bargaining and prior information and the
consultation of workers in case of technological innovations or impoifan, changes in the
company: and (2) concerning employment and working conditions: the right of any
worker to be covered by a collective bargaining or professional agreements, whatever this
negotiated employment contrae, and the right to be represented in the collective
bargaining; the ngh, for workers employed the various fonns of atypical work to social
securtty benefits and to protection concerning the hours of work; the right of workers,
whatever their work regime, to protection measures in the field of health and safety, the
nght of any worker to fair remuneration to ensure for him and his family a decent
standard of living, (for this detail see Ross, 1995a, 368).
4.3.1.2 Response of the Commission
As a response to these critical voices, the Commission created an
interdepartemental working party at the beginning of the year 1988. The working party
was given the task to study the social implications of the common market and
recommend accompanying measures that should be taken. The overall goal of the
Quoted in Agence Europe (May 27, 1987, 6).
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economic and the Socia, aspects of the interna, market. On February 24. „88 Ma„ue,
’
thCn thC C0mmiSSI0ner of thc DG 011 Social Affairs and Employment, Education
and Training, announced the following three objectives which would font, the basis of
social policy that should be pursued by the Community in the following years: (1)
implementing measures which promote freedom of movement for persons which should
among other things enable the recognition ofcenifica.es and qualifications;
,2) analyzing
the possible impact „l the single internal market on employment and working conditions
as well as assessing the possible risk of social dumping; and
,3) identifying the socia,
changes that will be brought about or speeded up by the completion of the larger market.
such as legal measures on the European, sectorial and regional levels.
2”
Then in May of the same year, the Commission issued a special edition of “Social
Europe” dedicated to the “social aspects of the internal market.” The report was based on
the work of scholars which were asked ,0 study the issue in depth. Two main findings of
this report stand out: First, the repor, boldly states that “the social dimension of the large
market is absolutely necessary if we are not to loose the supporl of the workers and
,
238
unions.” Second, the report recommends the establishment of fundamental social
rights to mitigate some of the possible negative consequences of the internal market.
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Commission of the European Communities ( 1988b, point 12 1) Also see AeenreEurope (January 23, 1988, 7), (February 25, 1988, 7).
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Quoted in Agence Europe (May 6, 1988, 9).
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Building on
.he findings of .he s.udy, in Sep,ember Commissioner Marin
presen,ed a report on ,he
..Social Dimension of ,he fn.emal Marker. This repod was
!a,er adop.ed by ,he Commission as a forma, communicafion and cons.im.ed
,he program
Of action that the Commission proposed ,o implement between 1988 and 1993.
239
Three
™i„ conclusions stand on, in .he repod and the communication: Firs,, bo.h documents
emphasize tha, the social dimension of the Community should mostly impodant.y
facilitate the free movement of labor. For this propose actions were proposed which
eliminate obstacles to ,he free movement, such as extending the freedom of the worker
also ,0 parents, children and dependants and implementing a system of recognition of
diplomas of higher education and professional qualifications. Second, both repods point
OU, that social hamonization through legal measures will be the appropdate tool to
address the cutren, economic problems as well as social inequalities. Instead social
cohesion is best achieved through decentralized policy measures, such as encouraging
education and professional training. Third, the report concludes tha, the social partners
are the most important actors in bringing about changes in social policies. Thus, the
reports recommend, that the social dialogue should be fostered both by European
institutions and national governments
By and large, the Charter on Fundamental Social Rights was based on the
conclusions of this report. During the French Presidency of the European Council in
1989, the final details of the Charter were worked out. Again, the French government
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Commission of the European Communities, (1988a, point 1.1.1), also see AgenceEurope (September 7, 1988, 5), (September 8, 1988, 5-6). Also see Social Europe
Sondeiheft 1988 and the Social Dimension of the Internal Market, Commission
Communication, September 1988 - also called the Marin Report
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deeded to adopt most of the Commission's proposals, instead rf^^^ ^
as ,0 increase the hkelihood of a positive vote of the British govern,. As was already
predictable prior ,o ,he Counci, nreeiing in Strasbourg on May 30. 19S9, eleven Member
States agreed to sign the Chafer, with the British govern,
,he „„ly Member State that
icfused to be part of the agreement.
According Margaret Thatcher (1993, 750), “the Social Charter was quite
sintply a socialist charter - devised by socialists in the Commission and favoured
predominately by socialist member states [...) we did no, teed a Community document
aimed at introducing the Delors brand of socialism by the back door.”
4.3.2 Implications on Decision-Making
The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights represents an example in
which the Commission has used rather skillfully a window of opportunity: maximizing
on current criticisms of the lack of a social dimension of the single market, the
Commission was able to respond by presenting a detailed proposal which outlined
general social measures which the heads of states were asked to sign as an agreement.
Tins observation suggests that the theoretical predictions made by neofunetionalism
about the dynamics of decision-making, best fit the process by which the Charter of
Fundamental Rights was agreed on.
Again the strategy pursued by the Commission had three components: first, it
aimed at involving as many actors as possible, so as to gain greater political cloud and
credibility; second, it aimed at gaining a political commitment from the Member States
legarding the C harter, and third and finally, it aimed at presenting the exact policy details
189
” 3 S0C ' al aCti°" Pr08'amme^ aflCT o^ina, agreement on the Charter had been
made. Few changes were made by the Member State governments the proposals pu,
forward by the Commisston. Most important,,, agam in this context was the support by
he Belgian as we„ as French governments both of which had the Presidency of the
European Council.
4.4 The Social Protocol of the Treaty of Maastricht
The initiative of the Intergovernmental Conference in Maastricht on December?
and 10, 1991 goes back to a common proposal of both Chancellor Helmut Kohl and
President Francois Mitterrand on April 18, 1990 to the President of the European
ctl, Charles Haughey. In this letter both heads of government recommended the
deepening and widening of the European Union. The letter specifies that “in the light of
far-reaching changes in Europe and in view of the completion of the Single Market and
the realization of Economic and Monetary Union we consider it necessary accelerate
the political construction of the Europe of the Twelve in belief
,ha, i, is time to transform
relations as a whole among the Member-States into European Union and vest this Union
with the necessary means of action as envisaged by the Single Act.”
24
'
In effect, both
Kohl and Mitterrand proposed that the “European Council should initiate preparations for
an intergovernmental conference on Political Union” The particular objective of such a
See Agence Europe, No. 5238 (April 20, 1990, p.6).
run-up to Maastricht see Compston (2001, 113).
For a detailed discussion of the
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conference should be the red,, ion of ,he democratic deficit, more efficient institutions,
U" ,ty an<l C°herenCe bC 'WeCn ",e aCti0ns of the T«c'lve in the economic, monetary and
political field, and last bu, no. leas,, ,he developmen, of a common foreign and security
policy
,n ,Une l990> in Dublin
’
The EuroP“» Council decided ,„ convene two IGCs,
one on Economic and MoneUuy Union, and the one on Political Union. Both IGCs were
opened a, ,he European Council meeting in Rome in December ,990. According ,o
several scholars, the Commission a, the time was mainly focused on the development of
proposals for the economic and monetary union and did no, contribute much ,„ the
discussions of the Political Union.
2
"
For instance Rometsch (1999, 173) has argued ,l,a,
the participation of the Commission in “both parts of the Intergovernmental Conference
was quite different: while the Commission greatly influenced the course of the
negotiations of the economic and monetary union, its influence on the negotiations of the
Political Union were vety limited.”
244
The reason cited for this limited influence are
mainly that Delors had invested a lo, of time and energy on developing an agenda for the
economic and monetary union, while completely neglecting to develop a stance on
Political Union. For instance Rometsch (1999, 173) quotes an interview with Francois
Lamoureux, who was Deputy Head of the Cabinet of Delors, in which Lamoureux points
out that the Commission was unable to participate on the debates of the Political Union,
242
See Mazzucelli (1997, 64).
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For this argument see Edwards and Pijpers (1997, 7 ).
For the same argument see Curtin (1993, 17), Wiener and Neunreither (2000, 3).
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since „ was conceptual,y no, sufficiently prepared. In the same in,e,view with
Rometsch, Lamoureux points out tha, this lack of preparation did no, allow the
Commission to link the debates on Economic and Monetary Unton with the debates on
Political Union. ,n effect for the Commission, the Intergovernmental Conference was
spin into two arenas: one in which i, played a large role and one in which i, was no, more
than a spectator.
Furthermore, several scholars have pointed on, that the limited proposals that the
Commission made in the area of political union were not well received by most of the
member states. For instance Wester (1992, 214) has pointed on, that “the Commission, as
a defender of Community interest found itself several times in a minority position, often
only supported by small countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands or a federalist
country such as Italy.” Throughout the negotiations Dolors was not able to sufficiently
reline the position of the Commission and thus, by the end of the negotiations Delors
“would become more and more isolated form the other partners, which increasingly
considered such an approach to be unrealistic.”
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While the Commission sided with the German government on the issue of
political union, its actions in this area were mainly confined to declarative statements. For
instance in a memorandum released at the beginning of February 1991, the Commission
pointed out that “EMU and political union alike aim to give the Community a new
245
For this argument see Wester (1992, 213).
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capacity for act,on [..., Both are aspects c.oseiy ,i„ked one and the satne movement:
the advance towards European union.”
246
At the next summit meeting on April 28, 1990 in Dublin, the European Council
followed up on the proposal and confirmed its commitment to Political Union. The
dec,Sion was reached that two new intergovernmental conferences should take place on
December ,4 and ,5, ,990 in Rome: one on the Political Un.on, the other on the
Economic and Mone.aiy Union. Germany signaled from the outset a veiy strong
commitment to the creation and implementation of institutional refonns for the Political
Union, while France was mostly concerned about refonns towards an Economic and
. ,
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onetary Union. As a matter of fact. Kohl was only then willing to negotiate
economic and monetary reform, as long as steps toward political reform were taken.
248
Gennany indicated from the outset of the negotiations that the strengthening and
the Political Union was a necessary condition that needed to be fulfilled before
Gennany was willing to make concessions in the domain of the Economic Union.
248
Chancellor Kohl in particular demanded greater powers for the European Parliament than
246
See the European Commission Memorandum on the draft treaty on EurooeanEconomic and Monetary Union, in: Agence Europe (February 1, 1991 ).
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Andrews (1993, 109).
For an analysis of this point see Wooley 1994.
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For instance see “Kohl will den Durchbruch zur Politischen Union” and “Kohl beharrt
auf Junktim Handelsblatt (May 2 1 , 1991). “Die ungewollte Politische Union ”Suddeutsche Zeitung (July 7, 1991).
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mos, other Com™* ieaders were wj||mg
,o„ - „ ^ ^
on strengthening the competencies and powers of the European Parliament vis4-vis the
European Council. According to the competencies established by pas, treaties the
European Parliament was effectively excluded on all decisions reached in the European
Council that were based on the voting procedure of simple majority or unanimity.
25
'
The
European Parliament only participated in the decision making process in those areas that
were decided on qualified majority vote by the European Council. The objective of
Helmut Kohl, thus was to extend co-decision procedures in areas such as transeuropean
networks, environment and social policy. The strategy thereby was to extend qualified
majority voting procedures to areas outside of the already established articles.
Germany submitted a proposal to the Council on the Political Union in which it
favored the reform of unanimous voting procedure to “enhanced qualified majority-
voting procedure (“verstaerkte qualifizierte Mehrheit”). This proposal represented two of
Germany's most important objectives: (I) it fulfilled Germany's interest in the
strengthening and deepening of the Political Union; and (2) it addressed Germany's
wotry about the erosion of its high social policy standards and its reluctance to be bound
by what might turn out to be insufficient European social legislation.
252
250
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Foi a discussion of the position of Germany see Story (1997, 26).
For an analyses of legislative competencies between European Parliament andEuiopean Council see Fntzler and Unser (1998, 44), McCormick (1996 157) Corbett
1994, Viola (1997, 117).
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Additionally, Germany insisted on the inclusion of the subsidiarity principle in the
1 reaty text.
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Most other member states agreed with Germany „,a, the unanimous voting
procedure of the European Council shot, id be extended policy areas outside of Artie,
e
49
’
10°a
'
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'
an“ l27
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'
SOcial Poii«y Jurisdiction among member states had
been both hampered and obstructed because of the veto power of one single member
253
state. Mostly, Great Britain had vetoed several social policy initiatives, such as the
Social Charter in 1989. Nevertheless, while Belgium, and France showed reluctance to
agree with the German proposal, Denmark and Spain indicated their outright refusal. A
compromise was dralied which turned out be a slight variation of the original German
254
proposal. Based on Article 148 the qualified majority vote would thereby proceed as
follows: The number of votes for countries was to be weighted roughly by population.
The large countries (Britain, France, Germany and Italy) were given ten votes and eight
votes (Spain). The smaller countries (Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal) were
given five votes. The smallest countries (Denmark, Ireland) were given proportionally
west votes, namely thtce. And Luxembourg was merely given two votes. The total
253
xiThe following countries endorsed the extension of qualified majority voting in theirproposals submitted to the Council: Belgium, Portugal, Italy, Denmark and France
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ed Talified majority voling” differs from qualified majority voting namelym the number of votes necessaty for any proposal to pass. In enhanced qualified m^o kyvote 66 votes out of 76 are considered sufficient for a proposal to pass, in qualified
majority vole 54 votes are sufficient (which means 23 votes would be needed to block)Assuming that Germany might be interested in blocking Council proposals at some point
interest w?rGerman |Pr°P0Sal W0U 'd l,ave been far more Iikc|y <° maintain Germanrest. Since Germany has ten votes in the voting procedure of the Council, it would
have to have found only one more member countiy to support its point of view. Underquahiicd majority voting rules a countiy who wants to block proposals has to muster a
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of votes in the Couneil would therefore sum up to 76 votes. For a qualified majority
decision 54 votes would be necessaiy. Translated into possible interest constellations this
means, that large countries would always have find another country as an ally to veto
the Council's policy proposals. Most importantly, smaller countries with similar interests
would need to form veto alliances if they wanted to block the passage of social policy
proposals.
Thus, three observations about the compromise solution are important to note.
Fust, Gennany was successful in introducing institutional change in the discussion on the
Political Union. Even though it had to back down on its proposal of 'enhanced qualified
majority vote,' it still won the concession of qualified majority vote. Second, the
compromise solution ultimately allows the various member states to retain the possibility
of vetoing social policy proposals, which they might view as contrary to their national
255
interests. Third, the insistence of Gennany on progress in the Political Union required
the member states to work out some compromise on decision making rules in the Council
so that Gennany would be satisfied. The agreement on the Social Protocol symbolizes
this compromise. In this sense, the Protocol is not an expression of the political will of
the various members states to allow the European Union to enhance its capacity to pass
social policy legislation. Instead the Social Protocol was an item on the bargaining table
. The most notable difference to the voting procedure before the Social Protocol is
that member states after the implementation of the Protocol will need sufficient votes of
other member states to block proposals. Thus, in the arrangement of “pooled sovereignty”
national governments continue to play a dominant role in the decision making process,
while at the same time individual states can no longer block social policy initiatives
agieed upon by a qualified majority of member states; for reference to the term “pooling
of sovereignty” see Keohane and Hoffman (1991, 13).
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Which, after i, was agreed on, allowed France and ftaly demand more supper, „f
Monetary and Econonnc Union front Germany and a,.owed Spain to demand the creation
of the Cohesion Fund.
Overall, France piayed a dual strategy a, Maastricht. First, France demanded the
deepening of Economic and Monetary Union. Second, i, insisted on substantial
increase of social policy competencies of the European Council. The proposal submitted
to the Council on Political Union supporied the extension of Community's competencies
both in industrial and social policies. The proposal asked for qualified majority voting „„
industrial policy and suggested that Article 1 18a should be amended so that it would
include harmonization of working conditions across the member states. Additionally,
France agreed with Italy tha, the Community should be given more competencies in the
area of social protection. Both France and Italy proposed the creation of a new article
that would make the integration of persons excluded from the labor market its goal.
25
Spam threatened to veto any social policy proposals and political or economic
reform proposals unless the final Treaty would specify a clear commitment to the
256 „
For an analysis of France’s interest in
1997, Feldstein 1997, and Obstfeld 1997.
Economic and Monetary Union see Cameron
257
For a discussion of the proposals submitted to the Council see Schulz, 1996. pp 75-
. Denmark s proposal suggested a comprehensive improvement of the working
conditions with the goal of harmonization across member states, establishment
*
consu 1tation and information rights of workers, and right of workers to social protection
Additionally, Spam suggested in a proposal that harmonization of social policy should be
achieved m several stages. Each stage should be decided independently by the EuropeanCouncil based on unanimous voting procedure. The implementation of the content of the
stages should be worked out in directives which should be subject to qualified majority
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creation of cohesion herds to help poorer European Community
transition to EMU. The Spanish position on this
Irish and Greek leaders.
A compromise solution was found for Spain that took i
258
countries to make a final
issue was reiterated by the Portuguese,
ts most important interests
tnto account. The President of the European Council proposed that a new article (An.
103dl should be included in the Treaty which specified that "the Council (...) create prior
to 31 December 1993 a cohesion fund to contribute financially to the realization of
projects in the areas of environment and transeuropean networks.” Thus, in effect, the
Spanish vote for both the Political Union, of which the Social Protocol was par, of, and
the Economic Union, of which the Economic and Monetary Union was par, of, was
bought through promising financial compensation.
^
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See “EG- Regierungsverhandlungen iiber die angestrebte Politische Union,
emeinsamkeiten und Konflikte.” Handelsblatt, May 6, 1991.
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For this point see, Addison and Siebert (1994, 18). In fact, the potter countries havein the past received economic transfers from their richer fellow member states when
’
accepting potentially costly new steps toward integration. Such transfers constitute sidepayments to the poor countries, linked to the agreements of their governments to
cooperate wuh progress on integration potentially harmful to their political interests The
e 0t Slde payments 111 Promoting integration has been explored by Gary Marks. In his
the WWtl°P
° f theJTPtanCe by the peripheral countries of the Single European Act andhite Paper, Marks argues that “the challenge for innovators has thus been to find
ways of paying off recalcitrant member states by combining issues in such a way that
every member state benefits (...). The politics of unanimity voting is one of creating
bundles of issues to distribute potential gains so that no voter wishes to block the
legislation.”
What explained so well the cooperation of the poorer countries with regard to the SEA
appears equally well to illustrate their agreement to the Political and Economic Union of
the Maastricht treaty. In fact, the revised treaty calls for both an increase in the existing
structural funds and the creation of a new “cohesion fund” to assist the poorer countries
with programs for environment and infrastructure development. For this point see Marks
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Grea, Britain entered the Maastricht negotiations with vety different
.mentions
that the other member states. It did not see any need to change the social competencies of
.he European Community. And most importantly i, was no, wi„ing
,0 compromise its
position on reforms of the Pohtiea, Union or reforms on Eeonomtc and Monetaty Unton,
From the outset of the negotiations leading the Maastricht treaty, the British Prime
Minister John Major emphasized his opposition to any mclusion of a Socia. Chapter in
he Maastricht Treaty. While al, Member States were interested tncluding a Socia,
Chapter in the meaty, the Brit.sh strategy was one of veto and stalemate. Throughout the
negotiations of the second day of the summit (December 12, 1991), the Council's
President, Ruud Lubbers, tried to reach an agreement acceptable Major and the other
eleven political leaders.' Each time he failed. Jacques Delors, then President of the
European Commission, tried to break the deadlock with a proposal tha, would allow
Bntam to opt out of particular social laws and then, if i, wished, to opt back in. But
Major rejected all vaneties of opt-out. Meanwhile, Lubbers considered the possibilities
"’a' ‘ f the British would not ac«P' ^ opt-out, because of negative connotations, Major
might buy the idea of eleven countries “opting-in” to the social chapter.
26
*
This
diplomatically clever move finally solved the stalemate. Rather than watering down the
1992.
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r7 °f "’u Eur°Pean Co™.il in 1991 was held by Luxembourg followedy Netherlands; Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jacques Santer was the President of the
RnlTr'i n T 1 f°r “? fi? P3rt °f the year followed by Netherlands Prime Ministeruud Lubbers the president for the second half.
261
See Grant (1994, 201).
199
on Poll!,cal Union, leaving Britain out. The social chapter
the Treaty and called an “agreement” and
was excised from the body of
was annexed to Protocol No. 14 on Social
Policy. I, was subsequently was signed by eleven governments. A protocol in an
appendix to the Treaty stated that the Eleven would make social policy according the
rules of the “agreement” and authorized the Member States to use the Community
institutions and procedures to do so. “I hope in no, too long time the UK wil, join again.”
Lubbers remarked. “We did the best we could"
262
The Social Protocol sets ou, two key innovations: First, i, expands the number of
social law subjects that can be passed by a qualified majority vote. While the pre-
Maastricht treaty had restricted the qualified majority voting mechanism to health and
safety topics, the Social Protocol expanded this voting mechanism to issues invoicing
health and safety, working conditions, worker information and consultation, sexual
equality and the integration of persons excluded from the labor market.
263
Nevertheless,
it should be pointed ou, that Article 2(3) of the Social Protocol specifies that unanimous
voting rules still apply to issues concerned with social security and social protection,
employment contract terminations, collective bargaining, immigration from countries
262
/"AfcSrlf <l997 ' l94) ' ,mmediate|y after 'he las, British election the newH ime Minister Tony Blair, announced that he was willing to sign the Social ProtocolThis ended the Bnttsh “opt-out”. Additionally, i, allowed',he member spates duringdreir
,0 mC^0ra,e ,hC S0C '“' - ^ea,y
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see Art. 2( 1 ).
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ou,ide
.he EU, and financial contributions for pr„motion of employment andjob
creation.
Second, the Social Protocol grams a legislative role to the social partners (chiefly the
association representing employers: Union des Confederations de Plndustrie e. des
Employers d'Europe (UN1CE, and the associations representing trade onions: European
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). In a provision unique in al, of EU law, the Social
Protocol allows the social partners to jointly recommend changes to pending social
proposals as well as i, allows the social partners to make its own proposals after a
collective agreement has been reached. Additionally, the Social Protocol allows the
Member States to delegate the implementation of social policy to the social partners.
4.5 Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the factors and forces that have
contributed towards the change in pace and depth of policy development on the European
level m the area of social and employment policy. Special attention was paid to the
emcial role played by the European Commission, in particular Jacques Delors’ vision of a
rejuvenated economic and social Europe and his skillful strategy, as well as the
importance of the Presidencies of the Council. A closer examination of the
Intergovernmental Conference which led to the Single European Act, the policy debates
which led to the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights as well as the Maastricht I treaty
demonstrated the important role played by the European Commission in setting the
agenda tor the European Union and thereby crucially influencing the policy-shaping
201
decisions taken by the heads of state. The dynamic of such
by the theoretical predictions made by neofunctionalism.
an influence is best explained
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CHAPTER 5
NEW COMMUNITY POLICY STYLE AND FOCUS:
1991 TO PRESENT
m the mid-1990s empioymen, policy became one of the priorities of the European
Union. After decades of trying break the deadlock in this area, in the midst of a trend
of increasing unemployment rates, the European Commission finally managed to expand
Ihe agenda of the European Union and to successfully add employment policy as a new
policy field. The employment chapter which was ultimately included in the Amsterdam
I'-eaty no, only allows the Commission to develop policy targets and guidelines for the
Member States in the area of employment, bu, i, also gives the Commission the ability to
draft employment recommendations which it can use to both evaluate and criticize the
policy efforts of the Member States. In this sense, the empioymen, chapter represents a
new policy focus of the European Union just as much as it represents a new policy style.
This chapter is structured into two sections. The first section asks which factors
and forces have contributed to this new policy focus and new policy style of Ihe
European Union. In a nutshell this chapter demonstrates how the Post-Maastricht crisis
has shaped the policy focus and policy style of the European Commission. In particular,
a detailed analysis of the consequences of the following four factors is presented: the
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British opt-out of the Social
the subsidiarity debate, and
Protocol, the ratification difficulties of the Maastricht Treaty
increasing levels of unemployment during the early 1990s.
The Green and White Paper of Social
focus and style.
Policy are presented as examples of this new policy
The second section of,his chapter analyzes the strategy and resources utilized by
'he Commission in its effort of breaking the deadlock among the Member States in the
area of employment policy. The argument developed in this section demonstrates that the
elements of the European employment chapter that were finally included in the
Amsterdam Treaty were carefully prepared and drafted by the Commission. The
argument presented in this chapter outlines the specific resources and strategies employed
by the Commission through which it managed to prepare the Community agenda, to keep
the momentum concerning the issue of employment policy and then finally in the last
run-up of the 1GC to preserve the consensus among the Member States.
Three resources of the Commission are identified as being particularly crucial for
its ability to influence the outcome of multilateral negotiations: First, the institutional
location ol the Commission gives it greater flexibility and latitude and thereby allows it
to draw up policy proposals that are capable of representing latent interests in the
Member States. Additionally, this position allows the Commission to draft policy
proposals that in effect represent a synthesized compromise position among the Member
States. Second, the receptiveness of the Council Presidency crucially determines the
degiee to which the Commission has an influence on the outcome of the multilateral
negotiations among the Member States. Third, the Commission can exert pressure onto
Member States when it can be seen to represent latent domestic interests. The
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representation of the concents over unemployment in Europe, gave the Commission a
posttion of strength front which
,, was ab.e to influence the policy-shaping as we., as
policy-setting decisions and thereby critically influence the content of the employment
chapter that was ultimately included in the Amsterdam Treaty.
Thts conclusion of this chapter suggests that tin process by which the
Commission managed to influence the inclusion of the employment chapter into the
Treaty of Amsterdam is best explained by a theoretical model that simultaneously focuses
on the European as well as the domestic level. As discussed in chapter 2, a two,eve.
entrepreneurship model is best equipped to capture both the intervening steps of the
decision-making process as well as the final outcome of the negotiation.
5.1 Aspects of the Post-Maastricht Debate
Many scholars have pointed out that the post- Maastricht debates represent a
turning point in the European Union. It is being seen has having had a significant effect
both on the Member States as well as the European Commission. In a nutshell, the
common lessen learned from this crisis for both the Member States as well as the
Commission is that the European Union would have to try harder to achieve a greater
degree of representation of the publics’ interests. For the Member States this implied a
greater political vulnerability in issues in which it could be seen as not representing by
domestic interests. For the Commission this implied a process of redefining its policy
style and focus. Issues by which it would be certain to represent the publics’ interests
would be pushed more to the forefront. Given the economic development during the
early 1990s, the issue of unemployment was identified as one such important concern.
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For .he Member States the post-Maastricht crisis mean, primarily that further
progress in European integration would have to be done more cautiously as well as more
focused on the demands of its citizens al large. As poinled out by Griinhagen (2001, 10),
“the political debates in several Member States about the relevance of the Union to the
ordinary citizens following the Maastricht ratification crisis had the seemingly
paradoxical effect of simultaneously dispelling most of the Member States' enthusiasm
for a new round of treaty reform while leading them to call for a strengthened Union
closer to its citizen.”
F°r thC C0mmissi0n
’
the Post - Maastricht debate was a time of crisis during which
a redefinition was called for concerning the policy issues as well as the policy
instruments that were utilized to bring about a forward momentum to a Social Europe.
For instance NtDonagh (1998, 81) has observed that in the early 1990s “a change in
emphasis has taken place everywhere in the European Union. The change can be said to
represent an important manifestation of democracy.” The European Commission more
than ever is adapting its policy focus and policy style to the very issues of “what voters
264
want to hear.”
In this sense, the early 90s represent a watershed in the policy style and policy
focus of the European Commission.^ This time of a crisis was for the Commission just
as much a time of rethinking and recalibrating its strategy. For instance Wendon (1998,
345) has pointed out that “the period between 1992 and 1995 was a particularly difficult
264
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one for the officials in DG V as a number of factors converged that appeared,
„
undermine the chances of further EU social policy expansion." Also Cram has argued
that (1997, 57) “in the 1990s, the Commission my simply have been forced to adopt a
new strategy. This time a heavy emphasis has been placed upon the process of
consultation.” In a nutshell, this new strategy was to focus the Commission’s activities
on the goal of achieving a representation of domestic interests that would otherwise
remain underrepresented by the policy actions of the Member States.
Four factors in particular can be identified as having contributed to the changes in
the Member States and the European Commission: (1) the British opt-out conveyed a
sense of uncertainty to policymakers in particular within the European Commission; (2)
the French and Danish referenda on Maastricht together represented what Ross called
national populism” which signified a change in the political climate in Europe, (3) the
Maastricht clauses on subsidiarity severely limited the scope of supranational institutions
for possible policy proposals, and (4) high levels of unemployment were seen by the
Commission as an opportunity of developing a policy program that would hopefully
bring the activities of European Union to the concerns of the public at large.
In the wake of these developments, the new policy approach of the Commission
would have to be characterized by two aspects: First, policy issues would have to be
carefully selected in such a way that their focus would be likely to increase positive
resonance and support among the European population at large. Second, policy
instruments would have to be selected which favored benchmarking and coordination
over harmonization or convergence. In a nutshell, a new policy focus and policy style
was needed. The following section gives a detailed analysis of these three factors.
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Additionally, it demonstrates the impact these factors had on the process of decision-
making in the European Union.
5.1.1 British Opt-Out of the Social Protocol
Tlte op.
-out clause on the Social Protocol in the Maastricht Treaty was seen as a
devastating failure for the European Commission. While the European Commission
had invested a lot of time and effort in getting the social partners to agree, yet in the
endgame of the negotiations it failed to muster sufficient support from all the Member
267
Even the value of the achievement on paper of getting eleven Member States
to opt- in on the Social Protocol ultimately appeared questionable. Uncertainty with
regard to the legal and political implications of this arrangement prevailed more in the
perception of the officials of the European Commission than a sense of achievement.
In the academic debate at the time, the opt-out arrangement was seen as an
example ot a ‘Europe of variable geometries’. Streeck (1994, 164) summed up the
essence ot this arrangement in the description of Europe as a “confederation whose
geometry varies between policy areas [and which] could be metaphorically characterized
For a detailed discussion of the Social Protocol and the Maastricht Treaty see Chapter
267
For a detailed analysis of the negotiations leading towards the Social Protocol see
Falkner 1998, Ross 1995, Schulz 1996.
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as a cafeteria state’, whose constituents r<eserve the right to ‘opt in’ or ‘opt out’ of this
authority [...] on an item-by-item basis.”
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The practical implications of this uncertainty were clearly felt inside of the
European Commission and the DG Employment and Social Affairs. Politically, the opt-
out clause signaled to the Commission the danger of the unraveling of the entire
integration project. As pointed out by Rhodes (1993, 300), for the Commission, the
pursuit of social policy reform along the Protocol track [... was seen as undermining] its
el forts to ensure a united, cohesive approach to integration and set precedents for
variable geometry” which could defeat the entire object of the Treaty on European
269
Union.” This assessment of the effect of the opt-out clause on the Commission was
confirmed by Barbara Nohlen, the current Assistant to the Director General in the DG
Employment and Social Affairs of the European Commission, when she pointed in an
interview that for DG Employment and Social Affairs “the opt-out came as a real shock
to us. We were left in limbo, unsure what to make out of the Social Protocol. As a
270
consequence, we fell that we had to recalibrate our strategy.”
268
.
oi tt discussion of the legal and political uncertainty ol the opt-out clause see
Barnard 1992, Bercusson and Dijk 1995, Dowiling 1993, Everling 1992, Falkner 1996,
Fitzpatrick 1992, Geyer 1996, Lipietz 1996, Watson 1993, Whiteford 1993. Based on the
analysis of Ai tide 239 EEC t urtin (1993) concludes that the Social Agreement is legally
not controversial and instead should be viewed as an integral part of the treaty.
Rhodes 1993.
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personal interview with Barbara Nohlen in Brussels on February 27, 2001.
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5.1.2 Ratification Difficulties
Equa"y problematic for th= European Commission and the DC Employment and
Social Affairs was the fae, that the ratification of the Maastricht ( 1991) treaty, turned on,
to be complicated and cumbersome.
27
'
From being initially portrayed as a success by the
media, however, due to the public's reaction to it, the treaty was soon considered as an
unreadable fiasco by the press. When the treaty was formally signed by the heads of state
on February 7, 1992, few foresaw the complicated ratification process. At the beginning
of June, the Danish voters narrowly rejected the treaty in a national referendumand
thereby triggered a larger public debate against Maastricht which Ihreatened the
ratification process in a number of countries.
”2
As pointed out by Duff (1997, 107), the
“Danish veto represented a huge setback for the Community and presented it with a
number of political and legal problems. Technically, the Danish vote meant that the
Maastricht Treaty could not go into effect as planned since EC law required that
amendments to the Rome Treaty be approved by all member states.” Thus, for the treaty
to suivivc a positive vote from the Danish voters would have to be secured. In order to
create sufficient incentives for such a vole, a special exemption clause was agreed on al
^ or a general discussion of the ratification difficulties see Franklin Marsh and
McLaren 1994.
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.
While in May ol 1992 the Folketing had approved the Treaty by 130 to 25, the
referendum which was held in June showed that the political elite had seriously
misjudged the public mood, as 50.7 percent voted against the Treaty. For a discussion of
the ratification problems see Nielsen 1992, Siune 1993, Tartwijk-Novey ( 1995, 14ff),
Thune 1992, Worre 1995. Also see Agence Europe (June 4, 1992, 3) and Financial Times
(June 4, 1992, 1).
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the Edinburgh summit in December 1992. Subsequently, in
time held on 18 May 1993, a majority of Danish voters (56.8
the specifications of the treaty.
a second referendum, this
peicent) finally agreed to
Along similar lines, President Francois Mit.erand in France called for a
referendum the day after the ftrs, Danish referendum, and subsequently the Treaty wa:
accepted merely by a narrow margin: only 51 per cen, voted in favor of the Treaty in
September 1992. Also, in the United Kingdom and in Germany the ratification were
equally contested. In these countries there was a clear hck of popular support for the
273
Maastricht Treaty. As pointed ou, by Kowalsky ( 1 999, 1 98), a “Maastricht-Shock”
was unleashed with the Danish rejection and the slim outcome of the French votum. As a
consequence of these events, the Community believed i, had entered a phase of policy
maknig in which it could only propose very limited social and political proposals and
should mostly refrain from legislative proposals.”'
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5.1.3 The Subsidiarity Debate
Furthermore, the political debate on ‘subsidiarity’ can be seen as a testimony of
Member States’ fears of excessive centralization.'
75
Many scholars have pointed out that
273
See Luif 1995.
274
Translation from German.
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For the political relevance and an historical overview of the concept of subsidiarity
see Adonis 1991, Berg 1993, Dehousse 1998a, Follesdal 1999, Inman 1994 Kersbergen
and Verbeek 1994, Rubinfeld 1998, Schima 1994, Scott, Peterson and Millar 1994.
.he rise of .he concept in ,he late 80s was motivated by Member States’ interest in
reaming decis,on-mating power and competences.
276
A number of scholars have
attributed the intensity of this debate to a grave
,ms,ate Delors made on June I988
.
On that day he delivered a speech the European Pari,amen, in which he pointed on,
.ha, in “ten years hence, 80 percent of our economic legislation, and perhaps even our
fiscal and social legislation as well, will be of Community origin.-
277
This remark raised
alarm bells in a number of governments of Member States. In particular in the UK
Margaret Thatcher, ihen Prime Minister, directly responded to Delors in her famous ami-
Brussels speech in Bruges in September 1988.
In the debates following Thatcher's passionate speech, the issue of subsidiarity
was utilized to problematize the question of the appropriaie allocation of decision-making
pierogatives and the use of political authority within the EU. In general many
commentators have pointed out that powers or tasks are to rest with the sub-units of that
order, unless a central unit is more effective in achieving certain specified goals.
278
As a
consequence of this principle, the scope of the common agenda is to be limited to those
tasks that it can perform more efficiently and effectively than the Member States. In the
F°i a discussion on the historical development of the concept see Hueglin 1 994
Kuklis 2000. S ’
277
Quoted in Endo (1999, 173).
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The following articles of the EUT are seen as the legal basis of the principle of
subsidiarity: Article 5, second paragraph (3b) ECT, in conjunction with Article 2 (B) last
paragraph, and the 12th recital in the preamble to the EUT. See European Parliament,
2000. European Parliament Fact Sheets: Subsidiarity.”
http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/l_2
_
2
_en.htm
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European come*, this is intended to simultaneously reduce the risk for Member Saies of
being overruled in common decisions as well as to keep policy issues outside of the realm
ot influence of the European Union.
The scope of Community action post- Maastricht
requires that
is set out in Article 3b EC which
the Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferredupon ,t by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it
“
n areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence theommumty shall take action, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed
aetron canno, be sufficiently achieved by the Member Strand
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed
action, be better achieved by the Community.
As the wording of Article 3b EEC makes clear the application of the subsidiarity
principle has the effect of limiting the extension of the scope community legislation and
thereby preventing the Union institutions from moving into new areas, while preserving
the level of competence the Union institutions have already achieved.
The conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council noted that the
implementation of Article 3b should follow a number of guidelines.
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These guidelines
piovide that subsidiarity is a condition for any Community action and the Council must
be satisfied both that the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved
by Member States alone and they can be better achieved by Community action which
must produce “clear benefits.” Harmonization legislation should only be introduced
See Annex 1 to Part A of the Conclusions of the Presidency at the European Council
in Edinburgh, 1 1-12 December 1992. Commission of the European Communities 1992EC Bulletin. No, 12/92, pp.25-26.
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Where necessary Co achieve the Treaty, objectives and consideration shouid be given to
sethng minimum standards no, jus, in those areas where specified by the Treaty.
Additionally, any decision in favor of Community action shouid take into account
transnational aspects such as the need to avoid d, s,onion of competition and to strengthen
economic and social cohesion. Finally, in tenns of preferences of policy measures the
Council conclusion decisively spells ou, a preference of “soft laws” over detailed
regulation when it declares that:
direc,i''“ should ^ preferred to
>ures.
where appropriate. Consideration should be givenVhere^H^
w . ~ > uuttuvcj) anoiiia oegu ations and framework directives to detailed measures Non-in mg measures such as recommendations should be
appropriate to the use of voluntary codes of conduct [and 1
preference in choosing the type of Community action should begiven to encourage cooperation between Member States
coordinating national action or complementing, supplementing <
supporting such action.
Thus, as pointed out by several scholars, the Edinburgh conclusion represent a
“change in the direction” in which social policy of the Community would proceed from
now. In the words of Kowalsky (1999, 160), pas, activities in this policy area were seen
in a bad light and new activities had to be justified within the boundaries set by the treaty
basis." Thus, the impression was created that for the most pan in the past, the
Community had acted outside is legal purview and therefore had to be limited both in
scope ot activities as well as measures available. With the Edinburgh conclusions, the
"future perimeter of community action considerably shrunk and a shift of policy tools
280
Council Conclusion, 1992, points 5 and 6.
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.00k place from decisions ,o directives and from framework directives to
,
.
281
recommendation.”
The European Commission has attempted,
Parliament and the Council in 1993, to
in a communication to the European
give a more legal and technical view of the
.
,
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concept of subsidiarity. The general aim of the twenty page Communication is, first,
«o define those competencies with which the Community has been enfrusted by the
Treaty of Rome, the Single European Ae, and Maastnchi, second, outline how the EC
mst'lutions should apply the principle and, finally, to make specific provision for the
principle of proponionality in order to prevent the Community from exceeding the means
necessary to obtain the specific objectives within their competence. The solution
proposed is an inter-institutional Agreement, between the Commission, the Parliament
and the Council, designed to preserve the institutional balance and ensure that the
principle promotes more effective action at Community level rather than bringing all
Community action to a halt.
Thus as far as the impact of the subsidiarity principle on Community social policy
is concerned, the treaty provisions and the Council’s subsequent clarification increased
the pressure on the European Commission to change its policy focus and style. In
practice, as Santer told the EP in January 1995 during his inaugural speech, subsidiarity
means “less action, but better action.” Concretely, this pressure has suggested to the
Commission that policy measures which were either directives or “soft law” would be
For this argument see Kowalsky (1999, 160).
Commission of the European Communities, 1993, COM (93) 545 final.
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morre acceptable to Member States than policy nteasntes which used the too, of detailed
regulation either with the aim of achieving harmonization or minimum social standards
Thus the effect of the subsidiarity debate was pressure the Commission into adopting
,
new policy style which was character,zed by framework agreements which specified
common targets and goals.
5.1.4 Unemployment and Employment Trends in Europe
Smce the end of the Golden Age, the unemployment rate in Europe has increased
283
dramatically. Especially, the recession starting in the beginning of the 1990s brought
slow economic growth and high rates of unemployment. 1998, the year that followed
lhe neg0,iati0nS f0r ,he Amsterdam Tre^ was characterized by the process of
ratification of the treaty in the Member States, the aggregate unemployment rate stood a,
9.9 % for all members of the European Union. 2" This means tha, at that time about 17
nnlhon men and women are unemployed. These numbers represent a dramatic increase
compared to 1990. At a time unemployment was 7.7 %, which represented 12 million
people without work.
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For a discussion of the characteristics of the Golden Aize
1984, and Tsoukalis 1997.
see Glyn 1990, Goldthrope
284
see Eurostat, 1998.
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In general
.he upward drift of Europeamwide unemployment rate is characterized
by the fact that it markedly jumped in three major steps. As can be seen in figure (5)j the
rate was pushed up dispropotlionally in the major recessions of 1974-75, 1980-84, and
1991-1994.
While the unemployment rate was 2.7 % in 1974 it jumped to 4.2 % in 1975. A
similar increase can be observed between the years 1980 to 1984 and the years 1991-
1994 which recorded a rise of unemployment from 6.1 % to 10.5 % and 8.6 % to 1 1
. 3
,
respectively. A striking aspect of these different recessions is that the economic recovety
following the macro-economic shocks, did not push the rate of unemployment below the
level it had been prior to the respective recession. As a consequence, a socket of high
and persisting unemployment was gradually accumulating over time.
285
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the causes of these cyclical shock
effects as well as the reason for the persistenc e of high unemployment after each
lecession. There is extensive literature by economists and political scientists who attempt
n„“
pam
Ht phenomenon. For a detailed discussion of the macro-economic shocks seeBurda and Wyplosz 1997, and L.ndbeck 1993, For mainstream economists who argue
that unemployment in Europe is caused by market rigidity, strong unions, job protection
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Another aspect of the aggregate picture of European labor markets is the
employment rate.* Chamc,eristic of its development is tha, Europe experlenced^
JOb '°SSeS dl ' rinS^ ‘hree *
booking a, the penod from 1973 |99g
a -a, of nine miiiion jobs were lost dunng the major recession, * ^^^
dunng this period, only ,7 million new Jobs were ereated which adds
„p a „e, Job
growth of 8 miiiion. As a consonance of this deve.opment, the emp.oytnen, rate in
tnrope decreased from about 64 % in the mid-70s to below 60 % in the mid-80s and after
having nsen to roughly 63 % in the late 80s and early 90s i, has dropped down 60
288
%• During the year .999 the employment rate in Europe was 62 % which means that
around 155 million EU citizens had a job.
289
"eberi BCan 1994
'^
the trad,non of Keynesianism see Marglin and Bhaduri 99 M1^™'A Md ' 1 0w”'Boga, 1998, Comps,on 1997, Krugman,994, Moussis
.997 V^ Xden .995,
286
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For a discussion of the employment growth performance see Teague 1994
.
As can be seen in figure (6) these job losses were particularly heavy in GermanyIta y, Finland, and Sweden. Also note that in all figures countries are Abbreviated by thefollowing letters: Belgium: B, Denmark: DK, Germany: D Greece- G Smi 7c 7 .R Ireland: IR, Italy: I, Luxembourg: L, Netherlands: NL, Austria: A.' Portugal- PFinland: FI, Sweden: S, United Kingdom: UK. S
288
see European Commission, 1999. Employment Performance in the Member States-
Eumj^an^Communft^^p.T'
Uaa*aB* 0ffice for 0fficia ' ™'ica,ion of the
289
see Eurostat, 2000a. News Release. No. 56/2000, 16 May.
http.//europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat. Luxembourg: Office for the Official
the European Communities.
Publication of
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Despi.e the similar impact of the macroeconomic shock on all European
countries, one should take note of the fact that member states of the European Union vaty
greatly in regard to their unemployment and employment rates”" For the
unemployment rate in 1998, the member states can be differentiated into three groups:
First, a group of countries had unemployment rates much below the EU average of 10%.
In this group one finds Luxembourg (2.8), the Netherlands (4,0), Austria (4.7), Portugal
(5.1), Denmark (5.1) and the United Kingdom (6.3). Second, there is a group of
countries in which the unemployment rate is slightly below the EU average. Here Ireland
290
It should be added that the unemployment rates among regions in different countries
vaiy quite considerably. At the low end one finds Centro (Portugal) with 2.1 %
unemployment, Aaland (Finland) with 2,6, and Zeeland (Netherlands) with 3.4. At the
very high end are Campania (Italy) with 24,9, Extremadura (Spain) 28,8 and Andalucia(Spam) with 29.9. For these numbers see Eurostat, 1999. “EU Regional Unemployment
Ranges from 2.1% to 29.9%.” News Release. No.93/99.
http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/eurostat/compres/en/
1 0 1 99/6 1101 99a.htm.
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(7.8), Sweden
,8.3), Belgium (9.5), Greece (.1,6) and Germany
,9.4, can be inc.nded.
And finally, there is a group of countries which has unemployment rates above the EU
average, such as Finland (11.4), France (1 1.7), Italy 12.2) and Spain (18.8).
Also, looking a, the employment rate, one can find great variat.ons among the
292
European countries. In ,998, the rate was above 70 % in Denmark (79.2), United
Kingdom (71.4), Sweden (70.3) and Austria (70.1). It was above 60 % for the following
countries: Portugal (68.9), Netherlands (68.3), Finland (65.1), Gem,any (61.5), France
(60.8), Luxembourg (60.5), and Ireland (60.5). Several countries had employment rates
below 60 % Belgium (57.5), Greece (56.5), Italy (51.8), and Spain (50.2).
For long-term unemployed one can obsetve a decline in total numbers from 5.2 %
of the labor force in 1997 to 4.9 % in 1998. This decline, however, has been less strong
than the overall decline of the unemployment rate. At the same time, the share of the
unemployed who had been out of work for a year or more in 1998 (49 %) showed no
improvement compared to the previous year (49 %) and in fact it represented a worsening
of the s,mat,on compared to 1997 (48 %). Therefore, as of yet, there has been no
29
loon 'T
percentages of the unemployment rate are taken from European Commission,
1999. Employment in Europe. Luxembourg: Office for the Official Publication of the’
European Communities. For a discussion variations among member states see Sapsford
Bradley and Millington 1998.
292
For a discussion of the institutional causes of this variation see Scharpf 1997e.
293
see European Commission, 1999. Employment in Europe
,
p.22.
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tendency for the increased rate of net job creation to greatly benefit the long-term
unemployed.
~
Two conclusions can be made on
.he basis of.be brief sketch of
.he labor market
s.tua.ion in Europe: Firs., Europe's unemployment problem was caused by various
factors. particular relevant are short-term macroeconomic shocks and long-term
perststence effects. Several countries coped better than others and recovered more
quickly. These countries experienced higher levels of employment. Unemployment is
particularly high for women, young people and people who have been out of the labor
market for more than one year.
A second conclusion
.ha, can be drawn is that the increase of unemployment had
a clear impact on the issues
.ha, were considered to be important for Community action.
Thts dissertation agrees with several scholars who have pointed out that the public's
perception that common \ measures were needed, clearly influenced the agenda of the
European Union. For instance Griller (et ah, 2000, 527), observes that the fact "that the
issue of employment was adcfed to the agenda of the 1996-97 IGC is largely due to
popular demand for an upgrading in the fight against unemployment.” Additionally,
Bemdt Keller expressed the view that “the Europe
-wide employment measures were
caused by a mix of political pressure good intentions and time constraints.”
2" 5
Asa
294
the same observation can be made for the unemployed who have been looking for
work for more than two years. The situation of this group also has been worsening.
295
Keller (1999a, 14) and (199b, 145).
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consequence, given this kind of domestic pressure, the Commission
Member States into coming to an agreement in this policy area.
was able to pressure
5.1.5 Adaptations of the Commission's Policy Focus and Style: The Green
Paper on Social Policy
The Green Paper on Social Policy represents the first piece of policy blueprint
that clearly demonstrated this new shift in policy focus and policy style. Published in
1993, it states boldly:
The aim is not the harmonization of national systems, but a
framework for efforts to strengthen social protection systems and
enable Community legislation on social policy to fit into a dynamic
policy framework based on common objectives. Consistency
between the activity and legislation on minimum standards are
essential principles of action by the Union in a field where national
systems will converge but remain autonomous.
Thus, the self-ascribed role of the European Commission and the DG
Employment and Social Affairs should be one of fostering discussion, exchange of
experiences and consensus in order to prepare the European Union for the political,
economic and technological challenges ahead.
The Green Paper is also relevant in terms of its policy focus by making a very
explicit connection between a strengthened social dimension and greater acceptability of
the integration process. It states that the “achievement of the Single Market and of
economic and monetary union will be at risk if the general population, and notably the
Commission of the European Communities, (1993 COM (93) 551, 44).
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working population, does no, take par, in ,he venture.”
2
”
this sense>
,he socja ,
dimension should be used deliver ,o citizens wha, they are most interested in. Giv
the high levels of unemployment, a new “look at the lit* between economic and social
policies” would have to become a priority of the European Union
.”8
The Green Paper
goes on to point on, that the best way achieve such acceptability is through an optimal
balance of economic flexibility and social security. Thus a high level of employment
would be a necessary condition for such an acceptability.
Additionally, the Green Paper evaluated the causes of unemployment in Europe
and suggested appropriate solutions. For instance the Green Paper points ou, tha, while i,
is widely accepted tha, “ a mix of macroeconomic and structural policies is now needed,
[...simultaneously] a rather more radical approach aiming at moving towards active
labour market and social policy is what is required.”* Thus, active labor market
measures were identified as the solution for unemployment in Europe which was seen as
patfly caused by cyclical factors, but also partly by skills gaps and structural factors. The
debate “social policy as a productive factor” was utilized as an analytical frame inside of
which the analysis of the unemployment problem with the suggested solutions were
coupled.
Thus, in effect, the Green Paper on Social Policy and the White Paper on Social
Policy emphasize that the role of social policy has to shift from income and status
Ibid, p. 59
298
'I vlibid, p. 6
299 ^
Green Paper, 1993, p. 18
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maintenance towards investment in human capital through education and training,
especially by prepa. i.tg and encouraging unemployed people to contribute economic
activity. Active labor market policies are assumed lead to greater socia. cohesion by
encouraging individuals to take up paid employment. As a conscience of this shift, the
Comm, ss,on launched vety few legislative proposes a, the time. The political decision
Of the Commission for inaction is documented in remarks made by Flynn during a speech
to the C onfederation of British Industry (CBI), where he pointed out that the “White
Paper on Social Policy indicates clearly that the Commission has concluded tha, there is
no need for a major new programme of legislation in the coming period”
3"
As summarized by Ginsburg (1997, 24)
The White Paper on Social Policy certainly also marks something
of a shift from the 1980s model of Social Europe as an increasinglyharmonized European Social Model towards a looser entity
§ Y
founded essentially only on shared liberal democratic values and
an internal market. The White paper suggests social policy
convergence which respects diversity’ as the new norm. It is
therefore conceded that common policy objectives can be reachedby different routes. Given the diversity of economic development
and resources of the member states it is also recognized that policy
should focus on the ‘establishment of a framework of basic
minimum standards.' This is quite some way from the high quality
welfare system implied in the Delors vision of Social Europe
reflecting an almost Beveridgean emphasis on social minimum.
300
rrQuoted in Agence Europe (September 24, 1994, 6).
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5.1.6 Implications for the Decision Making Process
As a consequence of the different aspects of the post- Maas,rich, debate, the
Commission as wei, as the DO Employment and Social Affairs fei, that i, had to readjust
“S P°"Cy f0CUS and POliCy Style in ,W0
• clearer emphasis was needed on the
role of the European Union in serving the cittzens. As Patrick Venturing a fonner
Counselor in DG Employment and Social Affairs, mentioned during an interview in
ebruary 200
1 , “Europe needed to show that it was there for the citizens"”
2
One of the tssues that was ident.fied from early on as being capable of appealing
'° ‘he EUr°Pean Ci 'iZenS a * unemployment. The recognit.on of this aspect can
be seen in the fact that by early May i993, Delors directed his advisors and the Forward
Looking Studies Unit to launch a detailed study focusing on Europe’s unemployment
problem. As potnted out by Endo (1999, 195), this policy “shift reflected Delors' anxiety
[...] that the Community looked too technocratic and irrelevant to citizens' concerns. By
picking up on this massive social problem with over 17 million jobless people, Delors
hoped to narrow the gap between the Community institutions and the ordinaty citizens.'
Second, the opt-out and the ratification crises of the Maastricht treaty also made
the Commission all too aware of its limitations and thereby encouraged a process of
rethinking of the available policy tools. Internal debates in the Commission brought
30
ft is worth noting that Patrick Venturini fonnerly was a researcher at the
Confederation Fran9a.se Democratique due Travail (CFDT) as well as a close advisor of
Jacques Delors on social affairs between 1987 and 1995. Currently he is the SecretaryGeneral of the Economic and Social Committee.
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Personal interview with Patrick Venturini in Brussels on February 19, 2001.
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f0™ard^ argUmeMS ,ha ‘ 'he
confine i.self.o initiatives that co„ |d
be considered useful as well as a non-zerosum gain in light of Member States
303
interests. A new policy style was advocated which should emphasize merely the
coordination of the employment policies as well as highlight the economic merits of
ployment and social policy. In this sense this crisis, compelled the Commission and
the DG Employment and Social Affairs to concentrate its policy style on the development
of benchmarks and recommendations for economic and structural reforms of labor
markets.
An early sign of a significant change in the policy style and policy focus of DG
Employment and Social Affairs was given by Padraig Flynn, once he started his
appointment as Commissioner at the beginning of 1993. In his first interview with the
Financial Times he pointed out that the prescriptive and detailed approach to the social
dimension as championed by his predecessor Ms. Vasso Papandreou, had run its course.
In the interview he emphasized that “we've reached a hiatus, a natural kind of hiatus,
with the social action programme.”
3
"
Instead of achieving social policy goals through
regulation, he pointed out that the Commission should only lay down a framework of
minimum standards without getting involved in the details, which should be left to
employers and unions. He insisted that “the details should be worked out when the
legislation passes through national legislatures, the flexibility must be there.”
305
303
304
For this argument see Endo (1999, 191)
Financial Times (January 29, 1993, 2).
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ibid
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This emphasis on minimum policy targets
,
whiIe leaving ^ Member^^
.0 choose the policy tools by which they could achieve these targets, was a rather radical
departure from the previous policy style ofDO Employment and Social Affairs. Much of
.he efforts of DG Employment and Social Affairs in the pas, aimed a, ,he hannonization
of labor market institutions. This standardized approach problem solving
predominately utilized detailed relations and legal pocedures. As discussed
Chapter 3 and 4 of this dissertation, numerous examples of this policy style can be found
in the area of health and safety a, the work place, working time and working condttions
and measures to reduce barriers to labor mobility. Commenting on the policy style of the
DG Employment and Social Affairs, Jean Degimbe, former Director Genera, of DG
Employment and Social Affairs potn.ed ou, in an interview: “We were known as 'DG
Regulation. Our conception of social policy was legalistic. Our aim was to create a
common standard in Europe through regulation.”
306
The new policy style developed by DG Employment and Social Affairs in the
wake of the senes of crisis, now predominately utilizes “soft” fonns of regulation,
benchmarking tools and the logic of “best practice." In the process of its workings, it
idealized the maxim of “Europe learning from Europe.”
307
With a new policy focus and
style, the old overall goals for the Commission remain unchanged: to convince the
Member States of the importance of the single legal framework. That this challenge
306
307
Peisonal interview with Jean Degimbe in Brussels on February 21, 2001.
see Teague (1999a, 1999b). Kenner 1999, Majone 1993, Radaelli 1998. Larsson 2000.
nttp.//europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/employment_social/speeches/2000_en.htm
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continues to be on the agenda of the Commission and would even increase in importance
during ,he time leading up to the Intergovernmental Conference
clearly expressed in a document in 1993 which
in 1996/1997, was
stated that “the Commission’s principal
objective is to promote the development of a European Social Policy which will benefit
all citizens of the Union and will therefore enjoy, as far as is possible, the support of all
member states. [••] A major opportunity to achieve this will be the conference of
representatives of Member State governments in 1996.”
3 °8
5.2 The Employment Chapter in the Treaty of Amsterdam
The particular content as well as the timing of the employment chapter in the
Treaty of Amsterdam was influenced by this new policy focus as well as the new policy
style adopted by the European Commission. On the one hand, in the employment chapter
the Community believes to be addressing an issue that is of utmost importance the
citizens at large. On the other hand, the policy tools adopted in the employment chapter
con-espond to the new policy style of coordinating policy goals. The following pages
detail the particular elements agreed in the Employment Chapter of the Amsterdnn
Treaty. Then a cursory overview is provided on the impact of the employment chapter.
During the Amsterdam summit (June 1997), the European Council agreed on a
treaty that calls tor the coordination of employment policies within the economic policies
308
Commission of the European Communities, (1993d COM (93) 600 final, 9-10).
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se, by the Economic and Mouetaiy Union. Three aspects of ,be treaty stand out . (|
,
foe .be first time in .be histoty of the European Union, the po„tica| ^
.he Member States to promoting employment on the level of the European Union is
formally wntten into the treaty, (2) a policy procedure is detaiied that a,ms at promoting
employment, and (3) a Employment Committee is formally created which monitors and
policy procedure in the are of employment.
As to the firs, aspect. Article (2) of the treaty represents a strong political
comnutmen, on the par, of the Common, ty as we,, as the Member States to promote
nployment policy by ptoviding that employment is a common task of the Community
and that "the Community shall promote [...] a high level of employment and of social
protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and
social cohesion and solidarity among Member States” In Article 3, where the
Communities activities with a view to the purposes se. ou, in Article 2 are listed, “the
promotion of coordination between employment policies of the Member States with a
View ,0 enhancing their effectiveness by developing a coordinated strategy for
employment” was added.
Second, a new coordination procedure formally specifies how the “Member States
and the Community shall [...] work towards developing a coordinated strategy for
employment and particularly for promoting a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce
309
not induded in this list is the fact that the Social Protocoil which was annexed to the
aastncht Tieaty has been included into the Amsterdam Treaty and will be binding for
all member states of the EU. For a discussion of the Social Protocoll see chapter 4 For a
description of this procedure see Rhode 1995,
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^ 'ab0Ur markC,S re— *“— ' 10 Thts procedure is
new Employment Chapter, Tide V,„ tha, contains six anic.es <125 ,0 130)
. In Article
126 the Member states agreed to “regard promoting employment policy as an area of
common concern- and “to coordinate their action in this respect within the Council”
Wtthou, transferring any specific powers to the Counci, of Ministers, this provtsion alms
3t red ' reC,
'n8
‘he MembCT Sta *es ’
notions towards muhta, adaptation.
3 "
Add,
.tonally, Articles 127 outlines that the “Community shall contribute to a high level
of employment by encouraging cooperation between the Member States and by
supporting and, if necessa,y complementing their action." Furthermore, the second
paragraph of the article specifies that “the objective of a high bve, of employment shal,
be taken into cons,deration ,„ the fo,mu, a, ion and implementation of Community policies
and activities.”
The precise mechanism through which the policy goals in the area of employment
should be brought about is specified in Art.cb ,28 and ,30. Based on a proposal from
the Commission, the Council “shall each year consider the employment situation in the
Community” and “shall draw up guidelines which the Member States shall take into
account in their employment policies.” ^ Subsequently, each Member State must report
“the principle measures taken to implement its employment policy in the light of the
310
quote of Art. 125, TEC.
31
t
!
tlSJ0r!h n°ting *hat this article is similar to the wording of the relevant provisionson the Member States economic policies, laid down in Art. 99, TEC.
312
Art. 128, TEC
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Council's guidelines for employment The Council shall “carry an examination of the
implementation of the employment policies of the Member States in Ugh, of the
guidelines for employment.”
3
" The Council may also make recommendations to the
Member States, “if i, considers i, appropriate in the light of that examination.”
3 ' 4
A joint
annual report by the Council and the Commission to he European Council, on the
employment situation in the Community and the implementation of the guidelines closes
the circle of activities by serving as the relevant input for the annual employment policy
conclusions of the European Council.
While i, is leyond the scope of this dissertation to assess the precise impact of the
employment chapter on both Community institutions as well as institutions in the
Member States, a cursory look at this question suggest that there are five areas which
have changed with the employment chapter. First, with the inclusion of the employment
chapter m the Amsterdam Treaty, employment policy now constitutes a separate policy
field. No longer is employment considered to be simply the automatic outcome of sound
economic policies. Instead the European Union and the Member States have
acknowledged that a coordinated strategy among European institutions and the Member
States was needed to accomplish commonly agreed on employment targets.
315
313
ibid
314
ibid
see Laeufer 1999. For a discussion of the Articles see Kasten and Soskice 2000
Biagi (1998, 327), Barnard and Deakin (1998, 13).
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Second, the coordinating convince, origi„a,,y called the Employmen
, and
Labour Market Committee and since
.be
.as. refotm cubed
.be Employment Connnu.ee
was established with .he intention of facilitating the coordination of employment targets.
1,1 h°WeVer
’ COmmiUee h3S e" *» of the European Commission,
since i, hardly ever changes the draft of the Join, Employmen, Repot, and the
Employmen, guidelines that i, receives from the Commission
.
3 ' 6
Unlike in the past, the
working group in the Council or the COREPER no longer revisit the decision of the
Employmen, Committee. Under this new amangement, the Commission's proposal is by
and large adopted by the Council. The strengthened effect of the Commission's influence
is particularly striking in the ease of the employmen, recommendations, which in the ease
of some Member States can be quite harsh and critical. Most changes suggested by
members in the Employmen, Committee in regard to the employmen, recommendations
are merely cosmetic and not analytical. For instance las, year, when given the
opportunity to edit the recommendations, several representatives merely changed the
phrase “structural labor market problems” to the slightly more benign version of "labor
market problems.” But apart from cosmetic amendments, the Employment Committee by
and large follows the lead of the Commission.
Third, the employment chapter has increased the overall capacity of the European
Commission, especially the DG Employment and Social Affairs, to influence the content
of the employment targets on the European Union level. This influence of the European
Commission was particularly clear in the first set of guidelines accepted by the European
1 am grateful
2001
.
to Paul McGrade mentioned this point in an interview on January 30,
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C0UnCl1 SUmmit " LUXemb°Urg '" 7
- T 'K four pillar suture ofemploy
otijec'ives suggested by the Commission, were entirely adopted by the Member Sta ,es:
Employability, entrepreneurship,
adaptability and equa, opportunities
.
3 ' 7
Apparently the
°"'y ChmSe SU88eS,ed by
minister feamClaude fttncker, then the
CounctPs Pres,dent, was that the sequence of policy objectives should be changed.
According ,o A, Ian Larsson, then Director General of DG Employment and Social
Affairs, the original proposal of the Commission had listed entrepreneurship prtor
, ,
.
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employability.
Fourth, a number of observers as well as Social Affairs Attaches have expressed
‘he VieW dl‘rin8 interviews
' ,hat ,he European Employment Strategy has had a
measurable impact on Member States. For instance, Michel Tillieut recalled in an
interview on February 26, 2001 that the Luxembourg government in 1997 agreed to
transpose the entire set of European Employment guidelines into national law. Along
similar lines, the Portuguese Social Affairs Attache mentioned that the existence of a
European Employment Strategy has strengthened the position of the government vis-a-vis
domestic interest groups, especially the social partners. Refetring the imminent risk of
getttng criticized by the Commission in the recommendations Porftrio Silva mentioned
that a greater degree of cooperation as well as more concessions from both sides of the
social partners were achieved in recent rounds of negotiations in Portugal, partly due to
317
-mm
°th Karl
^
ani L5nnroth 011 February 6, 2001 and Allan Larsson
-001 expiessed this point in an interview in Brussels.
on February 1
1
,
This he mentioned in an interview during February 200
1
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the fact that the
guidelines.
Portuguese government could refer to the European employment
F,fth
’
‘he Pr0CCSS °f defi'™8 guidelines a, the community |eve|
Wh ‘Ch the" haVC '° ^ ,ranSP°Se im° "a,i0nal P0li^ -‘on -e expected render positive
results on the employment situation in the Mentber States. For instance Roberis and
Springer (2001, 47) have argued that :
Perhaps the two most important aspects of the Employment
MarshalTpitm °f
targetS and wha < might be called the
arsh l Plan strategy. Targets worked very well in preparing forthe Economic and Monetary Union when member states hadfobring thetr economies into line with agreedon criteria
,
Manyeconomists have concluded that this exercise was useful in
Y
,
t,k
en^^^ZL^IS^les
so many parts of the world.
uouoies
5.2.1 Factors Influencing the Adoption of the Employment Chapter
This section analyses the factors and forces in greater detail that have contributed
towards the employment chapter. Specifically, the subsequent sections demonstrate the
resources and strategies employed by the Commission through which it managed to
prepare the Community agenda, to keep the momentum eoneeming the issue of
employment policy and then finally in the last run-up of the IGC to preserve the
consensus among the Member States. Of particular interest is 0 demonstrate the
mechanism employed by the Commission by which it was able to resolve the lines of
contention among the Member States
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In the preparations leading towards the IGC five main issues with relevance to
employment policy became more and more ctystallixed: (I) whether or not there should
be a separate employment title, or ifan employment chapter within an already existing
“tle WOUld be SUffiCient
' (2) Wha ' ki "d “Active the employment title or chapter
should be given, (3, which procedures should be created to implement these objeclives;
(4) whether or no, there should be a separate Employment Committee which could
possibly ovetsee the proper implementation of these procedures; (5) whether or not
additional incentive measures would be needed.
Regarding the first element, there was the issue whether or no, the new treaty
should be amended to include new provisions in the area of employment. As will be
discussed in greater detail below, some Member States argued that no new provisions
would be necessary, while some Member States were in favor of creating provisions
which would represent a strong commitment for policy coordination on the Community
level.
The second issue was that if such a provision would be developed, should these
be written into a separate chapter entirely dedicated to the issue of employment, or if
these provisions should merely be titles in an already existing chapter. If the latter option
would be agreed on, then the question was if such a title should be included with the
chapter on social policy or economic policy.
The third issue was the question about the particular objective the treaty articles
should be given. Some Member States were in favor of the objective of “full
employment”, while others were not willing to agree on any objectives beyond
increased level of employment.”
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Fourth, a number of actors argued that a Employment Policy Committee shouid
be created in order to monitor and influence the policy agendas of the Member States in
.he area of employment pohcy. Again, a number of Member States disagreed with such a
point of view.
Fmally, there was the question if the Commission should be provided with
“incentive measures" to bring about the goal of the employment chapter. Again, while
some Member States were in favor of it, in parttcular Gennany and Spam were rather
vehemently opposed.
This section of the dissertation discusses three resources of the Commission as
betng particularly crucial in helping ,o foster the agreement on employment chapter:
First, the institutional location of the Commission gives it greater flexibility and latitude
and thereby allows i, to draw up policy proposals which are capable of representing latent
interests in the Member States. Additionally, this position allows the Commission to
draft policy proposals that in effect represent a synthesis compromise position among
the Member States. Second, the receptiveness of the Council Presidency crucially
determines the degree to which the Commission has an influence on the outcome of the
multilateral negotiations among the Member States. Third, the Commission can utilize
manifested interest organizations as channels to put pressure onto Member States.
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5.2.2 Preparing toe Agenda: The White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness
and Employment
Following the Publication of the Green Paper on Social Policy, the Commission
continued to shift its policy focus away from traditional
'worker rights’' and towards
focus which emphasized an increase of competitiveness of the European economy
Dowling (1996, 605, recognizes this shift of policy focus when he points ou, tha,
..by
moving the social Europe spotlight from workers’ rights to economic success, the
Compeutiveness White Paper breaks fresh ground." line with th ,s focus
.
the^
Paper provided an analysis of the causes of unemployment and possible solutions and
-hereby continued to keep the issue ofemploy, poiiey on the agenda of the Europea,
Union.
The White Paper acknowledged the importance of efforts to improve the
employment situation and for that pugtose provided a rich and multifaceted analysis of
Europe's economic problems. ^ Right at the beginning of the document, the Preamble
specified that "it is imperative to give a new impulse for keeping employment firmly at
the top of the political agenda of the European Union.”
32
" One important argument in the
analysis of the unemployment problem was that Europe was economically falling behind
319
It b beyond the scope of this paper to summarize even just the main points of this
analysis. Therefore, this chapter will only provide those aspects that are relevant to the
discussion of employment policy.
320 cEuropean Commission, 1993a, COM(93) 700 final. See also Commission
European Communities (1993b, point 1 2.44) and 1993c.
of the
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her competitors due to a lack of structural adjustments. As pointed
Paper:
out in the White
AUh'
1311
]^'
11
,
tec *ln
'°S*ca h scrcird and^ntem^nTl^nv^onmenr
competitors, with the result that vulnerability to cyclical downturns
and external shocks remained high.
The White Paper largely proposed two sets of solutions for the structural
problems of the European economy: First, it called for action in the following areas:
improvement of education and training systems, increased flexibility of work
organization, reduction of indirect labor costs, efficient use of public funds, and training
for unskilled young people. Second, the document spells out the plan for a massive
investment program to renew the infrastructure in the EU. The program would create
jobs and make European firms more competitive by providing them with a more efficient
and less costly infrastructure. At the same time, governments should remove barriers to
flexibility. The success of the program, called Trans European Networks (TENs),
depended on the creation of an enormous investment fund. If the proposal was followed,
fifteen million jobs would be created in the EU between 1994 and 2000.
Both sets of solutions were received differently: the five policy areas identified
foi immediate policy action in the White Paper where again repeated and confirmed in
the summit. Heads of states agreed that there should be a coordinated policy effort in the
238
f0l '0Wta8 P°' iCy arMS: ( ° opportunities for tite labour foree by
pronto,ing investment in vocational training.
,2) increasing the employment-
intensiveness of grow, h, in particular by: more flexible organization of work. (3)
Reducing non-wage labour costs. (4, Improving the effectiveness of labour-market
policy by moving from a passive to an active labour market policy, and (5) improving
measures to help groups which are particularly hard hi. by unemployment.
322
Thus, the issue areas identified in the White Paper had a clear impact on the
Council conclusion of the Essen summit. For instance Sciatra (2000, 212) has argued
that the “leading ideas voiced at the Essen European Council in December 1994, are
directly connected to some of the principles set out in the Delors White Paper.” In this
sense, the conclusions of the Essen summit provide just as much continuity between the
ideas presented in the Green Paper, the White Paper of Social Policy and the White Paper
on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment as well as a blueprint for policy action in
the previously identified policy areas.
32
’
Several Social Affairs Attaches have pointed
out that the new policy tool created in the Essen summit was cmcial to provide the policy
blueprint of the White Paper with a mechanism by which it could be transfonned into
324
policy action.
322
Foi a discussion of the Essen summit see Radke and Stoermann (1998, 709).
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European Council, 1994b. See also Commission of the European Communities
(1994, point 1.3).
324
I am grateful foi this point tor instance to Paul van Leuwe who mentioned this
personal interview on January 31, 2001.
in a
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By combining policy goals with a feasible policy process of how ^^
goals,
.he Commission managed to commi.
.he Member S.a.es in ,he Enropean Counci,
'° mal<e 'he fi8h ' a8amS ' Unempl°^“ “*> eCfuality of opponents for men and
women
.he paramoun.
.ash of ,he EU And fmally
,
the Counc„ asked^
Social Affairs Council and
.he ECOFIN Counc.ls ,o keep track of employment
.rends in
.0 .he Council on further progress. Thus the Essen conclusion urges Member S.a.es ,o
“report annually to the European Council on further progress on the employment
marker This new policy tool of multi-annual reports was later adopted in the
employment chapter of the Amsterdam Treaty.
The second se, of solutions, by and large had a mixed tmpac, due to the reluctance
of the Member States. Already the firs, progress repotf on the policy in ,995 indicated
that the Member States had no, giyen full support to the required projects and tha, several
priority projects faced fiinding challenges.
32
"
Funding continued to be a problem. In
October 1996, the Council could not reach an agreement on how to revise the financial
situation for 1998 and 1999, and financing difficulties were discussed in a number of
meetings in 1997. Despite funding problems, a number of projects in the transportation,
communication, and energy sectors and the amount of fiinding available for them
increased significantly between 1996 and 1997 with the EU committing ECU 402.9
Foi a discussion of the conclusions of the various Council summits see For example
see Casey 1993, Symes 1998, Thomas 1999.
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Commission of the European Communities, (1995, 138-139). Also see Commission
of the European Communities, 1996.
240
miUi0n ” 1997 ,0 he,p
Despite a„ these efforts, a number of critics
have pointed out that the programs have not had a significant impact on job creation.
Overall, the White Paper on Growth and Competitiveness and Employment
represented an important milestone in the Commission's strategy of getting employment
policy accepted by the Member States as an important field for Community action. With
the White Paper the Commission managed to no. only provtde a definition of the problem
of unemployment, bu, also was able suggest a set of policy tools that subsequently
were considered to be a viable solution to the problem of unemployment. Two factors in
particular contributed to the adoption of the White Paper: First, the Commission was able
to rely on the support of the Presidency of the Council. Second, the Commission worked
through the Group of European Socialists to foster a consensus among a large group of
actors that the Community should add employment policy onto its agenda. The following
section details both the process by which the Commission managed to prepare the agenda
as well as the resources it employed along the way.
Commission of the European Communities, (1997, 155-158).
For this argument see for instance Roberts and Springer (1997, 45).
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5.2.2.1 Factors Influencing the Adoption of the White Paper
The beginnings of the White Paper can be seen in the efforts of the Delors
Cab, net and the DG V to wo* closely together to pronto,e stn,ctarai refonns with the
goal of .nereasing employment growth in Europe. In February of 1993, Delors indicated
«ha, the ••classical models of growth are no. sufficient produce jobs.”
32
’
mid-
February he told the European Parliament that “the vety idea of a united Europe is in
penl- and suggested that the Community needed new initiatives which aimed both a,
promoting active labor market measures as well as fostering the dialogue with the social
330
partners. In March of the same year, the Commission floated for the firs, time the idea
of putting a new economic initiative on the agenda of the Copenhagen meeting of the
European Council. In May of 1993, Delors directed his long-range planning unit, the
Cellule de Prospective headed by Jerome Vignon, to prepare a detailed study of the
problem of European unemployment.
And in May and June, Delors began a lobbying campaign with the governments
of various member state - in particular the French as well as the German government - to
get the issue of unemployment included on the agenda of the Copenhagen meeting.
Given that Denmark, which held the six-month rotating presidency of the Council, was
responsible for the preparation of the agenda, he concentrated his attention on Poul Nyrup
Rasmussen, the Danish Prime Minister, who in mid-June circulated a letter to his fellow
329
For this point see Financial Times
,
February 5, 1993, 5.
330
12 )
tor this quote see Official Journal ofthe European Parliament, (February 10, 1993,
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leaders indicating that one of the principal foci tfthe Copenhagen meeting would be
unemployment and that the discussion would be introduced by Delors.
Delors used his opportumty to speak in the forum of the European Council rather
wen. As Pointed on, by Sven Swenson in an intetview in Februaty 2001: "Delors only
presented two graphs and tigures which suggested that structural problems were the mtain
cause of Europe’s unemployment problem" He argued tha, eunently less than 60
percent of the working age population was in employment in Europe, which stood in
Sharp contrast to about 70 percent in the US and the EFTA countries as well as over 75
percent in Japan. His analysis focused on the fact that after each cyclical downturn, the
number ofjobless individuals was much larger than prior to the economic crisis. From
tins observation he drew the conclusion that unemployment was primarily a structural
problem caused by the lack of flexibility in the job market as well as the deteriorating
competitiveness of European firms. Thus, while economic growth would be
indispensable for the creation ofjobs, such a development would nevertheless not be
sufficient to cure the Europe's structural problems which lay at the heart of the
332
unemployment problem. He convinced Member States that a White Paper was
necessary in which the Union would have to outline a new medium-term development
strategy. The heads of states agreed with Delors and thereby provided him with a
mandate to draft such a paper by the end of the year.
mentioned in a personal interview with Swenson on February 15, 2001.
332
see Agence Europe (June 24, 1993).
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S.2.2.2 Collaboration with the Belgian Council Presidency
In July 1993, on the firs, day when Belgtum took the rotating pres ,dency rf^
Council, the Belgian government and the Commission had a meeting ,o discuss the
agenda for the following six months. Both sides agreed that the White Paper should be
given priority in the coming months. Equally imponan, was the agreement reached on
selecting the appropriate level in the Council that should deal with the White Paper.
Upon insistence of Delors and supported by the Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc
Dehaene, the Belgian Finance Minister, Philippe Maystadt, eventually agreed that the
White Paper should first be submitted to the heads of state.
3
”
effect, Delors argued
that since the mandate to elaborate the Paper was given by the European Council, the
final version of the Paper should not be evaluated by the Finance Ministers in an Ecofin
Council, but instead should be evaluated by the heads of state in the next European
Council. By convincing the Belgian Presidency of this strategy, Delors was later able to
bypass the Ecofin Council. As it turned out, this was absolutely crucial for the political
feasibility of the proposals made in the Paper. Thus from the outset of the Belgian
Pi esidency, Delors had the strong political support from Dehaene.
334
This section draws on the work of Endo (1999, 196 ff).
334 cEndo has pointed out that Dehaenes’ interest in the White Paper (1999, 198) was farlom politically altruistic, but instead, “Dehaene’s keenness on the Paper was a healthy
self-interest He was one of a few leaders about to execute a far-reaching austerity
economy in his own country. It was clear that a rigorous national plan for Belgium could
not be realistically be implemented unless accompanied by a Europe-wide strategy on
growth, competitiveness and job creation. Thus, the Belgian presidency had a clear sense
o pnontization, the channels through which to work with the Delors presidency as well
as the will to do so.”
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5.2.2.3 Mobilization of Commission’s Internal Resources
>n order to utilize the politics, mandate that has been given t0 him and „ a£hieve
h ‘S POl,, ' Cai 8°alS ' De '0rS m°biii2ed inte™'
-urces of the Commission l0 use lhe
window of opportunity provtded by the mandate. Intemaiiy
,he Commission, nine
working groups were created to contribute towards the White Paper. Each group was
headed by a Commissioner or two.
335
Each working group pu, forward a repot, on the
issue given. Coordination of these reports was given to the so-called
‘core-group’ which
institutionally was iocated in the office of the Commission’s Secretary General.
Accordingly, the chair of the core group was David Wihiamson. Other members in this
group included Christopher Boyd, a Dolors’ cabinet member in charge of economic and
monetary affairs and Jerome Vignon, then Director of the Forward Looking Studies Uni,.
5.2.2.4 Mobilizing the Group of European Socialists
Parallel to these debates on the European Council, the Director General ofDG
Employment and Social Affairs, Allan Larsson was instnimental in mobilizing support
for the Commission’s proposal for the employment chapter in the Amsterdam Treaty.
335
AAccording to Endo ( 1 999, 234) the groups were organized under the followingheadings ( 1 ) Economy and EMU (supervised by Henning Christophersen), (2) Solidary
rAntnnf
n
J hTw,^° ^ (Le°n Brittan)’ (3 ) R^arch a"d Development
[ .
110 Rubertl)
’ (4) Trans -European Network (Martin Bangeman), (5) Information
(6) Edacatl0n and Trainin§ (Ruberti), (7) Labor Market Policy(Padiag Flynn), (8) Accomplishing the Single Market (Raniero Vanni D’Archirafi), (9)New Model of Development, including environment and restructuring of taxation(Yannis Paleokiassas and Christiane Scrivener).
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one of his mam avenues gather support was through the socja| ^
both ,n the Member S.a,es and on the levei of the European Union. Insti.u.ionai.y
,he
Party of European Socialists Group in the European Pari,amen, provided
. lmk^
the debates ins.de the European Commission and the Member States as well as among
Member States. As pomted out by Ladrech (1997, ,7) the Sociahs, network sough, to
influence the multiple points at which the IGC was being developed.
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Before being appointed Director General of DG Employment and Social Affairs
while he was Ftname Minister in the Swedish government, Allan Larsson was the
Chainnan of the European Employment Initiative, a working group inside of the Party of
European Socialists (PES). As pan of his work, he drafted a document “Put Europe to
Work- which outlined his vision for an “Employment Union” and the ways in which it
could be achieved. The document was adopted by the PES a, its conference in Brussels
on December 9, ,993. The next year before the Essen summit, the PES leaders jointly
adopted a declaration in which they pointed out .ha, “Europe lacks an effective
employment policy.”
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One important element that was common both in the papers of the PES and the
Commission’s White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment is the
reference to an “employment system." While Jerome Vignon, the head of the Forward
Studies Unit, pointed out in a recent interview that he was the one who coined this
phrase, several other participants have attributed this concept to Allan Larsson. Despite
quoted in Johansson (1999, 89).
337
see Johansson (1999, 89).
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.fference of opinion, it is clear that there is a considerable overlap of ideas belween
‘he W°rk d°"e m PES 3nd t,K Cabme' °f 1“'X**- J*nsson (1999) explains this
Jerome Vignon, on a regular basis attended the meetings of the working group on the
European Employment Initiative. While they were exposed the ideas discussed in this
f0'™' 'hey alS° C°n,r,bUted ,0 “» hy drawing on their experience in their
work for the Commission.
5.2.2.5 Bypassing the Ecofin Council
During the last phase of drafting the White Paper it became apparent that in
particular two elements the Commission was planning include in the Paper would be
most controversial.- First, the idea of work-sharing was severely criticized by the vast
338
majority of Finance Ministers. For instance JeamClaude Junker, the Finance Minister
of Luxembourg, argued that work-sharing would send a “negative, defeatist signal” to
339
Euiope s woikeis. Nevertheless, drawing on the positive experience of the
Netherlands, Vignon continued to argue that work-sharing should remain a central pari of
the Paper. In particular he emphasized that solidarity between those in and out of work
should be established through shorter working hours and sharing jobs among a wider
population.
This section draws on the work of Endo 1 999.
See Financial Times (November, 24 1993, 2)
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Second, the ,dea of increased public expendiiure was received rafter negative,,
by the Finance Ministers. A, the end of October, during an Ecoiin Councii, their
.espouse was overwhelmingly negative Delors’ initiative to boost econonttc growth
and job creation through investments in infrastructural projects.
Anticipating the reaction of the Finance Ministers, De,ors pursued the foliowing
strategy: First, he dehberateiy toned down sotne pans of his *af, paper. For instance the
reference to work-sharing was completely dropped. According Endo (1999,200).
Delors remarked during a cabinet meeting that since this idea will be politically no.
viable “however intellectually conec, [it might be], we should abandon it.” Additionally,
a reference to a 2-3 percent reduction in interest rates was dropped, most likely to solicit
support from the German government.
Second, with the support of the Belgian government the Commission managed to
delay the presentation of the White Paper to a date as late as possible. The aim here was
.0 avoid submitting the Paper to the Ecofin Council under all circumstances and instead
to submit the White Paper directly to the heads of state. Thus, when the Finance
Ministers gathered four days before the European Council summit, they still had not
received a proper document. Accordingly, in order to make a decision by the heads of
state more diflicult, the Finance Ministers moved to block the adoption of the White
Paper. The British Chancellor Clark voiced the mood of the Finance Ministers when he
said “there is no way that heads of government are going to leave this city [of Brussels]
248
'hiS haV”8 0 '’ 3 maSSi™ b
—^P~e without there having been
detailed proposals put first to the finance ministers of the EU”
34°
Finally, 2d hours after the Eeonfin Council a„dj us, two days before the European
Council summit, the Commission emulated the long-awaited White Paper the heads of
government. The Commisston knew that i, was able to play on, this strategy, since i,
could completely rely „„ the suppott of the Belgian Prestdency. Prune minister Dehaene
himself kept a close oversight over the agenda for the European Council and personally
made sure that the White Paper would be put fomard dtrectly to the summit. He asked
Delors to introduce the discussion of the Paper and thereby gave him another opportunity
to “sell” his ideas.
341
Fortuitous for the sake of the White Paper was the fact that Germany and the
Dutch governments were willing to support the White Paper after Delors had strategically
removed those sections that he knew would be received adversely by both
342
governments. This recent shift in the constellation of supporters placed sufficient
pressure on the United Kingdom which did not want to be seen as isolated in the matter.
In the wake of these developments, the stance of the British government also softened
and it was agreeable to accepting the White Paper. The conclusions of the summit point
to a compromise which must have been the selling point for the United Kingdom: the
conclusions state that whilst the bulk of the implementation of the White Paper would be
340
Guardian, 6.12.1993:12
- quoted in Endo (1999,201).
341
J>ee Agence Europ, December, 1 1, 1993, 3-4
342
cSee Financial Times, December, 4-5, 1993, 1 and December 10, 1993, 2
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left to the Finance Ministers, the heads of governments and
monitor their work of implementation.
343
state themselves would
5.2.3 Implications for the Decision-Making Process
Overaii. the White Paper was a entcia, document in framing the policy debate tha,
politically paved the way for the Europe-w.de empioymen, measures to be acceptable to
Member States. As pointed ou, by Youri Decays,, the
-Commission's White Paper and
Opinions have effectively helped se, the tone for European Council debates and
consequently, for the EU's adaptation process al this level. For examp,e, the Delors
White Paper of 1 993 the Commission had called repeatedly for a coordinated
Community strategy on employment.”
344
The efforts of the Commission to frame the
policy debate were particularly successful for three reasons: First, the timing was well
chosen. The Commission intensified the policy debates a, a time when Member States
were straggling to reduce their respective unemployment rates. As mentioned by the
Social Affairs Attache Paul van Leuwe in an interview in Brussels on January 31, 2001:
“Member States were rather clueless how to respond to the high and persistent
unemployment rates. They were willing to see what the European Union would suggest."
Second, the Commission succeeded in presenting widely-acceptable solutions to a
generally recognized problem. The bundle of suggested active labor market measures
See Agence Europe, December 12, 1993, 5.
344
Devuyst (1998, 616).
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With elements of struchtra, refonn were widely seen as a way of basing the
effectiveness and flexibility of the ,abor markets and thereby of ^ ^
increase of empioymen, the Member States. The Commission managed commit the
Member States to these measures firs, through the adoption of the White Book and than
later added a policy process of ach.eving these goals through the Essen conclusions. a
sense the Essen conclusions were already a major step towards fostering consensus
among the Member States. As Kenner (2000, 380, has pointed out,
-Essen can be seen
as a rehearsal for the formalized procedures later brought into play under the
Employment Title.”
Thud, the Commission utilized the Council as a forum in which it was able to
float its ideas as well as a forum in which it could influence the Member States’
positions. As pointed out by the Commission's Secretary General, David Williamson,
who had attended the European Council meetings from the early 1980s, “the difference
[between Delors and his predecessor] is really incredible. In the early European Council
meetings, the Commission had a subsidiary role. Now Delors presents all the main
arguments, and the heads of government comment on them. That’s how it actually works
now. Delors is absolutely a fundamental pan of the operation of the heads of government
345
meetings.”
In this sense, the issue of unemployment was used an opportunity by which the
Commission could demonstrate the importance for Community Action. For instance,
Jacques Santer, then President of the European Commission, described in 1995 the levels
345
Quoted in Endo (1999, 111).
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Europe showed its ctizens tha, une„lp ,oyme„t was major concern and a priority:
2 !s~^dsest-* tasoetenes, destroying solidarity between our people creatine aepnved
without hope’ class of excluded people front the benefits
of the joy of living. Pensh the thought that we fail.”
346
Thus, in sum, a number of scholars have pointed out that the progress achieved in
the area of social policy during the early 1990s
in the context of the political climate of it
is quite remarkable and has to be placed
s time. As pointed out by Endo (1999, 191), the
“deeply hostile atmosphere for the Commission, and the stalled
‘Maastricht fatigue’
after the Treaty’s turbulent ratification process would have made i, extremely difficult for
any Commission leader to launch a new initiative." Yet, remarkably enough, in this
climate the Commission managed to exercise agenda-setting leadership by initiating the
process leading to the adoption of the White Paper by the Brussels European Council in
December of 1993 and securing an agreement among the heads of state to considerably
widen the agenda of the intergovernmental conference.
347
quoted in Milliard and Lee (1997, 5).
347
European Council 1993.
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5.2.4 Keeping the Momentum: Background Preparations
Summits
for the Council
5.2.4.1 From Corfu to Turin
The European Commission kepi the concern over unemp.oymen, prominenfly
„„
•he agenda of the European Union during the years 1995-1997. Given the series of
initiatives of the European Commission, smd.es and background papers, successive
European Counci,s were infiuenced to simuitaneousiy address various aspects of the
issue. A, the Madnd summit in ,995, the Council reiterated
,ha, job creation was the
principle social, economic and political objective of the EU at* its Member States. The
Florence European Council in June 21-22, 1996, mainly directed political attention
unemployment by giving its
-political approval" to mobilize the Community, national
and loca, au, horit.es, and the social pariners in the battle against unempioyn.cn,. And the
Dublin European Council in December 1996 expressed in its "Dublin Declaration on
Emp.oyment - The Jobs Challenge" the commitment of the European Council to bring ail
the social and economic agents together so that common projects for territorial
employment pacts could be created. The outcome of this summit was that the Member
States agreed to am, towards the following structural objectives: integration of
unemployed young people into the labour market, prevention of the dnf, towards long-
tern. unemployment, and more balanced participation of men and women in the labour
market.
This section documents the initiatives started by the Commission and the
subsequent pressure this exerted on the Member States. In particular three initiatives are
253
analyzed more closely: The Social Action Programme, the
Entity”, and the “Social Policy as an Economic Factor,”
Emope as an Economic
S.2.4.2 The Social Action Programme 1995-1997
APn ' 1995
’ ^ C°mmiSSi0n co"ti"“e‘J <° Pressure the Member States for
action in the area of nnemp.oymen, by presenting its third Social Action Programme.
3*
ier programmes were presented in 1974 and in 1989 respectively. The Financial
Times responded on April 1* to the presentation with an article on the front page which
pointed out that the social action programme represented another example of a changed
policy focus and policy style.: “The European Commission has formally abandoned its
commitment to the wide use of legal measures as a way to strengthening workers’ rights
throughout the European Union.” [The Commission is now emphasizing that]
competitiveness and job creation should become its main priorities.” The article went on
to point out that “total harmonisation of social policies is not an objective of the
Commission or the Union.”
349
To give more strength to the goals identified in the Social Action Programme, the
Commission called to form a Comite des Sages which was given the task to evaluate the
Social Charter of 1989. After the Committee had me, on several occasions between
(i995a
'
com <95 > i34>
-
<i995b
’^
349 QSee also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (April 13, 1995, 15), (May 22, 1995, 15).
35° .
ccoiding to Kowarlsky (1999, 203), the Committee was headed by Miria de
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October ,995 and Eebruaiy 1996> it issued
. repon wift ^ „„ ...^ rf^^
Poltttca, Rights.” a nutshell, the Committee recommended
,ha, ,lle European Union
Should work toward es.abhshtng a ”Socia, Union.” order to achteve this goa
, it
suggested that all social
one section in the treaty.
policy provisions of the past treaties should be consolidated into
This would allow ordinary citizens to be both better informed
about their rights as well as to identify better with Ihe European Union.
hi order to publicize the findings of the Report, the Commission organized a
"Social Policy Forum” on March which lasted until Mach 3tf‘. About 1000
representalives of the Member States, the community mstitutions, the social partners and
351NGO participated in the event/'
Additionally, the Social Action Programme as well as the Commission's proposal
for employment measures received additional support from the European Parliament
which passed a resolution on January 16, 1996. In this resolution the Parliament
endorsed the 1 1 key areas identified for action by the Commission. Moreover, the
resolution stressed the importance of implementing surveillance procedures for
mulitannual programmes thereby supporting the Essen conclusions as well as
strengthening the policy platform of the Commission in the preparation towards the IGC.
And finally, the Parliament took the view that the Intergovernmental Conference should
Louides Pintasilgo and included the following members: Eduardo Garcia de EnterriaHartmut Kaelble, Luka Katseli, Frederic Pascal, Bengt Westerberg, and Shirley Williams.
351
See Commission of the European Communities, 1996a, 1996d, and 1997c.
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provide a specific legal basis for social
352
unanimity in the Council.
and employment policy that does not require
5 2.4.3 Europe as an Economic Entity
In July 1995, the Danish government submitted a paper to the European Council
which aimed a, achievmg strengthened coordination of economic and structural pohcies.
Tins initiative was reflected in the Cannes European Council Conclusions as follows:
mo
S
m
ai
fnr
C0n0n,iC CI1 " ly ' ,he Eu'°pean Union offers additional
r ’Maneuver and a specific added value that makes for the
L“c 1 ar,h.CC Pl0ymCm ' The El,r°Pean C° l,"Cil Calls uPontne council nd the ommission to study the mutually reinforcim,eifect of increased coordination of economic and structural policiesand to report back to i, at its Madrid meeting." P
The European Commission eagerly jumped to the opportunity this initiative
provided by reacting in two ways: in a tactical and in a strategic manner. Already, on 1
1
Octobu 1995 the Commission had adopted a Communication witli the title “Trends and
developments in employment systems in the E.iropean Union, the European employment
strategy: recent progress and prospects for the future.”’
53
In this Communication, the
Commission expresses the opinion that full implementation of the macroeconomic part of
the broad guidelines on economic policy would enable investment-led growth of 3-3 . 5%
per year to be achieved over the period 1995-2000. More than 1 1 million new jobs
352
noinU 3?9'n oreei
r
f
S
,
0l "ti0
',’
S? Commission of the European Communities ( 1 996b,p it 1. .1 1). Offic al Journal of the European Communities (1996, C32).
353
see Commission of the European Communities 1995e.
256
W0Uld bC Creattd
' reSUMng a“
- “«**»-
- .0 around ,5%
. A ftrther
reduction could be achieved by implementing struchtra, measures As^^
functioning of the labor marke, is concerned, the Communication reveals tha, the
Member States have made a great effort to establish coherent medium-term
programmes incorporating the priorities set out in Essen.
Furthermore, the DG also reacted rather guide,y in . tectica , mamer by
national
submitting a worlcing document to the European Council i
was titled “Mutually reinforcing effects of increased
n Madrid, 1995. The document
co-ordination of macro-economic
and structural policies at the Community level."
354
While
first setting up a steering group which was to deliberate i
initiative could be used to further the Commission’
DG V, reacted strategically by
n which ways the Danish
drafted a report which was submitted to the Dublin
for discussion there.
s agenda. In the end, the DG V
summit and which served as a basis
5 .2 .4.4 Social Policy as a Productive Factor
Already mentioned in the Green Paper, the DG V used the idea of the economic
value of social policy. In the years following the publication of the Green Paper, this idea
became part of larger debate which is often referred to as “social policy as a productive
355
factor.” Here the argument is that social policy is essential in order to enable
see Commission of the European Communities 1 995f.
355
see Vobura 1989, 1995.
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economic players to betave flexibly and innovative^ In this
as a necessary component for a competitive economy and not
sense, social policy is seen
merely as a luxury or a cost
item. As pointed out in the Green Paper, “it i
of social protection have been
>s important to underline that high standards
a major contributory factor in Europe’s economic success
‘he PaSt ' Ma"y W°Uld hi^ -ial standards should no, be seen as an
optional extra, or a luxury which can be done without once limes
an integral part of a competitive economic model.”
356
get hard, but rather as
5.2.5 Implications for the Decision-Making Process
This new policy focus was instrumental in four ways: First, i, helped to break the
encrusted line of the old debate between flexibility and security. All of a sudden the
debate was no longer characterized by a zerosum logic. Proponents of the welfare states
were no longer in need to defend social polices merely on the basts of social justice tha,
had its economic costs, bu, instead were now equipped tojoin the economists on their
turf and use economic arguments to support the provision of social security measures.
Second, it helped DG Employment and Social Affairs to change its image with
employers associations as well as other DGs inside of the Commission. In the past i, was
seen as a rather incapable political actor, far too closely associated with Trade Unions in
Europe. The debate “social policy as a productive factor”, helped the DG to shed some
of this image. As Wendon points out, “social policy as a productive factor is clearly
356
Green Paper, 1993, p. 14
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hope employers will feel comfortable with.-
3”
Fourth.
„ provided the DG v with arguments against an expert group which was
As potnted ou, hy Bois (1995, 1). Independent Expert Group on Legal and
Administrative which was headed by Bernhard Mob,or had as its main goal the
“turning] hack of the regulatory tide in Europe a, large [and] recommencing] where to
slash away the red tape superimposed by EU laws in recent years."’
58
Finally, the DG Employment and Social Affairs also defined a new frame for the
analysis of the factors causing unemployment in Europe and suggested several steps that
were necessary to address the issue. While highlighting that social policy is a productive
factor, i, also emphasized that European welfare states should provide more active
measures to avoid unemployment and to reduce the economic costs associated with social
exclusion. The Green Paper explicitly points out that “social protection and labour
market policies should where possible be directed towards the positive goals of human
resource development, individual self-sufficiency and the integration of individuals into
society.’
359
357
Wendon (1998, 348).
358
Bois 1995
359
TEU, Principles, Article 2.
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5.2.6 Preserving the Consensus: the In.ergovernmen.a, Conference
After the employment issue had been successfully piaced on the Community
agenda by the Commission and the momentum was maintained through a series of
initiatives and studies, the Commission gradualiy adjusted its strategy to one which i,
atmed a, preserving the consensus among the Member States,
Originally, the idea to convene the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996/1997
came about during the Maastricht heaty negotiations of 1991, in the negotiations, i,
became apparent that the Geinran. Belgian and ftaiian representatives were unsatisfied
with the final outcome. As a consequence, these countries insisted assembie a new
ICC- a few years later. ““ Subsequently, the agreement was formalized and incorporated
into the Maastricht Treaty as Article N. According to this article: “A conference of
representatives of the governments of the Member States shall be convened in 1 996 to
examine those provisions of this Treaty for which revision is provided, in accordance
with the objectives se, ou, in Articles A and B" (Council of the European Union 1993).
This made the 1996/97 the first conference to be mandated by treaty rather ,ta„ as a
response of governments to various internal and external pressures. However, even
though the original idea was to bind the parties to meet within a short time to evaluate the
treaty and then to negotiate further some unresolved elements, some of the premises for
opening the IGC had changed dramatically during the years from the Maastricht I
conference to the IGC 1996. In the end, the IGC was loaded with a whole range of issues
360
1995.
For this point see Bieber (1997, 237), Corbett (1994b, 55), Bainbridge and Teadale
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that were previously rather unexpected such as enlargement, increasing the democratic
image of the EU and developing a coordinating
policy goals on the European Union level.
mechanism for employment and social
5-2-6. 1 The Spanish Presidency
Concerted steps prepare the IOC were taken a, the Corfi, Council i„ June l994
.
The Presidency concluston specified the setting up of Reflection Group to prepare for
he 1996 Intergovernmental Conference eonsist.ng of representatives of the Mmisters of
Foreign Affairs of the Member States and the President of the Commission/
6
'
I, will be
chatted by a person appomted by the Spantsh government and begin its work in June
362
1 995.” As Chairman of the Group Carlos Westendrop was selected and the other
members of the Group consisted of representatives of the fifteen governments, the
European Commission and the European Parliament.
363
The Reflection Group was given
361
362
363
European Council 1994a.
...
pf^mbers of the Reflection Group were as follows: Carlos Westendron tSnainlM,chel Bamier (Franee) Werner Hoyer (Germany), Silvio Fagilo.o (Italy), Donald Davis(UK), Joseph Wyland (Luxembourg), Gay Mitchell (Irland), Niels Ersboll (Denmark)Stephanos Stathatos (Greece), Franklin Dehousse (Belgium), Michel Patiin
MNinTR
an
f
S)
n^
dre CTalV6S Pereira (PortuSal ), Manfred Scheich (Austria), Ingvardeli (Finland), Gunnar Lund (Sweden), Elisabeth Guigou (EP), Elmar Brok (EpfMarcelmo Oreja (European Commission). For this list see Agence Europe (May 3 1,
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a C°mPrehenSiVe ”anda,e by ,he
not those items |aid
down by .he Maastricht Treat, bu, a,so "any Cher
.treasure deemed necessaty
facilitate the work of the institutions and guarantee their effective operation in the
364
perspective of enlargement.”
Jacques De.ors welcomed the decision to estabhsh the Reflection Group with the
words: •The experience of the Rome Treat,, of the Single Ac, and of the ‘EMU pan' of
the Maastricht Treaty has proved that the intergovernmental conferences ‘work better' if
•hey are prepared b, experts who, even though the official national representatives do no,
resume all their positions, may suggest one, two or three coherent plans,”
3"
Additionally, the Commission presented a "Report on the Operalion of the Treaty
on European Union” to the Reflection Group on May 10th
,
1995.
3
“
I„ its report it
identified the need “to make Europe the business of evety citizen.” I„ order to achieve
tins the report again advocated to strengthen the role of the Community in promoting
employment policies. Specifically, i, urged tha, there is a need for "coordinating national
364 QSee Duff (1997, 2) It is worth noting that its opening session was arranged inTaormina, Sicily to coincide with the 40fi ' anniversary of the Messina Conference In thisway the Reflection Group hoped to be perceived as a Messina II instead of a Maastricht IIand would be more associated with the success of the 1957 Treaty on the EuropeanEconomic Community than the crisis of legitimacy following the ratification of the
aastiicht Treaty. For this point see Agence Europe (June 6-7, 1995 2) (March 3 1996>and McDonagh (1998, 30). ’
uviarcn j, tyyp)
365
366
Agence Europe (March 28-29, 1994, 3).
See Commission of the European Communities, 1 995g. This report was preceded by ateport from the European Council 1995c, the Committee of the Regions 1995a, and the
Economic and Social Committee 1995. Also, it was followed by the report of the
European Parliament on May 17, 1995.
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decisions on ,he basis of overal, European pians. and [urged rha,
.here was a need for]
special funding fr„m .he Community budge, ,o pro,no,e synergies between na.iona,
projects.”
JUne and JU 'y °f 1995
' "" Pudency sen, ou, questionnaires
,„ ,he
vanous delegations ,o ge, some initial feedback on the issues under consideration. On
.he basis of the responses to the questionnaires, the Presidency pu, forward an interim
repot on September 5, .995 With regard to enjoyment pohcy the main conclusion
uses almost the exact wording as the one chosen by the Commission in its repot
submitted to the Reflection Group. Specifically, the interim repot points ou, tha, “a key
challenge facing the Union internally is the need to ensure that European construction
becomes a venture to which its citizens can relate. The graving popular dissatisfaction
With public matters in general and European construction in panicular is party due to
economic, political and institutional reasons: a high level of unemployment, which is
particularly senous in the case of young people and the long-torn unemployed, social
rejection and exclusion, [. .
.] the crisis in relations between representatives and those
represented." The operational conclusion the Reflection Group derives from this
observation is that the next treaty reform will have to demonstrate a stronger commitment
ot developing employment policy measures on the level of the European Union.
In total, the Reflection Group met twelve times in the six months of its
368
existence. Following its mandate, the Group issued its final report on December 5,
Spanish Presidency 1995a.
For a detailed working schedule of the Reflection Group see Svensson (2000 , 52) and
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1995 which was then officially submitted
369
to the Madrid European Council on December
,5/ ' 6
’
IW "' ThC^ “ «*<- *P« by the Croup constituted a
“sound basis for the work of the conference,™ Tllis document contained part, A
genera, htle on “A Strategy for Europe- underlined the necessity to make the EU
transparent and closer to the citizens Here the Refection Group arg,
Union fell short of being a proper state, it nevertheless
more
market. As such it had to devote itself
gued that while the
was more than just a common
more to the issues of immediate concern to its
citizens.
Additionally, an annotated agenda provided a range of more detailed refonn
proposals. According to the report, the internal challenge of the Union had to be me,
with a clear definition of goals. Here the report tdentified three main areas for the work
of the IGC: (1) making Europe more relevant to its citizen, (2) enabling Europe to work
better and prepare it for enlargement, (3) giving the Union greater capacity for external
act,on. More specifically, the report recommended that the Union should to acquire
instruments to meet the main concerns of the citizens that were considered to be social
exclusion and unemployment as well as environmental degradation. One area identified
by Which this goal could be achieved is employment policy. Specifically the report
pointed out that “many of us wan, the Treaty to contain a clearer commitment on the part
Griller (et al.) (2000, 14).
369
370
Agence Europe (December 17, 1995, 1)
European Council 1995a.
371
Spanish Presidency 1995b.
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of .he Union
.0 achieving greater ec„nomic and socla| and^^ ^
promote employment, as we., as provisions ending the Union take coordinated action
on job creation.”
The Commission was firs, to react to the Wes.endrop report in an infonnal press
release of December 6, 1995 in which i, generally support the work and the conclusion
Of the Reflection Group. Nevertheless, hinting on the need to go further, i, p„iraed out
.hat overall the
-'main posifion which [the Commission] will be taking on are matters on
Which the members on the Reflection Group diverged.”
372
The overall assessment in the literature of the impact of the Reflection Group is
mixed. For instance Svensson (2000, 59) finds that the Group managed “to tie hands"
and “put pressure on the states that had no, been willing «„ agree to changes” in certain
policy areas. Nevertheless, several participants in the Reflection Group as well as
scholars who obsetved the Reflect™ group have pointed out tha, beyond a momentum
for agenda setting the report was too vague and lacking in strategies for action.
3”
Instead of providing a policy bases from which further negotiations could be conducted,
the reports of the Reflection Group merely represented a plethora of viewpoints. For
instance, McDonagh (1998, 41) quotes an official of the Spanish Presidency who when
asked to assess the relationship between the Reflection Group's report and the subsequent
work of the IGC replied that it was merely “historical.” Additionally, Kortenberg (1997,
Commission of the European Communities 1995h.
373
.
hor instance see Dehousse (1999, 4), (1998b, 4), Devuyst (1998, 619), Aeence(December 4-5, 1995, 3).
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7111)1* POintCd“ te <“* 3—— tthe Report] c„ns,itutes more a
S,a,emeM 0fdiSa8reeme“ ' hal’ 3““ °f—
” Furthermore, some obsetvers
attributed this lack concreteness in the Report to the fact
composed of too many junior ministers who
was
that the Reflection Group
were all too aware of not upsetting their
respect,ve politico, superiors.- Finally, Dinan (2001, ,4) concludes that »i„ the end the
Report did not become a formal reference document for the IGC ”
374
5-2-6.2 The Italian Presidency
After the preparatory phase was completed during the Spanish Presidency, the
Italian Presidency was expected to enter the drafting phase of the IGC. In Januaty.
Susanna Agnes, then Italian Foreign Mtnister, presented the Presidency's programme
the European Parliamert.“ In. nutshell, the Italian presidency pursued two objectives:
during the firs, part of its presidency I, aimed a, securing the mandate to officially open
the IGC, which it accomplished with the Turin summit. In the second part it aimed at
furthering the negotiations. As pointed out by Silvio Fagiolo, who was the personal
representative of the Italian Foreign Minister during the Reflection Group and the IGC, in
an interview with Svensson (2000, 82) in May 1999, the Presidency had two alternatives
374
For this point see Wessels 1996, and Bourlanges 1997.
375
That the Italian Presidency was on track with this timing of this customary
presentation was considered surprising due the political uncertainty associated change ofgovernment in Italy. For details see The European (October 26 - November 1 1995)(November 23-29, 1995), (February 15-21, 1996), (February 22-28, 1996) and Agence
MQOfi
e
i 7a?
nl jV"6 ’ 2) ’ f°r 3 detailed discussion see Daniels (1997, 242), Dastoli(1996, 178), and Pasquino (1996, 140).
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.0 foster negotiations: i, conld either sing.e on, two or three subjects for deeper review
and can, then, as Cose as poss.hte to treaty agreements. Alternatively, as in the
Reflection Group, the
.tatian Presidency coutd continue to review a„ issues and narrow
down the options Anther by singiing ou, the „o„-viah,e opt.ons and those clearly
supponed by only a small minority. the end, as pointed ou, by Svensson (2000 82)
•he Presidency opted for the second ahenrative, ‘Wing that a process of severa,
months lay ahead of them, no one would be keen to make concessions too earty - A , so
McDonagh <1998, 53, has pointed ou, that during the halian Presidency i, “was the view
of many Member States that there was no urgency about either opening or conceding the
negotiations.”
The European Commission presented to the Italian Presidency on February 28'",
>996 its repon on the ICC."* In this repon i, proposed tha, specific provisions on
employment be written into the Treaty; [... and in order to] treat employ™,, as a matter
of common interest they would aim at: establishing the conditions for a common strategy
for employment; stimulating cooperation between the interested pa,lies; consolidating the
arrangements for multilateral surveillance of Member States' multiannual programmes;
taking employment into account in all Community policies.” In this document, the
Commission advocated an ambitious Intergovernmental Conference. The first goal that
COMmanttr ‘997b. Also see Commission of the European Communities 1996a,M (96) 90 and Commission of the European Communities Bulletin, 1996b points 1.1
.i!,
It
r
S
!\
0Uk
)
be "oted that the Eur°Pean Parliament followed the Commission in
middle of March with its Dury/Maij-Weggen report.and European Parliament 1997.
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•he document recommended for the ,GC was
"bring Europe closer ks^ ..77
"^ 0f,WS^ "’e d”— ‘-— First. the Social Protocol should
be integrated mto the Treaty, second, specific provisions on employment shottid he
wmten into the Treaty. In the words of the Commission (1996b, 150), these provisions
Sh0U,d aim a,: “eS,abliShin8
"» a common strategy for employment-
stimulating cooperation between the interested panics, consolidating the arrangements for
multdateral surveillance of Member States' multkannual programs, [and] taking
employment into account in all Community policies.”
With this list the Commission hoped to break the entrenched standoff among the
Member States. The positions of the Member States as expressed during the
deliberations in the Reflection Group showed the fonnation of the following three
clusters: one group of countries (Sweden, Austria, Belgium, and Denmark) were
interested in fairly binding coordination procedures, including recommendations, and if
need be sanctions which were inspired by and large by the chapter on the Economic and
378
Monetary Union. One group of countries were largely interested in an employment
chapter, but wanted it to go not beyond the elements already included in the Essen
conclusions (Netherlands, Luxembourg, Greece, Portugal, and Finland). A final group of
countries were rather hostile to the introduction of a new employment chapter, based both
377
The other two goals were: (I) making Europe’s presence felt in the world (2)adopting an institutional system which will work in an expanded Europe. Fora discussion
o these goals see Commission of the European Communities, 1996c.
378
Mpmh
a
<Jw
re deta
^
e
u
d dlscussion on the nuances of the positions of the individuale ber States see Chapter 6.
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on their belief that no added value could be achieved through it and if at all any effect
expected it would be one which would merely bring up the risk of increasing
budgetary cogences for the Member States (Spain, France, the United Kingdom and
Gennany, Petite (I99S,
„ demonstrates the logic of this^ „y^^^
-when the Commission outlined its expectations of the conference, i, was in effect
setting its sights on the upper range of what it considered realistic. It hoped thereby to
g.ve an ambitious cast to the negotiations, focusing on the principa,
,hemes tha, wouid
come up: the citizen’s Europe, Europe’s identity „„ the international stage and the state
of the institutions in a Europe scheduled to undergo significant enlargement.”
The intergovernmental conference was formally convened on March 29, 1996 in
Turin. This extraordinary European Council meeting was intended as a clear
manifestation of a common will to give the IGC top political priority.
3
” |„ its
Presidency Conclusion the Italian government summarized the consensus among the
Member States when it pointed out that a mandate for the IGC has been continued and
that the IGC should be concluded in about one year.
380
Negotiations for the IGC took place at two levels: The first, the socall “personal
representatives” of the Foreign Ministers were the main negotiators. This group met on
average one and a halfdays per week. The second level on which negotiations took place
was the level of the General Affairs Ministers. Meetings here took place about once
See Agence Europe (March 29, 1996, 2).
380
See European Council, 1996a.
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ee
every month. During the course of the Italian Presidency th. f •Y’ le foreign ministers met thr
times and thirteen meetings of their appointed representatives took p|ace ,8,
in the end. the Italian Presidency drafted a progress repod which lt submitted
- Florence European Councii of dune 22 and 23, 199,» The main contribution
"ke 'y ‘° ^ UPO"' Pr°Vided ,hM lhe competences in this area remain with
the Member States,
,2) empioymen, levels win no, be used as a convergence cnteria for
the EMU, and
,3, no budgetary consequences couid be expected from the new treaty
provisions. The difficult task of working out the details of such a chapter, however,
remained ahead.
More significant than the report submitted to the Florence European Council were
the conclusions of the Council. Here the Member States agreed that the analysis of the
issues was sufficiently advanced and that the “Conference can turn now seeking
balanced solutions to the main political issues raised." The conclusion also stated that the
meeting in Dublin in December 1996 is expected to “mark decisive progress” towards
in o T o" had aPP°mted either the country’s Permanent RepresentativeBrussels or the State Secretary or Minister for European Affairs. Thus about half ofe group members already knew each other quite well since they had also been
representattves ,n the Reflection Group. New to this group were the following members-Philippe de Schouteete de Teiwarent (Belgium), Antti Satuli (Finland) Yamios
amdiotis (Greece), Noel Don- (Ireland), Jean-Jacques Kasel (Luxembourg), Fransisco
Km»lt\ |
K1
‘\|f
’°'r
Uf l1 ’ J?,V 'er E '0rZa Cavengt (S l’am) - Stephen Wall (Unitedingdom). Foi this list see The European (April 4-10, 1996).
382
"
Italian Presidency, 1996b.
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completing the Conference by mid- 1997. Most importantly, this gave the Irish
I out
I rcal.es” be prepared by the Irish Presidency for the
Presidency its mandate by asking that “a gene,,„ for , ^
Dublin meeting.
5-2. 6. 3 Irish Presidency
Jl"y 1996 ,h° r0 'a,inS Presid“^ °f«* Council passed into the hands of ,he
" iSh g0Vemmem
' ^ ° , ,hC“ towards the ,GC, the Irish government se,
up a cross-departmental Coordination Committee under the chairmanship of Gay
Mitchell, Munster of European Affairs. The members of this Committee consisted of all
departments of State and the Permanent Representative in Brussels. Identified as the
mastermind behind the tactics and the structuring of the Irish Presidency’s agenda for the
KiC is Noel Dorr, a former diplomat who was brought back from retirement, together
With Bobby McDonagh, who previously worked for the European Commission as the
Chef d’ Unite of Padraig Flynn in the DG Employment and Social Affairs.
3
" The Irish
presidency programme, presented to the European Parliament revealed besides the goals
summed up in the catch phrase “secure jobs, secure peace, safer streets and sound money,
that the handling of the IGC in an efficient way as a top priority.
38
" As pointed out by
McDonagh ( 1 998, 7
1 ) the objective of the Irish Presidency “was to gel cvety Member
383
This piece of information was provided by Barbara Nohlen in a personal interview on
rebruary 27, 2001.
384
1 his phrase was used by John Bruton, then Prime Minister of Ireland as well as
lesident ol the European Council, during the meeting in Dublin, December 1996.
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State in December to endorse an ending package as a basjs for^^ ^
strategy of the Irish Presidency was captured nicely by Noel
end of realism,” by which he meant
the government.
Doit’s phrase of “the upper
a maximalist interpretation of the mandate given to
Three broad phases can be distinguished under the Irish Presidency, in a process
described by Noel Dorr, the Irish chairman of the IOC Representalive Group as involving
successive Each phase would make i, possible to take one further step in
developing an approach which would approximate more closely to wha, might be the
ultimate basis for agreement.
m the firs, phase, from July to September 1996 the Presidency tabled introductory
notes for discussion. These notes took account of the discussions in the Reflection Group
or under the Italian Presidency and were distributed to the member states before each
meeting. The notes consisted of a few pages introducing the proposals and pointing
towards issues for discussion or possible alternative options.
On July 5-1996 the Secretariat of the Council submitted a draft proposal for the
employment chapter to the Irish Presidency. This proposal was largely characterized by
an intergovernmental^ approach to employment policy which left most of the decision-
making prerogatives either with the Member States or the European Council. For
instance, article A in the proposed text mentions that “Member States action shall be
aimed at the development of a common strategy for employment.” Conversely, the
Commission had in its earlier proposal made the reference to “Community action”
385
Cited in McDonagh (1998, 75).
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Of the new treaty provision “the establishment of eoordination between national policies’
was favored. In contras, to this, the Commission had earlier advocated
"the
establishment of a common strategy for employment.”
A, the end of this conniet, i, is remarkable to note that the Irish Presidency sided
^ C°mmiSSi0n ’S
i, circulated its Introductory Note on
Employment in which i. by and large kept the original wording of the Commission’s
386
proposed text. For instance the introductory note pointed out that “the Community
shall contribute to a high level of employment by encouraging cooperation between
Member States and by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting
the primary responsibility of the Member States.”’
87
This is the exact same wording as
used by the European Commission. The fact that the Commission was able to prevail in
this phase of the decision-making process over the European Council, can be attributed to
the fact that the Commission’s proposal it appeared to the Presidency as a better
representation of the public's demand. The Irish Presidency perceived the Commission’s
proposal to be closer to what the demand of the public at large would find acceptable.
The articles relating to employment in the Amsterdam Treaty should be read by the
public as a strong collective commitment on the part of the Member States to work
towards a reduction of unemployment. The Presidency fell that this message was better
achieved with the proposal of the Commission than with the proposal of the Council.
386
,
.
Irish Presidency 1996a.
387
quoted in McDonagh (1998, 87)
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"•he words of McDonagh (1998
, 85) the mam challenge for^^ ^
-on hy .he Union on enrptoyment.” This was necessary
,o address concerns no, „„ly
of ,he delega.ions, bu, more nnpo,dandy of
.he pnbiic demand for such aeon in „,e
different Member Sra.es. On the other hand, toe Presidency’s proposal would have ,o
accommodate dre opposition or relicence of other delega.ions sufficiently
,o make it
possible for discuss,on ,o begin ,o focus on toe con.en, radrer than merely on toe
principle of .he diaft text. By and large lire Irish Presidency considered the proposal of
.he Commission to be able achieve this twofold goal.
In a nutshell, this proposed approach by the Commission and now as well by toe
Presidency contained the Mowing principtes: (I) the establishment of a high level of
employment as an objective of the European Union (2) a brief definition of the respective
roles of Member States and of the Union in relation to employment policy, (3, the
establishment a, the level of the Treaty of a detailed procedure to ensure an appropriate
degree of coordination a, European level
,4) provision for the possibility of the adoption
ot ’incentive” measures in the employment area, and(5) the establishment of an
Employment Committee to promote the coordination of employment and labor market
policies.
The ICC Representatives' reacted to the Presidency’s Introductory Note during
tlteir meeting on July 16/17. While the broad majority of delega.ions welcomed the text,
the reluctant minority maintained their positions of principle. Nevertheless, for the firs,
time, the reluctant minority did not reject the text out of hand and, in the words of
274
McDonagh (199S, 36) “while foTOaIly reiterating and^^^
principle, began to address the points of detail and t0 dabble in^ „
To have found most of its element of i,s proposaIs adopted by
,he^
Presidency, rhe Commission a, this point deeded „0, submi, a foima| proposa
, bw
instead to let the Irish Pudency conclude its tenp and^ see^
specifically had been reached in the end. Overall, the strategy of the Conxion shifted
a. this point front keep ,ng the momentum behind employment initiatives to presetv,
„
g ,he
consensus among the Member States. Most imporiantly, the goal here was to ensure tha,
.he hey ideas and procedures were continued to be a„ the draft treaty version and the
end would be included in the final treaty.
During the second stage of negotiation, from September to November 1996, the
proposals were nanowed down even further and were now presented under the heading
of “suggested approach.” In the area of employment, the Presidency submitted its
suggested paper on September 1 7, 1 996 with the intention that i, could be discussed a, the
meeting of the Personal Representatives on September 23-24.
3
“
In this phase the Irish
Presidency made two important decisions: First, i, decided that there should be five main
• icq
sections of the Amsterdam Draft treaty.
'
' Second it reached the decision, that the
employment chapter should be considered to be part of the section on "the Union and the
Citizen.” Additionally it deliberated if the proposed goal of the Union should be full
388
Irish Presidency 1996b.
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These five sections were: I An Area of Freedom, Security and Justice; II The Union
and the Citizen, III An Effective and Coherent Foreign Policy; IV The Union’s
Institutions; and V Enhanced Cooperation - “Flexibility”
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employment or highest possible employment or high employment. Additionally, the
s addressed whe.e in the treaty the new provisions on employment should be
mcorporated. Simultaneously, in order maintain the delicately hlanced support for the
employment chapter amo„g the Member States, the Irish Presidency emphasized tha, the
primary competence of Member States in the matter of employment should be
acknowledged more clearly and tha, the consistency of employment pohcy with the broad
guidelines of economic policy should be ensured.
Finally, in November and December 1996 the draft treaty was prepared for the
Dublin European Council. This was done essentially a, a four-day drafttng session of the
Presidency in Ktldare, Ireland, with the help of officials from the Council Secretariat as
well as the European Commission. "" The firs, words of the Explanatoty Memorandum
accompanying the ,rish Presidency’s Outline Draft Treaty were: "The European Union
belongs to its citizens. The Treaties establishing the Union should address their most
,. 391
direct concerns.”
The draft treaty was finally presented for discussion at the Dublin summit on
December 13 and 14, 1996. The delegations received the 140 page long Outline Draft
Treaty on December S", just a day before the Conclave meeting of the Foreign Ministers.
390
Present on the Irish Presidency side were: Noel Doit, Bobby McDonagh; from theCounc,
.Secretariat persenl were Jurgen Trumpf (Secretary General) his chef de cabinetEchart Cuntz, Jaques Keller-Noellet and Giorgio Maga,J: from the present were Carlo
Trojan (then Deputy Secretary General) and Jim Cloos (chef de cabinet of PresidentSanter). For this list see McDonagh (1998, 105).
391
Quoted in McDonagh (1998, 94).
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As commented by McDonagh (1998, .29, "virtually all Foreign Ministers warmly
welcomed the text.- And while the British delegation was stil, voicing resections about
.he provisos pertaining the employment policy and other areas, i, accepted the
overall presentation as fair.
5-2-6.4 The Dutch Presidency
The principal challenge of concluding the IGC was passed into the hands of the
Dutch government on January I, ,997. In the Presidency memorandum presented in
January the government pointed out three top priorities- the irr • ,P , IOC, preparations for EMU
and preparation for enlargement. ' Being of immediate concern, concluding the IGC
eventually became the overriding goal. The deadline for the conclusion of the conference
in mid- 1997 had been set at the Florence European Council of June 21 and 22. 1996.
M4
The challenge now was to move from general acceptance of the Outline Draft Treaty
unanimous and definitive agreement on treaty amendments. To a considerable extent, the
Dutch Presidency relied on the draft treaty of the Irish. This was especially the case with
regard to the employment chapter.
As pointed out by several participants of the IGC, the agenda of the Dutch
Presidency’s programme was significantly influenced by the UK general election of May
Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 1996.
393
The Dutch Presidency 1997a
394
European Council 1996b.
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1997, after which only six weeks were left
Minister, Win, Kok used every opportunity
with negotiations with the British
to conclude the IOC. While the Dutch Priline
to stress that he was determined to carry on
government regardless of the scheduled general
395
impact of this event on the negotiation process could clearly be discerned.
For instance, the Social Affairs Attache from the Netherlands, Paul van Leuwe mentioned
a" m,erVieW tha' thC Dl',C '’ dde8ati°"™ siting for the British election to conclude
UMi ' tHS eVen
'' "°~
-Mch deal, with the issue of employment.
Accord,ngly, the Dutch Pres.dency can broadly be d,v,ded into two phases: one
between Januaty and M.d-May, wh.ch preceded the UK election, and one between the
second half of May and June. In the firs, phase, the Dutch government used the tactic of
increasing the intensity of negotiations in order to pu, delegations under pressure. As
part of this effort the Presidency held an informal meeting of the chief negotiators on !«.
17 May where it presented a compilation of texts resembling a draft treaty. To avoid
giving i, the official appearance of a draft proposal the Presidency presented it as a non-
396
papei. It is remarkable that the issue of employment is not mentioned in this draft
proposal.
In the second phase, after the British election was concluded, real negations were
finally possible. As pointed out by Phillipe de Schoulheete de Tervarent, Belgian
diplomat to the European Union 1987
-1997, the work done during previous Presidencies
395
Foi a
Q
lscussi°n of Kok’s strategy see Agence Europe (January 8, 1997, p. 4)(January 9, 1997, p. 2) and The Irish Times (January 7 and 8, 1997).
For this point see Agence Europe (May 20-21, 1997, 4) and McDonagh (1998, 185).
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was crucal to clear the grounds Without this preliminary work, zealously pursued
by .he Italian, Irish and Dutch presidencies the conference would no, have been
conceded. Bu, on the crucial points, no delegation was prepared to enter into the realm
of tea, concessions and decisions before knowing which British negotiator would si,
around the table in the final phase.””
7
McDonagh (19,8, 183) goes even further when
he potnts ou, that "the British election on 1 May 1997, moved the 1QC across the
Rub,con.” Thus, from now on the Dutch Presidency could aim for finalizing the
negotiations.
The firs, European Union meeting abended by a ministerial level representative of
the new British Government was the meeting of IOC Representatives Btusse.s on 5
and 6 May. The opening presentation by the new British Minister for Europe, Dough
Henderson, was the firs, presentation in Brussels of the new British Governments
approach to Europe since i, had taken office. After Dough Henderson's opening
presentation on 5 May, it was certain that the British government would support the
employment chapter in the Amsterdam treaty as well as some effort of including the
Social Agreement into the main body of the treaty.
To further agreements in these and other areas, the Dutch Presidency scheduled
an extraordinary meeting of the European Council in Noordwijk on May 23.
According to Svensson (2000, 155) the “main reason for holding this meeting was to
397 ^ , •
Cited in Dinan (2001, 20).
398
See Agence Europe (May 24, 1997, 3), and Financial Times (May 26, 1997, 2).
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introduce the new British Prime Minister to the club” AttP f6 Attention centered on Blair as he
set out his vision of Europe and baselines for the IGC.
The week fo,.owi„g the extraordinaty Council raeeting was characterized
„y^deveIopments: on the one hand, the new British government, asked for modification
oHhe employment chapter hoth of whtch would then make i, possible for the govemmeM
shouid include a reference to the national practices related to the responsibilities of
management and labour Second, Article (3) should be modified in such a way as
more clearly spel, ou, tha, the competences in the area of employment had to res, with the
Member States.
Additionally, the German government finally tabled a proposal in which i, laid
down its preferences in the area of employment. This proposal included the following
elements: Firs, i, specified tha, the Getman government is opposed to the creation of a
new employment title, bu, mstead would be willing to support merely the creatton of an
employment chapter within an already established title (preferably one dealing with
economic policies). Second, the proposal pointed ou. that there was no need to create a
new Employment Committee. Instead the work envisioned to be done by this new
committee could be carried out within the already established Economic and Policy
Committee and the Committee for Employment and Labour Market. Finally, the
proposal demanded tha. the reference to “incenttve measures” in article (5) should be
399
The Mention behind this clause was to allow for greater flexibility in implementingthe works council directive. For this point see Financial Times (June 5, 1997, 1 ).
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budget will be increased.
The reaction front the delations of the Member States was rather positive
towards the British proposal and the Onto,, government fe„ ,ha, these suggestions could
be easily worked into the new draft treaty
~ contras,, the reactions to the Gennan
pioposal was veiy hostile. The Member Sacs delegations were unwilling accept the
modifications of the Gennan government a, such a ,ate stage in the negotiations. Any
opportune i, W0„,d have had during previous rounds of negotiations, including
ministerial level meetings, i, had deliberately no, used. The immediate reaction of
several delegations was to present counter-proposals.
The Commission a, this stage amended its strategy ,o reflect this latest change in
he constellation of the Member States. The previously strong camp of opposing Member
States consisting of the United Kingdom, France and Gennany by and large had now
melted down only Gennany being the las, hold which was opposing the employment
chapter. France after the British election had already signaled that ,t was willing
,0 ap -ee
on an employment chapter. Furthermore, after the French election a, the beginning „f
June, the new government publicly announced
.ha, i, fully supported the Employment
401
chapter. For the Commission this meant that it needed to start a diversified.
400
.
ror the reaction of the Dutch Presidency
(May 27, 1997, 1 and 4).
on the Gennan position see Financial Times
401
of
“ r°Und f elc Cti0nS WCre held on 25 ’ the second on June 1st The winnerthe election was the Socialist Party which was headed by Lionel Jospin For a chanceon th^position of France with regard employment policy see FinSl Tim"s (£e8
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make SUfe ‘ha ‘ " W°U 'd "0t Cm y i,S °PPOSi, '0n ,0 ,he employment chapter into final
negotiations of the IGC.
Pan of this strategy i„ci „ded on the one hand contKtmg^
such as members in the delegation of the Presidency, Persona, Representatives
Employment and Socia, Affairs Mmtstnes - especially countries which were original,
only mtldly supportive of the employment measures. Members of the Comite des Sages
as well as influential organizations such as the European Parliament, the Economic and
Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, the Group of European Socialists, the
soeta, Partners, and the Commission of the Bishops' Conference of the European Union
countries.
For instance several scholars have pointed ou, that close contacts between the DG
on Employment and Social Affairs and the Group of European Socialists was
instrumental in keeping the consensus on the employment chapter firmly on track.
402
Just before the Amsterdam Summit in 1997, the socialist leaders in Europe met in
Malmo, Sweden, for a four day conference. The theme of the congress was: “A new
Europe and the responsibility of the left.” In its concluding message, the Malmo
conference leaders called for “a strengthening of the draft Employment Title in the Treaty
oi the European Union which encompasses the co-ordination of economic and
. 403
employment policies.” The spirit of the conference was captured quite nicely in the
402 C
instance see Aust 2000 and 2001.
403
Ibid, p. 99
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words ora, Acting congress chain™, Rudoif SCatpmg, of Geralanys Socja
,
Democrats, when he said:
-We socia, democrats now have a lifted majority the
Europe Union. We can no ionger dtstance ourseives from its course. We win shape i,
Additionally, George Fischer, the advisor the Director Genera, of the DG of
Employment and Social Affairs, mentioned a persona, interview on Fehruaiy
, 2001
'one important channe, of fostering suppon for the emp.oymen, chapter was the national
soca, Democratic Parties. Allan Larsson really used this fotum to promote his ideas.”
bother pan of the strategy included the use of eve^ invitation for a talk or a
presentation hy a high ranking representative from the Commission promote the pohcy
proposals of the Commission as well as the final draft treaty proposal by the Dutch
Presidency. Additionally, the Commission together with the European Parliament started
a major public initiative on June 3 and 4, ,997 for which ,, invited representatives from
•he Member States, the Economic and Social Committee, and the Socia, Fanners. The
goal behind this public initiative was to give both more prominence to the issue of
employment on the level of the European Union and simultaneously increase the pressure
on the German government.
On May 28, 1997 the Presidency called for a special meeting of a group of actors
called the “Friends of the Presidency.” This group was chaired by Jaap de Zwaan and
consisted of representatives of each delegation.* The purpose of this meeting was to
tidy-up the remaining elements. In this circle a compromise was found for the recent
404 MDeutsche Presse-Agentur, June 5, 1997.
405
For this detail see McDonagh (1998, 186).
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...
,,,,,
would be sufficiently toned down.
On June 4, ,9,7. the Dutch Prestdency submitted t0 the IGC
Group a linal, consohdated draft treaty in preparatton of the fina
, phase ^
Jnne
.6, AM proposals t0 be finalized
_^^^^ ^ ^^
Prestdency. Emp ,oytnen, policy was subsumed under the section "The Union and its
Citizens und wus discussed first At +1 * «. At this point of the negotiation all delegates fully
agreed on the draft proposal of the Council.- The British proposals were included and
he Gennan de,ega,to„ was willing to concede on the "incentive measures, As pointed
out in a persona, intervtew by Winfned Menrad on Februaty 7. 2001, "Helmut Kohl
wanted the IGC to be a success.” Given the immense public attention to the issue of
408
these measures.
407
408
For this point see Svensson (2000, 160)
See The Irish Times (June 18, 1997.
The same observation was made by Winfried Menrad, a member of the
the Am«
P
H
rliamem
’
W'’°“ diSCUSSed lhe Genmn P“si ‘ion with Helmut Kohl prior to
e“e“r:e W3S 10 n°‘ *« “ the ,as *“ S.a.e '» Oppose the
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5.2.7 Implications for the Decision-Making Process
While the EU ins.iht.ions had no fonnal right t0 panicipa
,e ^^^
,mP““"8 'he diSCUSSi0"S b°'h
- lection Group and in the ,GC in
general.” For instance Sverdrup (2000P U°
’ 256) ai'8Ues that th* “European Commission
devoted significant administrative resources to monitoring and mfiuencing the IGC” it
established a spec, a, task force, headed by Miche, Petite, whtch was given the
member states and “the members of which enjoyed a high level of legitimacy in EU
circles.’’ Along similar fines Lodge has observed that (1998b, 485, the priorities of the
agenda of the IGC “had been detennined in a different context and as pari of the notntal
process of agenda-setting and legislative prioritization in the EU via the work of the
Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.”
The Commission was successful to influence the outcome of the negotiations of
the Amsterdam Treaty because of three interrelated resources that it was capable of
employing: First, the institutional location of the Commission gave i, greater flexibility
and latitude and thereby allowed i, to draw up policy proposals which are capable of
representing latent interests in the Member States. This by and large allowed i, to
problematise the issue of unemployment long before the Member States had found a
consensus among themselves. Additionally, this institutional position allowed the
Commission to draft policy proposals that in effect represent a synthesized compromise
409
Foi this argument for instance see Sverdrup (2000,256).
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* “*
—« s.,a„.
„ ^
these down in order not to nffpnd ti-.Q 1 .offend
.he cluster of countries which were only mildly
supportive of a new employment chapter. Second, the recepttveness of theCounci,
Presidency cruc.ally determines the degree to wh.ch the Commission has an ,„nUenee on
.he outcome of the multilateral negotiations among the Member States. The fact tha, the
Hsh Presidency so heavily relied on the Commission, position demonstrates the
important role played by the Commission in the 1GC. Third, the Commission can utilize
manifested interest organizations as channels to exert pressure onto Member States
add'"0n ‘° ^ a"d~f Commission, several schohrs have
pointed out that the delegates of thp iC'C' . .e IGC were waiting for a joint FrancoGerman position
410
paper. Between the Franco-German Summit in BadetvBaden in 1995 and the
Amsterdam meeting in June 1997, the two countries continually sough, to develop a
paper which could “imprint a political impetus on problems of substance.”
4
" From May
1996 onwards, the French and Gennan governments me, informally eveiy six weeks to
address issues related to European integration and the ICC.
-" 2
As pointed out by
Sverdrup
,2000, 257, “they failed come up with a final join, position paper. [...) The
410
For instance see Devuyst 1998, Lodge (1998b, 490), Menon 1996 Petite ,1998a Tl
41 ;
412
For instance see Agence Europe (June 6, 1996) and (June 13, 1996).
Agence Europe (September 2/3, 1996).
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IGC eXPemnCed“*“
-—— of the HU, Franco>German
—on, tan ,„.o issues related to institutional reform, enU^ent, and fina„cial
" Shar,n8'” A|S°' MCD0"agh 37) P0in,ed out , had no sense of a c|ear
0Vera" FranC<>German“ Wh 'Ch «* has often acted as . ,llotor„ for „K
development of the European Union.”
Thts lack of initiative between France and Gemtany, and ye. the contentiousness
Of the tssue of employment pohcy among the Member States opened the opp„ltu„i,y for
.he Commission to step into the decision-making process and influence i, indirectly both
^ C°0Pera,ing W"h ^
and by „rob,,i2i„g Iatent and manifest
interests for the pohcy proposals i, was putting forward. Through these strategies and
resources the Commission was able influence the policy outcome of the IGC in the
area of employment policy.
5.3 Summary
In sum the period of 1991-1997 can be characterized as a period of contradtctory
elements: on the one hand the Commission changes its policy style and pohcy focus and
subsequently utilizes much less frequently the pohcy tools of decisions or directives.
Thts has correctly been characterized by Kowalsky (1999, 205) as carefully exercised
“legislative restraint" on the part of the Commission. On the other hand, this period is
also characterized by a high level of activism on the part of the Commission. The
Commission issues a large number of recommendations, a series of social action
programmes, and a wealth of reports and studies. The purpose of these studies was to
prepare the agenda for the European Union in such a way that employment pohcy would
287
be included in the early phase of the inr ay s IGC. As pomted out by Cmm (I997
,
,o7., 08rby
member states lo ransom over iheir stated commitment lo Hie social
d,menS,0n
’
"K COmmiSSi0" haS ^ —uy Wide,, its scope of action ,„ „K
-a. po„ey field; ,bese small steps, often imp,emeu,ed via soft iaw
,„visio„s, play a„
important ro,e in establishing institutional no,™ and precedent for ft,tore action i„
socal field." Additionally, the Commission managed to keep the momenta, behind the
^ MembCr Sta,eS
' ,WS COn 'eXt
' «5) has pointed on, tha, "the agenda
was filtered, assessed and expanded by the Commission and then, in preparation for the
1996 IGC
’
by the Special““ a"d— of the current government. [...,
The 1996 IGC was, hke its predecessor, indebted both to the Commission and to its own
appointees in terms of identifying key areas of the agenda.”
Thus, the Commissions' hmited achievements shook, be considered in „gh t 0f the
nature of these constraints of the time. Tins is al, the more so, in view of an important
institutional constrain, tha, the Commission and the DG Employment and Social Affairs
were no, granted a forma, membership of intergovernmental conference. A remarkable
fact is tha, this constrain, did no, prevent the Commission from setting the tone of the
IOC. Despite the ambiguity of its status, the Commissions' draft articles became the
mam basis for a large par, of the Employment Chapter, due to the fact that the Irish
Presidency was willing
,0 incorporate the Commission's proposal into its draft version.
Venturini's assessment of the contribution of the Commission is that the Commission
managed to get 90 percent of what it had worked towards into the final treaty.
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n her analysis of ,he impact of various actors on the outcome of the
Intergovernmental Conference Lodge (I998a 3 s n ,h8 ( 99«a, 351) thus appropnately points out that “i,
must be noted that players are not merely
EU Commission, the Council, the European Parliament
inter-governmental but also supranational. The
and the Council Presidency have
particular roles to play in terms of shaping the initial agenda and deliaing the boundaries
of the constitutional debate.”
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CHAPTER 6
COMMON EXPLANATIONS FOR
THE EMPLOYMENT TITLE
As discussed in chapter 5, the Amsterdam treaty negotiation resulted in an
employment tide. This raises the question why the Member States were interested in
including such a provision. More specifically this chapter aims a, identifying the forces
and factors that help explain the level of interest of the Member States in the
development of the Europe-wide employment measure. For tins purpose tins chapter
will draw on the qualitative comparative methods as developed by Charles Ragin and
appl.ed by many others. This method is particularly usefttl for analyzing the non-
linear,,y of composite factors tha, have had an influence on the level of support of the
Member States.
4 ' 3
The implication of the findings of this study is that the individual level of interest
of the Member States in the area of Europe-wide employment policy can be explained by
simultaneously analyzing the level of public opinion in several dimensions at a time: (1)
the assessment of EU membership, (2) the opposition to a common currency, (3)
413
ITFor a more detailed discussion of the method itself and how
dissertation please see below.
it is applied in this
290
T “ "»— - «> -»- - ,
power.
Th,s chapter is structured into three parts. The n rs, pan presents the exp,ana,ions
provided ,n the literature for the Europe-wide employment tneasures. hr 8e„erai, ,wo sets
01 eXP'anat,0nS^ bC diS,ingUiShed: TIk ^st se, of explanations regards the
Here, the assumption is tha, the reeen, economic development exerted such a strong
p.cssure on Membc, States that governments were interested in developing a mechanism
^ WWCh 'hey C°U,d C°°rdina,e
<•*«• on the European level. Thrs was
caused hy an n,crease in the level of unemployment. The second se, of explanations
maintains that Member States were pressured to add a social and political dimension due
10 a generally more critical public opinion. I lere two factors are identified as particularly
influential: h irst, the increase of the public’s perception tha, membership in the European
Union was “bad" for ones country and exerted such a strong influence on the respective
govern,nent, that the government was ultimately interested in the for Europe-wide
employment measures. Second, the increase in the public's opposition to a common
currency pressured governments to develop Europe
-wide employment measures.
Ihc second part of this chapter derives the following testable hypothesis from
these explanations and then develops a research model by which these can be empirically
tested:
414
The connection between the particular factors that have influenced the level ofin eiest of the Member States in Europe-wide Employment measures and the strategy of
I e C omnussion to facilitate such an agreement, as was described in chapter 5 will bedeveloped in the last chapter of this dissertation.
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) I ^ greater the increase and (he higher the level of
over the past few years, the more s
domestic unemployment
upportive the respective government wa*
wide employment measures.
415
is to I 'm ope -
(2) The greater the
"'crease and the larger the proportion of a Member Stale's
P""iC fe“ tha ‘ US " WIS ^ European integration, the more
supportive a government was Europe-wide employment measures,
<3) Th° 8reater "’C intraS° 2"d the die proportion of a Member State's
public opposed to a common currency, the more
I ‘.m ope
-wide employment measures.
supportive the Member State was to
"tree questions will be addressed in tins section of the dissertation: (A) Was there
so, is it
•i M'ong increase in the level of unemployment between 1991 and 1997? And if
the case that those countries which experienced the strongest increase were more
supportive of Europe-wide employment measures than those countries which did
experience such an increase? (B) Was there a decrease ofpublic support for Europet.an
integration between the years 1991 and 1997? ‘ And if so, can one observe that those
countries, which experienced such a decline, were more supportive of these measures?
(O Comparing the data of 1991 and 1997, has the average of public opposition to the
415
conhZtmrrT",'0'™ “?te 0f,unempl0yment” « unnecessaryontusion in the context ol an analysts that uses the rate of change of this variable thispupei uniformly uses the term “level of unemployment”.
416
99s7hroueh' loo?"' JT? T,™ ",C ?,lasl,id’ 1 1 "^“‘ions and the period from~ n g I ) )1 is selected to capture the full length of the IGC.
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“
'he“*- ‘-eased? And if 10
, were those^
States that encountered such an i„crease more supportive of^
These hypotheses and questions will be examined in a ^dimensional research
design. This means that the influence of one of the three i
dependent variable will be examined
ndependent variables onto the
one at a time. For this purpose, this chapter draws
on data from the Labour Force Survey and Eurobarometer for the years 1991, 1995, ,996
417
and 1997. The findings of this section point to the conclusion that the results of the
empirical analysis are counter-indicative to the hypothesized relationship.
The third section of this chapter, therefore, develops an alternative model which
improves the fit between the suivey data and the actual level of interest of the Member
States as expressed during the intergovernmental Conference 1996/1997. Instead of
assuming that the level of interest of the Member States in Europe
-wide empioymen,
measures were influenced by only one factor of public opinion a, a time, this section of
the chapter analyses the clustering of the countries into distinct groups with a different
level of interest in Europe
-wide employment measures based on the combination of
various factors. These factors are the following: (1) change in the level of
unemployment, (2) level of perception that EU membership is bad, (3) level of opposition
to a common currency, (4) level of perception that EMU will not create more jobs, and
(4, presence of social democratic parties in government. Based on the research methods
of qualitative comparative analysis, this research design allows one to identify two
aspects: First, the particular combination of factors which is common to all Member
Specifically the following Eurobarometer data sets
47.1.
were used: 35.0, 44.0, 45.1, 46.0,
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Stat£S WhiCh Share ,he ~ “ f
employmem measures
Second, the dtfference in the parttcular combination of factor$ across ^^
gi'oups of countries.
6.1 Explanations provided in the Literature
Common to all the arguments put toward in the literature why the employment
chapter was included the Amsterdam treaty is the assumption tha, Member State's
preferences were centra, to this agreement. All of the explanations share an
understanding of the political process in the EU tha, view the Member States as the prime
actors in the decision-making. The difference between these exp.anattons for the Europe-
wide employment measures lies in the changes of the factors that are seen as bemg
behtnd the preferences of the Member States. Generaiiy, the literature assumes tha,
either changes in economic development or political interests behind the preferences of
the Member States were instrumental in bringing about the employment chapter. More
specifically, the explanations for the level of interest of the Member States in the
development of Europe
-wide employment measures can be categorized into two sets of
explanations: ( 1 ) Europe-wide employment policy as a collective solution for a common
economic problem; and (2) Europe-wide employment policy due to the public's negative
418 Th
below The on!S
thiS research design and its aPPbcation is discussed further down
100 bnnm
L
| t
' ve comparative analysis was developed by Ragin (T987, 1994, 1998,
,
-000
> and has been applied to numerous research problems. For instance seeAmenta and Poulsen 1996, Amenta and Halfmann 2000, Berg-Schlosser and Qunter
Hkta wf rie,?^nnT rmrr998 ' C,overdil1 (et l994 > Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999,icks 1994, Goertz 2001, Griffin (et al.) 1991, and Romme 1995.
294
perception of the integration process. The statistics, analysis in this section aims to
,eS‘ if ‘he ,eVe ' °f^ °f
™— ,0 employment pohcy teas
influenced by these two general forces. In the following
of reasoning of both sets of explanations is provided testable hvnF mea, hypothesis are derived from
them and their validity is then evaluated.
section a brief outline of the line
6.1.1 Solution for Common Economic Problem
Economic development and economic interests of Member States have long been
considered to be crucial for the direction and speed with which the European integration
process would proceed. Accounts of this pen, of view can be found in the early wntings
of scholars who studied European integration.“ the tradition of this approach, one se,
of explanations regards the employment policy as a collective solution a common
problem in Europe. Overall this argument can be divided i nto two subcategories,
recent economic development exerted
Several scholars have pointed out that the
such a strong pressure on Member States that governments were interested in developing
a coordinating mechanism of employment targets on the European level in order to lower
419
Additional explanations provided in the literature point to the importance of the
ch^^ i^n cf^^er^'this^hapter here will not include the election in the model. P ’
420
For instance see Haas 1958 and Lindberg 1963.
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,he ‘r reSPeC, 'Ve 'eVelS 0fUnemP '0ym™ collective means.*' For inslance
Roberts and Spn„ger (2001, 44, point on, that ,he e,netgence of employment poIicy a$ .
unemployment in the EU Unemployment has been a problem in Europe since the
1970s. Economic growth was supposed to solve it, bn, when economic recovety i„*
1980s provide only a brief respite, ieaders began searching for other solutions^
Additionally, the Dutch Minis,* of Social Affairs and Employment recently p„i„led out
,ha‘ ",he reaS°n Why ma"y EU States have opted for centra, coordination is
probably do with the oppottuntties that i, affords. Central coordination can ac, as a
platform for recognizing and identifying collective and shared problems and also
collectively looking for solutions.”
423
For this explanation to be correct, one would expect to find a, leas, two aspects to
be correct: Frost, the level of unemployment has increased dramatically in the Member
States before the Intergovernmental Conference took place. Second, those countries,
which experienced the highest increase of unemployment were more suppose of
Europe
-wide employment measures.
421
see BiffI (2000, 63) and Lesch (2000, 9).
422
Kenner zdl'
1“ explanat
'on of lhe employment chapter see Aust (2000a, 270) and
Vaubei 0998,' 6)
“
Cn"qUe ° f 'his argllmem from a" economic point of view see
423
Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, (2000, 206).
296
6.1.2 Response
,o Public's Perception o, integration Process
PUbliC SUPP°" f0r ,,K^ 6- been e„ns idered t0 be cruda
,
>or the integration process. A number of scholar have emphasis the importa„ce of
puhite opinion for the specific development of European integration. According to
Anderson and Kaithenthaier, ..Eur„pea„ integration pushed forward a, the eiite ievei
cannot progress without pubiic suppon. (...) A deepening or widening of the Union
requires the active tolerance, understanding and support of mass publics-
Furthermore, Gazzo (.985, „ emphasized the imponance of the poiitica, mood in the
Member States when he po.nted out that “when we try to analyse successes or failures,
dynamism or paralysis, in the process of the union of Europe, we sometimes forge.
doubtless wrongly, that the latter is frequently and severeiy conditioned by events in
internal politics - in fact, in politics as a whole - which are taking place in each of the
Member States."
425
With regard ,o the dnving force behind the poiicy preferences of the
Member McDonagh (1998, 14) points out that “during the Intergovernmental Conference
leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam, each delegation attached central importance to its
public opinion, to ensuring that the Treaty emerging from the negotiations would have
sufficient popular support at home.”
The unique relevance of social policy for the integration process has been
highlighted by several scholars. The main argument in this context is that social
Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996, 179). Also, Ronald Inglehart believes public
Ingbhm 1970.
C°nSlderable ",nUen“ °n ,lK deciSi°nS ,aken by na,ional governments.
425
Quoted in Agence Europe, June 6, 1985.
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piovisions are being utilizer! as a fowl • jg lized a tool in order to foster a greater dem-^i c r gree of acceptance of
the integration process among the citizens and laklabor unions of all ,he different Member
S,tes. For instanee, Hal, 0994, 282
, haspointed ou , ,ha
, ^^
Commission and most member states have seen the development of the social dimension
important vehicle for securing suppon [...] for the single market project and for
enhancing the
-social acceptability- of the consequent economic restructuring. The
Commission presents the social dimension as the
-human face” of the EC”.
42
‘
Also
along similar lines, Majone
, 1996b, 234
,
has ar^ed tha,
-,he development of the
common market is not a goal which would be appropriate for fostering among the
European peoples feelings of loyalty and affinity towards the supranational institutions.
Instead in order to achieve this goal wha, is needed is a social dimension.”
427
Several scholars who have put forward specific explanations for the development
of employment policies on the European Union level also share the presumption that
public opinion exerts an influence on Member States. For instance, the firs, explanation
maintains that Europe-w.de employment measures were largely developed due to the fact
that Member States faced a more critical public opinion in the wake of the “post-
Maas,rich, crisis" and the ending of the “permissive consensus.”
428
As the public
withdrew its quiet acquiescence to European integration and became outspokenly more
LepsmsWT
argUmen,S presented in the Hterature see Koenig, Pechstein, (1995,149),
427
translated from German.
428
or a discussion on the “end of pennissive consensus” see Reif 1993 and Gabel 1998.
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skeptical. Member States were pressured to add a social and political dimension the
European motion project. For instance, Franh Deppe (« a, 2000
, 4) poi„,s ^
m~ trii-s.'
1
in
lte“fU.r0pean 80vernments and their national political
n
increasing opposition within the7ndiv‘i5J‘''“
?,,UU
' ^
IZ2T:™L™ifefn*™“ f-eXg 'corflictbetween the governing and the govm,ed ttooughoTp 8 ”
e individu^“£Z?
,consequences of their domestic policies of ““effitVad “Si
governments.”
exerted massive domestic pressure o7,he'
COmPe“,IVe adap,abili|y
Along similar lines, Aus, (2001, II, has argued tha, after the ratification
difficulties of the Maastricht treaty "i, was generally accepted tha, European integrat.on
was trapped in a crisis of legitimation (the „Pos,
-Maas,rich, crisis") [...]; ,his crisis was
active and visible way to the fight against unemployment and social disintegration. [.
..]
Thus, the issue of unemployment moved up the agenda of the European Union and
became one of the main issues. "" Thus, according to this perspective, governments
can no longer afford to exclude employment policy from the European agenda. In fact,
the area of employment policy is utilized as a tool by which Member States hope to
generate public support for European integration.
430
429
The same argument is repeated in
430
For this perspective also see Aust
and Tidow (1999, 70).
Aust (2000b, 17).
(1997, 753), Deppe 2001, Deppe and Felder 1993,
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.......<M„
_>im __
— ** »
- 1*.W
the common currency
4
'
For inctan^instance according to Dieter Duwendag,
One important reason for the development of thp - ,
initiatives in the Amsterdam t , ,
le emP*oyment
opposition of the public towardTthe EMU*
Stl’°ng
11
mot vated to propose employment measures during the
nakc EMU p" bli^
public that ttnemployment^aTfa^fro^j^J^^'^f
^
mest ’c
that unemployment might be reduced with the inidu^of^mrnon currency, the governments were hoping to reduce the
public skepticism towards EMU.”
Per this explanation he codec., one would expect to find a, leas, four aspects to
he codec: First, the public's perception that membership the European Unton was
“had" dramatically increased in the Member States before the Intergovernmental
Conference took place. Second, those countries, which experienced the highest increase
were more suppose of Europe-wide employment measures. Thud, level of public
opposition ,0 a common cadency has increased dramatically in the Member States.
Foudh, those countries, which experienced the highest increase of such a perception were
more suppodive of Europe-wide employment measures. Also these four aspects will be
evaluated further down below.
Among several for instance see Sciarra 1999 and (2000, 211).
432
ry
7 ^7?
U
°a^
1S/ translation of original Germantext. Duwendag, (1996.
). Also for a similar view see Ekengren and Jacobsson (2000, 5).
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6.2 Research Design and Data: Three separate Factors
°' der ‘° mVeS,i8a,e
,h“e— relationships, Labor Force Survey
Statistics for the years ,99. through
.997 and Eurobarometer data sets for the years
.99,
ough 1997 were analyzed. For testing the argument that Europe-wide employment
change ,n the level of unemp.oymen, between ,99, and ,997 was calculated. Then the
average
.eve, of unemp.oymen, across the years
.995 through
.99b was used to ca.cu.a,
the Spearman, rank come,a,ion coefficient in order to estimate the re.ationship between
changes of the
.eve. of unemp.oymen, and the level of interest of the Member States as
expressed during the negotiations of the Intergovernmental Conference
, 996/97 in regard
to Europe-wide employment measures.
433
To test the arguments pertaining to public, negative perception of the integration
process, several questions were selected from the Eurobarometer which fulfil,
,he
following criteria: they by and large had the same wording across the years. Also, one se,
of questions was asked before Maastricht I (1991, and the other was asked jus. prior to
‘he AmSterdam neg0,ia,ions
< 1997 >-
J,J
Then the change in each variable between 1991
to 1997 was calculated. Again, based on an average of the responses across the years, the
433
This timeframe was selected in order to capture the nhase nf thp trr 1 . ,•
positions were developed, expressed and amended. Thetc
the employment chapter was finalized at the end of 1996.
434
47 /
Co™mission of European Communities, Eurobarometer 35, 43.1 44 45 1 46 and.1. Commission of the European Communities, 1997.
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Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient
level of public pressure for each
interest of Member States.
was used to estimate the relationship between
variable in between 1995 through 1996 and the level of
6.2.1 The Dependent Variable
The positions derived in this way
assessment of the positions of the Member States as
on interviews with the Social Affairs Attaches
The level of interest of the Member States in Europe-wtde employment measures
the Presidencies of the Council as well as summaries cf these position papers by the
European Commission and the European Parliament,
are then cross-checked with the
discussed in the literature as well as based
of the Member States
.
435
Table A.2in the appendix, lists the different demands each government made
dunng the negotiations of the ICC with regard to the employment chapter. As discussed
in chapter 5, the employment policy during the IGC was characterized by five issue
areas: (1) whether or no. there should be a separate employment title, or if an
employment chapter within an already existing title would be sufficient.
,2) wha, kind of
objective the employment title or chapter should be given, (3) which procedures should
be created to implement these objectives; (4) whether or no, there should be a separate
435
Weiderfelfi^s IrT?' P,°S,iti0nS of lhe Member Stale see ™ow (1998, 6)w aen eld 1998, Joop and Schmuck 1996, and Goetschy 1999.
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Employment Committee which could possibly
Ihese procedures; (5) whether or no, additional
oversee the proper implementation of
incentive measures would be needed.
6.2.1. 1 High level of Support
The firs, group of countries had a high level of interest in Europe-wide
employment measures and consisted of Sweden, Austna, Denmark and Belgium “ The
governments in this gmoup demanded tha, employment policy on the Community level
Should move considerably beyond the level of agreement reached a, the Essen cone, us,on
94. While Essen with its mult,
-annual review process, its policy goals in the five
issue areas and the monitoring procedure was considered to be an important beginning
governments in this firs, group of countries a^eed tha, more efforis on the Community
level were needed. One of the criteria tha, was seen as lacking in the Essen conclusion
was that the Essen conclusion did no, establish employment policy as a separate policy
field. With the progress of integration in the area of economic and monetary policy,
employment policy was ever more a, risk to become subsumed under the overall efforts
of economic policy. In order to avoid such a development, this group of countries argued
that a treaty basis for a separate employment policy would be able to provide a counter
balance to the detailed treaty provisions in the area of economic policy. Thus, for this
436
Heinisch loOE^or'ln
U
|
SS '°n ° f ^stria and the government’s position during the IGC see,ms .001 for Belgium see P.jpers and Vanhoonacker 1997; for Sweden andD nmark see Petersen 1997; for Sweden see Anderson 2001, Lightfoo, 1997 for adiscussion on Denmark see Eliason 2001. ^ , 01
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"OUP " ,hC dCTel0P™“ ^ for employment,
_ .
paramount demand.
Furthermore, this group of counties demanded that a new treaty artlde shou,d
SPeCify " 8031 " “M
objective of the Community hr thls
context, the governments In this group ofcountr.es behoved that the corn,, should
comm,, itself to more tangible employment targets than have so far been agreed on. For
mstanee Austria, demanded specific achievement targets for each Member State the
area of employment policy.
Additionally, this group of countnes was in favor of addtng control mechanisms
.0 the procedure of achieving these employ™, objectives. For mstance again
,h,s
context, Austria demanded sanction mechanisms parallel to those in place for EMU (art
104c).
With regard to the Employment Committee, all governments in this group of
countries were in favor of a separate committee. Tins committee was expected to be
structured in a similar way as the Monetaty Committee and in fact was seen as a
institutional competition to the author,, ies of the Monetary Committee in the areas
Which its competences overlapped. Tins area of overlapping competences was
particularly relevant in the preparation of the employmett guidelines. In this activity the
government of this group of countries strongly felt, that the employment guidelines
should be written by a newly created Employment Committee and not, as was to case so
far, by the Monetaty Committee. Finally, all the governments in this group of countries
were in favor of incentives measures.
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6.2.1.2 Medium level of Support
The second group of c„untries Hod a medium level of interest in Hurope-wide
employment measures and consists of Greece, Fin, and, ,re,and, Portugal,
„a,y ,
Luxembourg, Spain and the Netheriands Common to ,He second group of countries
ere the follow,ng characteristics: Wh„e a„ governments in this group of countries were
more or ,ess agreeable to Europe-w,de employment measures, these measures were
preferred no, go beyond the of agreement reached in the Essen conclusion. A ls0 a
number of countries in this group pointed on, that such an employment tide, if i, wou.d
be agreed on, should no, be linked up with the convergence cnteria of EMU.
particular Italy, Spain and Portugal were very concerned about this issue.
Furthermore, the objective of the employment title preferred by this group of
countries was merely the achievement of a
-high level of employment." The
governments in this group beheved tha, such a commitment on the Community leve, wi„
be sufficient.
With regards to the development of procedures for the achievement of the
employment goals, the governments in this group of countries by and large fel, that the
Essen procedures will be sufficient. I„ fact, several governments in this group pointed
out that the employment guidelines should no, be adopted by merely by qualified
majority vote and that these guidelines should no, represent a shift of competences from
437
For a general discussion on Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain as well as a generaldiscussion of these Member States during the IGC see Tsakatoyannis 1997 For a
‘
KaTer 2001^ w fiT* ^ Zahariadi* Portugal «d Spain see Roy andnne 2001, foi Italy see Guiliam, Piattom 2001; for Ireland see Finnegan 200 1 . Y
305
the Member States
.he European Union. Addi.i„„aljy
,
of countries were by and large agreeable lo the
the
well as to the development of additional i
governments in this group
creation of an Employment Committee as
ncentive measures.
6.2.1. 3 Low level of Support
The third group of countries had a low level of interest in Europe
-wide
employment measures and consists of France, the United Kingdom and Gennany
«
common to the thtrd group of countries are the following characteristics: by and large a„
governments this group of countries were either merely agreeable to an employment
Mle or were outright opposed to it. Especially the United Kingdom and Gennany
strongly believed that there was no need for a separate employment title and if
employment should be mentioned at nil in tiaonentt at all in the new treaty it could be included as a few
paiagiaphs within the title of economic policy.
Along similar lines, this group of countries also believed that if employment goals
should be included in the meaty, these goals no. become to specified, but instead should
remain on the general level.
Furthermore, the governments in this group of countries believed that the Essen
conclusions provide a sufficient structure to pursue these general goals in the area of
438
r?For a general discussion cf the British
2001, George 1997, Rasmussen 2001. For
Lankowski 2001.
position as well as during the IGC see Duff
a general discussion of Germany see
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employment. Therefore no further procedures of achieving
needed.
employment goals were
Also, on the employment committee, the governments in this group „f countries
incentive measures were no, acceptable. Especiaily the Gennan government most
strongly opposed such measures. It perceived these measures as a way by whtch the
Community would be able to increase its budge, in an unnecessary way.
6.2.2 The Independent Variables
The explanatory variables are const™,ed with the objective of examining the
three explanations given for the level of interest of the Member States in Europe
-wide
employment measures. The firs, d,mansion tests if the changes in the aggregate national
level of unemployment influenced the level of interest of the respective Member
439
States.
The second dimension tests if the level of public support for European integratton
influenced the level of interest of the Member States. Here, public support is taken to
mean support for ones county’s membership in the European Union
"0
For this putpose
439
440
Data sets used are: Labor Force Survey for 1991, 1995, 1996 and 1997
In thellterature such kind of support is labeled “utilitarian support.” For a discussion
H P
a
nom
UPPOrlSeeGabel 1998, N.edermeyer and Westle 1995 Inglehart Rab eand Reif 1991, Hewstone
.986, Handley, 1981. It should be noted thaStmc^ is
and.
6
Scheingold°i 970.^
1%5^^ ™S diStmCti°n W3S ad°Pted * Lindber8
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the following question was selected:
country’s membership of the EU is ‘
( 1 ) “Generally speaking, do yon think that y„„r
3 8°°d thin8 ’’ ‘ a bad
‘neither good nor bad
i » 441
or don’t know’?”
71,6 ,hl 'd dimenSi0n leStS
' f there is a between pnbhc opposition a
common cun-ency and the level of interest of the Member States, the guestton selected
asked respondents if they were “for or “against” the EU having one European eutzency i
all Member States.
^
6.2.3 The Model
The model developed in this section of the dissertation aims at testing the
hypotheses presented in the hterature. For this putpose, the congntence procedure wiU be
utilized to determine the ft, between the hypothesized
.eve, of tnteres, and the actual level
of interest of the Member States in Europe-wide employment measures.
In a nutshell, the congruence procedure proceeds through the following steps:
First, the value of each independent variable for each cluster or countries is measured.
441
“don’t u
que
?i0n was ra
COded by combi"i"g the dimensions “neither good nor bad” and
-£: .0 three dLus^oS”
442
For this purpose the following question was selected: “Some people believe thatSIS H0 Hld be ,decidfd by the (nationa» government, while other areasP y ild be decided jointly within the European Community. Which of thefollowing areas of policy do you think should be decided by the (national) government
anil which should be decided jointly in within the European Community? Currency ( 1
)
Should be decided by the national government. (2) should be decided jointly with theEuropean Community, (3) don’t know.
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eCMd fr0m
‘he Va 'Ue ° f e“h '"d“‘ a hypothesized ieve, of
.otetes, is
J
nVe4 Th
' S
,W0,heSiZed iS
-
-
-— ,ve, of tntetes,
" e‘WeenthehyP0(heSeSand,heda
*a- *n^ words of George and Bennett (1997 29)“ "’' S Pr0“SS by
—•-- •~ sho,d stat, wi,h the f0„0Wlng
‘
'
’
questions:
The following model is a representation of the hypothesized relationship:
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6.2.4 Statistical Results and Evaluation
6.2.4.1 Solution for Common Problem
6.2.4.1.1 Changes in Level of Unemployment
With regard to the question if there was a strong increase in the level of
unemployment between the years 199. and
,997. the resuhs in figure (7) clearly show
ha. such an increase can be obseived. in total unemployment has increased by 2.4
percent in the European Union. When analyzing more closely which countries
experienced the strongest percentage mcrease, the following can be identified: Sweden
(6.8), Finland (6), and Spain
,4.4), Belgian, (2.8, and Gennany
,2.2). „ should be noted
.ha. , re,and (-5), Denmark (-2.8), the United Kingdom (-,.8) and the Netherlands (-0.6)
are the only countries in which the level of unemployment decreased between 1991 and
1997.
While a strong change in the level of unemployment can surely be observed over
the years, however, this set of data does not suggest that this shift would have influenced
.he level of interest of the Member States for the development of Europe-wide
employment measures in a consistent pattern. Aceording to the hypothesis one would
have expected to find the countries with the highest levels of unemployment to also
belong to the group of countries that most strongly supported Europe-wide employment
measures. While this is certainly true for Sweden, however, Austria provides a counter-
example. With 1 percent increase of unemployment Austria has the following
characteristics: it had the lowest increase of unemployment, yet at the same time it
belonged to the group of countries that most strongly supported the employment
310
observation can be made for Ireland and the Netherlands While
^ countries had a decrease ofuneven., that is t0 say
. negatiye^ rf
unemployment, they belonged the
.roup of countnes tha, had a medtum leve, of
support for the employment measures. According the hypothesized relationship, one
would have expected to find them belong to the group of countnes that had a low ,eve,
of support for the employment measures.
Increase of Unemployment and EU-wide Employment
( 1991 , 1997 )
Measures,
Figure (7) Increase of Unemployment and EU-wide Employment MeasuresSource. Labour Force Survey 1991 and 1997
The same observation can also be made as a result of measuring the degree of
association. The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient for this data set is merely -
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0.50. This figure indicates that there
this analysis suggest that there
1S 3 Weak ne§ative association. The results of
is no consistent pattern between an increase of
unemp!oyment and the We, of tnteres, of the Member States i„ regard t0
employment policy. Thus, the opinion expressed in the literature tha, the increasing level
of unemployment would have influenced the Member Stares their level of interest in
Europe
-wide employment measures, cannot be said to be unambiguously true for all
countries.
6.2 4.2 Response to Public's Perception of Integration Process
6.2.4.2.1 Perception that EU Membership is “bad”
In regard to the question if there was an increase in the public's perception tha,
membership in the European Union was “bad” for ones country between the years 1991
and
.997, the results show rha, such a decrease can clearly be observed. When looktng a,
the question if EU membership was “bad” for one's country a considerable increase can
443
many°^^rous 2000^smburg°andVoung^lT94,^^h and GibbonT^^^
6
^^
Blacf 993 mr' ATT^ ^Syr°US (2°°0 ' 1 59) ' For a simiiar Perspective seeb 3ck (1 , 137). lso note that the value of the Spearman’s rank correlation
and 1996
ntT Calcu ' a,ed for the avCTa«e level of unemployment across the years 1995
Austria and Finland^ ?"ih“
years woald not have pcnnitted the inclusion of Sweden,ust, land into the analysts of the Eurobarometers. These three countries joined
Eurobarometer
°" J““* '
'
a"d °"'y »- included i„
J
,he
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be observed among the 12 Member States: in 1991 6 ,, nfl
,
. 1 /o ot respondents believed that EU
membership was “bad.” In 1997 th,c ™ u ,lumber had increased to 15 9% Ti-iicu ro.y/o. This represents an
9-8 /o. A similar observation can be made when analyzing the answer
categories
“don’t know” and “good.” Between 1#9I and W7 the mimberof^
who fe.t that they did no, know if membership the EU was good for their country
increased by ,5.7% and the nun,her of respondents who behoved that EU integration was
the strongest increase in the response that the EU is “bnd” fi me tu a for one’s country, figure (8)
shows the following countries: Belgium (15) the Uniwi v a8 U ited K*ngdom ( 1 0.9), Germany (9 9)
Denmark (7.2), Spain (6.3), and Portugal (5.4).
Increase of Perception that EU Memberhsip
"bad", (1991, 1997)
good
ffldk
E bad
Figure (8) Increase of Perception that EU Membership is “bad”
source: Eurobarometer 1991 and 1997.
313
WH„e a strong change in tlle perception that EU membersh|p i$ „bad„ cm dear|y
e observed over the years, however, this se, of da, does not sugges
,
need the level of interest of the Member States for the development of Europe-^ emP '0yment 3“— According the hypothesis „„e
.be membership
,he EU was
-bad" for one, counny
,0 belong io the gronP of
countries that most strong,, supped Europe-wide employment measures. While tins
can be satd to be tnre for Denmark, certainly i, is no, true for the Untted Kingdom and
Germany, both of which had even higher increases of such a perception and ye, they
belonged to the group ofcounm.es tha, opposed Europe-wide emp.oymen, measures
Along similar hues. Be,g, urn, Spain and Portugal would have been predated to belong
mto the group of countries that strongly supported the employment measures, according
to the hypothesis. Again, the finding of this analysis does no, confirm this hypothesis.
In fact, if anything, this finding points to the conclusion tha, a reciprocal
connection exists for some Member States: certam.y the United Kmgdorn and Gennany
were the strongest opponents to efforts of creating European-wide employment measures.
Yet, their domestic public had the strongest increase in the perception that EU
membership was
-bad" for their country. Therefore, the positions in the literature, which
maintain that employment policies are utilized by Member States to gain support from
the public for European integration, miss the fact that quite the contrary seems to be the
case, at least for the United Kingdom and Gennany. Pressured by critical public opinion,
these countries seem more likely to avoid increasing the competences of the European
Union.
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made as a
The same observation of a weak to modem* connection can a, so be ntt
reSUl
‘ ° f meaSUrin8
,he^ °f The spearman, rank cone,a,ion
coefficient for this data set is merely 0 50 * This i a-y »- . Thts indicates that there is a, best between
weak to moderate assoc, a, ion between the hypothesized variables.
6.2 4.2.2 Opposition to Common Currency
When analyzing the cross-average of public opposition a common cunency the
following changes can be obse.ed: between ,09 , and ,907 among the ,2 Member
Slates, the percentage of respondents who believed that cunency pohcy should be
deeded by the national government increased by 0.5 percent. As can be seen in figure
<9) ' "’ IS ",CreaSe iS particular
'y strong among the following countries: Portugal (17.4).
Belgium (12.7), the United Kingdom (0.8), Franc (0.7) and Denmark
,8.6).
While a strong change in the perception tha, cunency pohcy should be handled by
Ihe national government can surely be obsetved over the years, however, this se, of data,
does no. suggest tha. this shift would have influenced the level of interest of the Member
States for the development of Europe-wide employment measures in a consistent pattern.
According the hypothesis one would have expected to find the countries with the
highest changes of demand for a national currency to belong to the group of countries
444
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‘ at“ Str0n8
'y WaMed EUroPe 'Wide
-**«—, While this can he said t0be true for Denmark, certainly it is not true for the United Kingdom, Germany and
France, a„ of which had high increases and ye, ,hey he,onged the group
‘ 3 ‘ °PP°Sed EUr°Pe 'Wide emP'°—
—— s 'm i,ar lines, both Porhaga, and
Belgium would have been predicted beiong the group of countries that strong,
supported the emp,oyme„, measures, according to the hyPo,hesis one finds in the
'"eratUre
- Agam
' ^ °f 'his ana lysis does no, eonfinn this hyPo«hesis.
Increase in Opposition to Common Currency and EU-wide Empioymen,Measures,
(1991 , 1997 )
y nt
MttsuLsomcvEurob™Tmxer TOl“3°w”*"'
5'^ EU'W 'de EmPlo>™m
The same observation can also be made as a result of measuring the degree of
association. If any association can be said to exist, it is a vety weak negative one, since
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SPeanMn ' S "* C°TO,a,i0n <*
- set is merely ,,,- G ,ve„
this observation it appears that the fourth hypothesi
cannot be validated on the basis of this data.
s presented in the literature also
6.2.5 Discussion
The findings of this empirical analysis suggest that those factors identified in the
literature as having had an tnfluenee on the Member States’ ,eve, of interest for the
development of Europe-wide employment measures cannot be substantiated by the data
When tested empirically, none of ,he si„g,e explanafions seem to be we„ enough
equipped ,0 account for the particular level of interest of the Member States. For
instance, there appears to be no connection between the changes in the level of
unemployment and the level of interest of the Member States in Europe-wide
employment measures.
A similar conclusion can be made when analyzing the strength with which the
public in all Member States believed that EU membership was '-bad'' for one’s country.
The level of the public’s support for EU membership did no. lead to a consistent pattern
that would be helpful in predicting the level of interest of the Member States. In fact, on
the contrary, the relationship overall was seen to have a negative association.
And, also for the opposition to a common currency, again no consistent pattern
can be discerned in the data. Additionally, also here a reciprocal connection exists
445
rpsnnnc f
pea™an ’ s rank correlation coefficient is calculated for the average of thee po ses in the answer category “national” across the years 1995 and 1996
.
317
between the level of opposition and the level of interest of the
wide employment measures.
Member States for Europe-
6.3 Research Design and Data: Composite Factors
Tbe empirical findings 0f the prevtous section lead to the suggestion that the way
pubhc opinion influences the level of interest of Member States is more complex and
multifaceted, instead of assuming
,ha, the level of
.merest of the Member States in
Europe
-wide employment measures was influenced by only one dimension of public
opinton at a time, i, might maite more sense to anticipate that the specific combination of
.be different dimensions couid have had an impact on the level of interest of the Member
States.
This section of the dissertation argues that in order to gain a deeper understanding
of the factors which influenced the Member States in their particular ievel of interest for
Europe
-wide employment measures a multidimensional research design is required.
Such a design is best constructed with the objective of analyzing the particular
combination of factors that can be said to have had an impact on the outcome. For this
puipose, this dissertation utilizes the Qualitative Comparative Approach (QCA) as
developed by Charles Ragin. This causal comparative methodology utilizes Boolean
algebra to formalize two aspects of Mill’s inductive logic of inquiry: the method of
agreement and the method of difference
Both Boolean algebra and Mill’s inductive
detail further down below.
logic of inquiry are discussed in greater
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Two strengths are pariicularly WOrih mentioning^ the QCA: ^^
aPPhed by 0CA a"°W °ne
‘° ~ cases, whfle a, the same time
,he nC" de ‘a " S ° f eaCh Case remai
" J a dear struck of comparison
Second, and more importantly for ,he research cues,ion of this dissertation, QCA attends
10 ‘he C°mbina,i0n °f C0"di *i0
- «* sense
’ OCA’s ability to capture the
combinationa,
,ogic of explanations mahes it capable of graspi„g the heteroge„eity of the
factors tha, influenced the Member States in their panic,,,ar level of interest for Europe-
wide employment measures This pnttiic n itire , hi entads a closer exam,nation of the factors that are
identified as present as well as the factors that are being
facto- becomes analyzable in the context of all other factors both present as well as
absent.
seen as absent. Therefore, each
6.3.1 The Truth Tablet Cases, Dependent and Independent Variables
The analysis of QCA proceeds by first building a truth table. The truth table for
this data se, is shown in table A. 1 in the appendix.
447
The rows of this table contain 15
cases. Each case represents one of the 15 Member States of the European Union. The
various independent variables fonn the columns and the dependent variable is listed in
447
milar definition and use of truth tables see Greue 1998 iqoo d r
and Ragin ( 1 987, 87).
g8 ’ KdtZ 1 992
’
Rafiquzzaman 2000,
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the last COlUmn
' Parallel to *he analysis of the previous section the H aF on, dependent variable is
C ' US,er °f“ *~ * - Europe-wide etnpioytnen,
.onr content anaiysis and cross-cheched hy seconds,
,iterate: high suppotf, tnediun,
hare the aim is to gain a better understanding of the patficular factors tha, have innuenced
tHe 'eVd ° f imereS ‘ °f ",e Member S 'ates in E“r
“P0 -ide employment measures The
only difference now is tha, the research destgn a,lows for the examination of the
particular combination of factors that had an impact on the outcome.
The independent vartahles used in the analysts ,n the previous section are again
used here. addition to the previously analyzed answer category of each variable, the
complementary answer categories is also included. For instance in the previous analysis
Of the perception of EU membership only the answer categoty ••bad” was used. this
section now, in addition
-bad" the answer categories “good" is used.
44
*
Additionally,
a variable has been added to capture the public's perception of the impact of EMU on job
449
creatton. Furthermore, a variable was added to analyze if there is a connection
448
The same logic is applied to the variable on common currency In addition to theanswer category “jointly”, also the answer category “national” is included Alom tllines of this approach also the assessment of EU membership is dealt with in the
§ *
way. In addition ,0 the answer categoty “good" the categty’ WistacluSed
Inswer rafe^y'-Ld”
WCrTT “bad” °f ** firS' SeCti°n °f lhis d,ap,er als0 here ““
know.”
8 Y d consistsofan average °f the answer categories “bad” and “don’t
449
The exact wording of the survey question is the following: “Do you believe that theuropean currency will or will not create more jobs?” The following answer categories
were recorded: “will”, “will not” and “don’t know.”
8
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between a Social Democratic Party in power and the government’s preference for
Europe-wide enjoyment measures Thus, in tota, the research design of this section
simultaneously analyses the tmpac, of ,4 dimensions onto the dependent variable.
The information contained in the truth table
of Qualitative Comparative Analysis which
is arrived at by applying the method
is a sophisticated application of two research
tools: (1) Boolean algebra and (2) Mill's methods of i
Boolean algebra, QCA uses it to
nductive inquiry. With regards to
represent information contained in the data sets as one of
.wo logical states: presen, or hue, and (2) absen, or false.
45
' The reduction of,he
richness of the details of each case into these binary codes allows for the discovety of
patterns that are similar as well as Afferent across all cases.
452
To use an abbreviated
example, states that had a high level support for Europe-wide employment measures are
eoded as a “100.” The “I” ind,cates ,he presence of high suppori, and the absence of
medium support and the absence of low support. Along similar lines, the independent
variables are coded for the presence or the absence of the particular dimension. Again, to
use an example, in case 2 which represents Austria, unemployment between the years
1991 and 1995 throughl996 has increased by 6 percentage points. This number of
450
P7er iS °Pera,ionalized <™lyzing the party affiliationhe head ot state, that is depending on the political system of a country either theChancellor or the Prime Minister y
451
see Ragin (1987, 86).
452
This is the case due to the
than for a structured logic.
existence of better optimization algorithms for a two- level logic
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unemployment is coded as a “I" which represents the presence of unemployment
case. To glve a counter example, case 5 that represents ire.ancl, had a decrease of
> .f the level of pubiic op.n.on is eq„a, or above 25%. If the level of pub|ic opmjon j$
below 25%, they are coded as “0 ” ,0. So, for tnstance ,n case 1 , with regard to the question
EU membership is bad
,
the responses were the following: 23% believed that EU
membership was “good" and 50 % believed tha, i, was “bad." Such a spread of
responses across the answer categories is then coded as “0 1 »: absent “good”, absent “ and
present “bad.”
A convention is followed in this section of the dissertation that specifies the
connotation of each variable. Accordingly, d.mensions of a variable tha, are identified as
present, are coded with a “I" and are wrttten in capita,. On the contraty, dimensions of a
variable that are identified as absent are coded with “0" and are written in small letters.
For example, the level of unemployment in case 1 is represented by the letter “A”, while
the level of unemployment in case 5 is represented by the letter “a."
With regard to Mill's method of inductive inquiry, two aspects are of pedicular
importance: the method of agreement and the method of difference.
J 'J
Both are utilized
with the goal of finding the minimal combination of factors that can be said to have had
an impact on the outcome. In the words of George and McKoewn (1985, 27) “both
453
Since it is difficult to determine at what level an increase of unemployment can be
sai to be politically relevant all positive increases of unemployment are coded as 1 Alldecreases of unemployment are coded as 0.
454
For the original reference of Mill’s work see Mill 1843.
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methods utihze the logic of e,
i
m , nation used in sowing a system of simuhaneous
equations: by subtracting factors found across the set ot cases one attempts to solve the
455cases for the critical independent variables.’
Briefly stated, in Mi,., method of agreement, the investigator looks for the
potenttany causa, antecedent condit.ons that are the same between two cases tha, have
the same outcome. For instanrp if rmo ™ce, if one compares case I and case 3 of the truth table
would bring the following result:
Case 1: A b, B2 C, C2 d, D> E
Case 3: a B, B 2 C, C2 d. Eh E
Thus, if we compared the following two cases using Mill, method of agreement,
we would conclude that the variables Efe C, C, d, D2 E are causally related to the
outcome. By applying this logic, one by one, the variables would be ruled out that would
not be held in common, in this limited case, the only variables to single ou, are: A and
B 1 . In this sense, this is a search for patterns of invariance in which all instances of a
phenomenon are identified and then the investigator attempts to detennine which of the
causal variables is constant across all instances.
In Mill's method of difference, the investigator looks for antecedent conditions
that differ between two cases that have different outcomes, and then judges that those
antecedent conditions that were the same despite differing outcomes could not be
455
Foi further discussion see Bennett 1997, George and Bennett (1997a, 2), Hall (2000
6), and Nohlen (1994, 513). For a discussion of the implication of Mill’s logic see
Lijphart (1971, 688), Prezeworski and Teune (1970, 33), and Sartori ( 1 99 1 , 250).
456
see Ragin (1987, 36).
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sufficient ,0 cause either outcome.
457
For instance a comparison of the firs, and the
eighth row would bring the following result:
Case 1: A b, B2 C, C2 d, £>> E
Case 8: A B, b2 C, c 2 d, D2 e
According to this logic, for both cases the following factors with their
complements can be identified: B, B 2 C2 and E. Thus, the next section applies this
method lo all the cases and thereby manages to arrive at a minimal solution. This
minimal solution is the sum-of-produet form and is capable of identifying the minimal
combination of factors that have influenced the Member States in their particular interest
in Europe-wide employment measures.
6.3.1 Statistical Results and Evaluation: Boolean Equation and
Simplification
On the basis of the application of the Boolean and Mill’s logic, the information
contained in the truth table can then be represented as a function of the combination of its
inputs. In the analysis of this chapter, the Boolean function derived horn the truth table
has one output variable with three possible categories and 8 input variables. The input
variables for each one of the categories can be summarized in, what is called, a minterm.
The minterm is a product term, in which each one of the input variables appears exactly
In this sense, Mill’s indirect method of difference basically involves the double
application of the method of agreement in order to establish patterns of invariance across
the cases.
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complemented or not, and is combined with the logical operator “AND " All
product font. The sum-„f-produc, foml consists of a|
, ^ ^ a^ ^
ANDs and connected by OR,« After «he ongina
, sum .of.product^^^
determined, a senes of simplifications can be app|ied „ (he^ m^ ^^
most minimal expression.
For the tnrth table in the appendix, one denves three minterms for each one of the
category of the output variable, that is to say one for the group ofcountr.es tha, had a
U8h SUPP° rt f°r EUr°Pe 'W,de
<>- for the group with medium
suppon and one for the group with low support. These m.ntenns can then be combined
.0 the following sutn-of-produc, form tha, represents the Boo,can func.on 0f this data
set:
g(A, B|, Bt, C,,C2 , D,JD2 , E) = g
g - B2 C, C2 d, Eb E + B, C, D2 + B, B2 C, D2 e
The following section will apply a series of rules of Boolean algebra to simplify
this term. Such a simplification is helpful for extracting the minimal expression ou, of
this term.
458
The ANDs in this case
addition.
represent Boolean multiplication, the ORs represent Boolean
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6.3.1.1 Common Factors for different Groups of Countries
This term can be minimized based on the rules of Boolean algebra
459
By
applying the rule of factoring this equation one derives the following simplified
460
term:
g = C, D2 (B2 C2 d, E + Bi + B, Bn e)
A closer examination of this term leads to the observation that the expression
”C, ft” is in front of the bracket. This means that these two factors had an influence on
the three groups of countries. More specifically, i, can be said that public opinion in all
countries of the EU is characterized by the following two aspects: In all Member States,
the public believed that there should be a common currency. Additionally, public
opinion in all Member States believed that the Economic and Monetary Union will not
create more jobs.
By applying Mill's rule of agreement, one would have to conclude that only these
two factors combined determined the interests of the Member States in developing
Europe
-wide employment measures. Since these factors are common across all the cases,
these would have to be seen as the only causal factors that influenced the outcome.
For a discussion of the most important rules see Ragin (1987, 93-101).
460
For a discussion of this rule see Ragin (1987, 101).
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6.3.1.2 Separate Factors for different Groups of Countries
WMe ,WS reSUl * rePreSe"'S “
-r the one-dimensiona, analysis of
•he ft- section of ,his chapter, however, the analysts would stil , seem incomp|e
,e jf„
woold stop a, this point. While i, is certain!, a meaningful resu„ t0 have identffled fte
factors which have had an influence on all the Member States, i, is still no, clear which
particular comb,nation of factors determined whether a Member State had a htgh level,
medtum, or low level of support. For such an analysis, i, appears useful to apply Mill’s
method of disagreement. Here the search is for the deference of factors across the three
rent groups of countries. Thus, a closer look at the terms inside of the bracket is
illuminating.
When looking more closely a, the terms inside of the bracket, one can observe
that there are three separate terms connected by the addition sign, that is the logical
operator OR. Each one of the terms represents the set of factors that influenced the level
of interest of each group of countries. Put in other words, each term represents the
combination of conditions that detennined whether a Member State had a high level of
support, a medium level of a low level of support. The most important factors to be
extracted out from each term are the ones tha, are complementary across the thr ee groups
of countries. Here one factor can clearly be identified: Whether or not the government
belonged to a Social Democratic party had a very important influence on the position of
the Member State. As can be seen inside of the bracket of the equation, the first teim has
an “E", while the third tenn has an “e.” This comparison clearly indicates the following:
while the first group of countries had a Social Democratic government and had a high
support for Europe-wide employment measures, the third group of countries did not have
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a Socia. Democratic government and only had a low level of support for tl,ese
.treasures.
This complementary correlation of input and output variable is indicative of a strong
influence of the factor Social Democratic government.
Thus, in sum the most important factor that detemtined the specific level of
interest of the Member States is the following: (I) whether or no, the government of the
Member State belonged to a Social Democratic party. This factor is clearly
complementary across the group of countries that had a high level of support and the
group of countries that had a low level of support.
6.3. 1.3 Common Factors for common Groups of Countries
Apart from the factors that are common across all cases and the complementary
factors across the groups of countries, it is useful to also look at the specific factors that
each group of country is characterized by. When analyzing the group of countries that
had a high level of support, it is striking to note that a large number of factors come into
play. In addition to the ones already mentioned, this group of countries was also
influenced by the following two factor: The belief that EMU will not create jobs can be
said to have been even stronger in this group of countries than in any other group of
countries. The variable “d| ” is indicative of the absence of the belief that EMU will
create jobs. The other groups of countries had mixed results in this answer category, and
therefore did not record such a strong perception.
When analyzing the group of countries that had a medium level of support for
Europe -wide employment measures, the following observation can be made: very few
additional conditions, apart from the ones in common with the other groups of countries,
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had ,o be fulfilled «o detetmine its output. facf, i„ this group 0fcounts
„n|y^
'adder variable can be seen as having had an impac, on the p0s, tion of the^
S,,es. This variable ,s whrch represents fhe public, percept™ that member.,
p
in the European Union is “good.”
F.na,ly, when a„a,yzi„g ,he group of counfries ,ha, had a low level of supped for
Europe
-wide employment measures, the following observation can be made: this group
orcountries is influenced by the combination of more factors than the group of countries
w,.h a medium level of support. Nevertheless,
,, is clearly influenced by a smaller
number of factors than the group of countries tha, had a high level of supped for Europe .
wide employment measures. Apart from the vanables already discussed, i, ,s worth
mentioning tha, in variable IT. that is the assessment of EU membership, the public
opinion in this group of countries was equally polarized as the group of countries tha, had
a high level of support for the employment measures. Also in the group of countries that
had a low level of support was there a large portion of the population tha, fel, tha.EU
membership was '-good," while at the same time there was a large portion of the
population which felt that EU membership was “bad.”
6.3.2 Discussion
The findings of this study suggest that the level of interest of the Member States
in Europe-wide employment measures can be explained by utilizing the research tools
available in the Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Such a research approach allows one
to analyze the particular combination of factors that have had an impac, on the outcome.
In the specific application of this research tool to this chapter, QCA is relevant since it
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*WS *he ana 'ySiS °f "K Un,que ***» «* have contributed towards tbe
particular level of interest of tbe Member States in Europe-wide employmem measures.
Wh.le the previous section was no. able to explain the level of interest in the three
clusters of countries with its
-dimensional research design, thr. section is actually able
.c illuminate the combination of factors tha, have contributed towards the formation of
these groups of countries, by analyzing the combination of factors through an apphcation
of QCA. this section, the clustenng ofcounh.es by the level of interest m Europe-
Wide employment measures can be seen to be a taction of the combination of input
variables. A detailed discussion of the three groups of countnes brings forward several
observations.
The group of countries that had a high level of support for Europe
-wide
employment measures was characterized by four aspects: First, public opinion was highly
polarized over the issue of the appropriate level of political authority that should deal
with currency policy. In this issue area the perception of the public pushed in two
extreme directions, wanting both a common currency as well as a “national” one.
Second, added to the precariousness of this polarization, is a strong perception
that the membership in the European Union is “bad” for one's country. Third, further
more to fuel the pressures on the governments, was the perception that EMU will not
create more jobs. Fourth, given both the polarization as well as the negative perception,
the Social Democratic governments, of the countries in this group of countries, had a veiy
snong incentive foi a high demand of Europe-wide employment measures. Through such
measures it would be able to address several of the large groups of the domestic public:
all the ones that felt membership was “bad”, and the ones that believed that EMU will not
330
create jobs. Thus, the pressures on the governments translated into a need to
country, and that while EMU might no, create more jobs by itself, the Member States
w„h the Community together would start a conceded effort to create more jobs through
other means. Thus, in this constellate of factors the Europe-wide employment
measures were no. only a natural preference of the Social Democratic governments
w„hin this group of countries, bur i, was also politically prudent for the governments in
order to gain support for EU membership from the public a, large, while mitigating the
negative effects of the perception that EMU will no. create more jobs. Put in slightly
more provocative terms, the governments of this group of countries had to convince its
public tha, the EU is increasingly going to evolve into a political system that will be more
comparable to the political system a, home in terms of active labor market policies and a
balance between economic and social goals. Within such a system, not only should more
domestic benefits begin to accrue, bur also the creation of more jobs will be a priority.
The employment chapter became the crucial item with which such a message could be
conveyed to the domestic public.
The group of countries that had a medium level of support for Europe
-wide
employment measures can largely be characterized by two aspects: First, there was a
strong perception in this group of countries that EMU will not create more jobs. So while
the public of these countries strongly supported a common currency, there must have
been quite a level of concern of the negative impact of EMU on the labor market.
Second, however, this group of countries is also characterized by a high level of public
perception that membership in the European Union is “good.” In this sense, the
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governments in this group of counby were faced with a pub„c that a|ready^^^
current division of policy competences was beneficial for one’s country.
Thus, given this constellation of factors i, is no, s„,prising that this group of
countries ne.ther spearheaded the efforts of creating strong Europe-wide employment
measures nor did this group very strongly oppose these efforts. The pressure engage in
either activity was no, present. The public was both content with the benefits it gained
from being a member of the European Union and while it was concerned that EMU will
no, create more jobs, i, still did no, oppose the common currency. Again pu, in slightly
more provocative terms, the Member States in this group of countries by and large were
agreeable to Europe-wide employment measures as long as these measures would not go
considerably beyond the scope of supranational involvement as set out in the Essen
conclusions. Thus, for this group of countries to interested in stronger Europe-wide
employment measures the other actors would have to show that there was an added value
to be gained by coordinating this issue area jointly.
Finally, the group of countries that had a low level of support for Europe-wide
employment measures can largely be characterized by two aspects: First, in this group of
countries, the public was also polarized over the question if membership was “good” or
bad. While there clearly is a stronger tendency for the perception that membership is
good
,
the polarization is indicative of the contentiousness of issue. Given both of these
pressures as well as the risks ol alienating a large portion of the population through
further actions on the European Union level, the governments in this group of countries
had all the incentives to not push for an extension of further competences in the realm of
employment policy.
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Second, this incentive was even stronger since, the public in these countries also
strongly supported a cotnnton currency. Thus, father Integra,,™,
,„ the econonuc reahn
was guaranteed to be accepts to the public, wh„e no concessions needed to be nrade in
.he reahn of social and employment policy. This was the case despite the fact tha, the
pubhc in these countries was skeptical tha, EMU wil. create more jobs. So, similar to the
second group of countries, also in this group, it is not surprising that the governments
were reluctant to be in favor of Europe
-wide employment measures. Already, a large
portion of the public fel, that its counhy was benefiting from being a member of the EU
and the portion tha, believed i, was no, benefiting most likely was seen to be father
alienated with any policy agreements tha, would push add.tional competences to the
Community level. So for the governments in this group of countries, increasing the
employment policy competences of the Community was no, seen as a move by which i,
would be able to increase the public's positive assessment being a member of the
European Union. With no added value, the risk of alienating a highly skeptical portion of
the population was a risk the governments were not prepared to take.
Thus, the pressures on the governments did not create incentives for strongly
demanding Europe
-wide employment measures, as it would not be immediately clear to
the public what added value such measures would bring. In this constellation of factors
the low level of support for Europe-wide employment measures was not only a natural
preference of the non-Social Democratic governments within this group of countries, but
it also appeared to be politically prudent for the governments in order diffuse the
polarization over question on which level the fight of unemployment should be
conducted. Pit in slightly more provocative terms, the governments of this group of
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was good, while the extension of EU competences in the area of employment wou,d
only have to,her alienaied a large portion of the public which already was skeptical
abou, EU membership, bu, i, would also have been difficult to combine with most of the
non-socia, democratic party pia.fonns of the governments which belonged to tins group
of countries.
6.4 Summary
The implication of the findings of this study is that the individual level of interest
of the Member States in the area of Europe-wide employment policy can be explained by
simultaneously analyzing the level of public opinion in several dimensions a, a time: (1
)
the assessment of EU membership, (2) the opposition to a common currency, (3) the
assessment of impact of EMU on job creation, and (4) party affiliation of government in
power. This finding fits well with John Kingdons’ (1995, 179) observation when he
writes that “generally the rise of an item [on the agenda) is due to the joint effects of
several factors coming together at a given point in time, not the effect of one or another
of them singly.”
The focus on the non-linearity of composite factors is useful in understanding the
particular set of circumstances that has influenced the level of interest of the Member
States for Europe-wide employment measures. Neither the mere presence of one factor at
a time, (such as a high level of unemployment) nor simply one dimension of public
opinion can explain the different level of interest Member States in Europe- wide
employment measures. Instead the explanatory variable can be seen in the specific
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combination of the relevant faetors. This empirical finding fits weli wi ,h Bllmk>s^
427, observation who pointed on, that “not all of polities can be understood from a
traditional Imea, peispective where the magnitude of a cause is directly proportional to
.he magnitude of its effects.” The challenge then is design research methods which are
capable of exploring the contribution of specific combinations of factors to particular
outcomes.
In the course of the analysis in this chapter two bundles of factors appeared to
have had a panicular strong effect. The first bundle represents the factors that are
common across all the groups of countries. Two factors had an tnfiuence on the three
groups of countries. In all Member States there was a strong demand for a common
currency as well as a strong belief that the common currency will no, create more jobs.
The second bundle of factors represents the factors that are different across all the
groups of countries. Most notably among these factors is the party-affiliation of the
government. The parties of the governments in the group of countries that had the
highest level of support for Europe-wide employment measures all were Social
Democratic parties. In the contrast, the parties of the governments in the group of
countries that had the lowest level of for such measures were all non-social democratic
panties. A similar dichotomy can be said to exist over the assessment of EU
membership. The public in the group of countries with a high level of support believed
that EU membership was “bad” for one’s country. In contrast, in the group of countries
that had a medium or low level of support the public either believed that EU membership
was “good” or the issue was at least a contentious one, that is to say a large portion of the
population believed that membership was “good,” while a slightly smaller portion
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beHeved tha, it was “bad.'- Thus, together, these two comp,emen,ary bund!es
^
',aVe inm‘enCed “,e level °f the Member States in Eumpe-wide
employment measures, within the context of the other, slightly less important factors.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Huropean institutions have in recent years increased their competence in the field
o( employment policy. Between the Essen summit of 1994 and the Lisbon summit of
2000, the European Commission and the Member States developed the European
Employment Strategy and, in so doing, transformed the way employment policy is made
in the European Union. Designed to alleviate the high levels of unemployment and low
rates of employment that existed throughout Europe in the early 1990s, the strategy has
given EU institutions an important role in defining the guidelines for national
employment policy, coordinating the formulation of national plans, monitoring the
implementation and impact of those plans, and inducing the Member States to achieve the
targets developed in the guidelines and plans while leaving the actual formulation and
implementation of policy in the hands of the member states.
At the core of this dissertation is the aim of identifying the factors and forces that
caused the timing, the form and the content of the employment chapter that was included
in the Tieaty of Amsterdam. The central claim developed in this dissertation is that the
inclusion of the employment chapter in the Amsterdam Treaty was decisively influenced
by the activities of the European Commission. Acting as a two-level entrepreneur, the
Commission managed to ratchet up support for its policy preferences. In particular, the
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Commission's ability to utilize asymmetrical control over informational and ideational
resources was critical in that it allowed the Commission facilitate the gradual
representation of previously latent interests within the Member States and thereby
indirectly pressured the Member States to endorse the Europe-wide employment
measures.
The single-case study, the central part of this dissertation, focused on the
developments that led to the adoption of the employment chapter in the Amsterdam
Treaty. In this context the Post- Maastricht crisis was identified as having had a
tremendous impact on the Commission by forcing it to reshape both its policy focus as
well as its policy style. A detailed analysis of the consequences of the following four
factors was presented: the British opt-out of the Social Protocol, the ratification
difficulties of the Maastricht Treaty, the subsidiarity debate, and increasing levels of
unemployment during the early 1990s. As a consequence of the different aspects of the
post- Maastricht debate, the Commission as well as the DG Employment and Social
Affairs felt that it had to re-adjust its policy focus and policy style. Most importantly, a
clearer emphasis was needed on the role of the European Union in serving the citizens.
As Patrick Venturing a fonner Counselor in DG Employment and Social Affairs,
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mentioned during an interview in February 2001
461
“p7 1 , Europe needed to show that it was
there for the citizens.”
462
In .he analysis of the decision-making process leading towards the inclusion of
.he employment chapter in the Amsterdam Treaty, particular attention was paid to the
resources and strategies employed by the European Commission. The main conclusion
drawn from this case-study is that three resources of the Commission were particularly
crucial for its ability to influence the outcome of multilateral negotiations: First, the
institutional location of the Commission gave
,, greater flextbility and latitude and
.hereby allowed 1, to draw up policy proposals that were capable of representing crucial
domestic interests in the Member States. Additionally, this position allowed the
Commission to draft policy proposals that in effect represent a synthesized compromise
position among the Member States that was clearly above the lowest common
denominator.
Second, the receptiveness of the Council Presidency crucially enabled the
Commission to influence the outcome of the multilateral negotiations among the Member
States. Especially the cooperation with the Irish as well as the Dutch Presidencies were
Vital for the ability of the Commission as an exogenous force to influence the multilateral
negations. For instance, the Irish Presidency chose to adopt as the main draft proposal of
461
„ ^
worth noting that Patrick Venturini formerly was a researcher at the
Confederation Franqaise Democratique due Travail (CFDT) as well as a close advisor of
Jacques Delors on social affairs between 1987 and 1995. Currently he is the SecretaryGeneral cf the Economic and Social Committee.
462
Peisonal interview with Patrick Venturini in Brussels on February 19, 2001.
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the employment chapter the proposal submitted by the Commission
rejected the proposal made by the Council Secretariat.
Third, the Commission was
when it can credibly be viewed to
and thereby clearly
seen to be able to exert pressure onto Member States
represent critical domestic interests. The
representation of the concerns over unemployment in Europe, gave the Commission a
posinon of strength from which it was able to influence the po.icy-shaptng as well as
policy-setting decisions and thereby critically influence the content of the employment
chapter
.ha, was ultimately inc luded in the Amsterdam Treaty. In the las, phase of the
ireaty negotiations. Member States could no, afford to be seen by their respective publics’
as no, supporting a Europe-wide initiative for more employment. Amidst high levels of
unemployment, a commitment of Member States towards Economic and Monetary
Union, and a strong belief of the public in all the Member States that EMU will not create
more jobs, the European Union, jus, as much as the Member States had to communicate
to the European people that it was indeed, nevertheless, representing the interests of the
European people. The employment chapter became the crucial item in the Amsterdam
Treaty by which such a message could be conveyed.
The conclusion of this dissertation fits with the observation made by a number of
scholars who have pointed out that even though the EU institutions had no fonnal right to
participate m the final negotiation the documents submitted by them were “important in
structuring the discussions both in the Reflection Group and in the IGC in general.”
463
For instance Sverdrup (2000, 256) argues that the “European Commission devoted
For this argument for instance see Sverdrup (2000,256).
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s.gmficam administrative resources to monitoring and influencing
established a special task force, headed by Michel Petit
responsibility “to collect, sort, rank, and reintetpret the
the IGC;” it
was given the
position papers presented by the
member states" and "the members of which enjoyed a high level of legitimacy in EU
circles. Along stmtlar hues Lodge has observed that (1998b, 485) the priorities of the
agenda of the IGC “had been determined in a different context and as part of the normal
process of agenda-setting and legislative pnontization in the EU via the work of the
Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament "
The explanation developed in this dissertation differs from the common
explanations one finds in the literature. The discussion in chapter 6 demonstrated that
those factors identified in Ihe literature as having had an influence on the Member States'
level of interest for the development of Europe-wide employment measures cannot be
substantiated by the data. When tested empirically, none of the single explanations put
forward in the literature seem to be well enough equipped to account for the funicular
level of interest of the Member States. The analysis demonstrated that there was no
connection between the changes in the level of unemployment and the level of interest of
the Membei States in Europe-wide employment measures.
A similar conclusion can be made when analyzing the strength with which the
public in all Member States believed that EU membership was “bad” for one’s country.
The level of the public’s support for EU membership did not lead to a consistent pattern
that would be helpful in predicting the level of interest of the Member States. In fact, on
the contrary, the relationship overall was seen to have a negative association.
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And, also for .he opposition to a common currency, again no consistent patten,
can be discenred in the d„a. Additionally. also here a reeiproca, connection exists
between the level of opposition and the level of interest of the Men, her States for Europe-
wide employment measures.
The empirical findings of this analysis suggestion that the way public op.nion
influences the level of interest of Member States is more complex and multifaceted,
instead of assuming tha, the level of interest of the Member States in Europe-wide
employment measures was influenced by only one dimension of public opinion a, a time
I might make more sense to anticipate that the specific combination of the different
dimensions could have had an impact on the level of interest of the Member States.
Using the method of the Quanta,ive Comparative Approach, the combination of the
following dimensions have been found to be relevant for the level of interest of the
Member States: (
I , the assessment of EU membership, (2 ) the opposition to a common
currency, (3 ) the assessment of impact of EMU on job creation, and (4) party affiliation
of government in power. This finding fits well with John Kingdons’
( 1995 , 179)
observation when he writes that “generally the nse of an item [on the agenda] is due to
the joint effects of several factors coming together at a given point in time, not the effect
of one or another of them singly.”
Given the high levels of unemployment in Europe, combined with the strong
public perception in all the Member States that EMU will not create more jobs, and yet
given the commitment of the governments towards EMU, the Commission found itself
with the unique opportunity: by representing the public’s concern over the issue of
unemployment, it was able to exert tremendous pressure on the governments to agree on
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he employment chapter In the Amsterdam Treat
, A^ proposa
,^^
European effon of reducing unemp.oymen, wou.d have not been politica„y .
it was also true to a large degree for the
joined the EU (Sweden, Austria and Finland), but
Member States that initial* had only a medtum interest in Europe-wide employment
measures. With the successful intervention of the Commission, the final agreement
reached was certainly, much above the level of the common demmmator. Wonted about
.he public's disapproval of a treaty without a clear reference to employment policy.
Member States were pushed by the Commission towards a strong treaty-based
commitment for a common Europe-wide employment strategy.
The findings of this dissenation are theoretically, methodologically and politically
relevant. Theoretically and methodologically, existing studtes on the influence of the
Commission on the outcome of multi-lateral negotiations most often do not follow a
rigorous theoretical evaluation. The lack of concrete theories and decisive empirical tests
makes the results of many of these studies neither unambiguously true nor available as a
basts from which to predict policy outcomes in similar situations. The findings of this
dissertation go beyond these limitations by carefully building up a strong theoretical
foundation, based on a combination of existing heuristic approaches drawn from policy
analysis as well as two level entrepreneurship model. The hypothesis derived from these
approaches are empirically tested both with the help of qualitative as well as quantitative
research methods.
As such, the finding of this dissertation is a contribution to the most fundamental
puzzle confronting those who seek to understand European integration, namely to explain
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how stalemate the decision-making process of the European Union was overcome
dunng the Amsterdam Treaty negotiates and why Member States ultima,eiy agreed
include the employment chapter in the final treaty.
Politically, the findings of this research are relevant for two reasons: First, the
study demonstrates how exogenous forces in the form of a supranational policy
entrepreneur, whose forma! role is limited and vastly overshadowed by its informal
influence, is able to so effectively orchestrate a su,prising amount of influence over the
outcome of multi-lateral negotiations. They successfully help overcome organizational,
representational and accummulational failures in the intrastate bargaining process by
stirring up activity which facilitates the manifestation of previously latent interests and
thereby enables Member States to overcome ponderous deadlocks.
Second, this is a contribution towards the debates about the future of social
Europe, The discussion about European integration and the European Model, which this
thests thereby joins, is not simply restricted to scholars and experts. It is a central topic
of public debate in all Member States of the European Union, as much as i, is a point of
discussion on the level of the Union itself. This dissertation aims a, contributing to an
understanding of the European Union's public policy efforts that attempt to reduce
unemployment. An analytical and empirical research that examines if any of the policy
tools have wcrked and to wha, effect will not only be a substantial contribution bu, also
will be very timely. Such research could possibly address which additional measures the
European Union may need to take, in order to attain its stated goals in the realm of social
policy.
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